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ABSTRACT 
This work focuses on tracing the animating ethos of Charles Brockden Brown’s 
intriguing but confusing novels through close attention to the texts and to the richly 
complex historical environment from which they emerge and to which they respond.  In 
several non-novelistic writings, including prefaces, letters, essays, and reviews, Brown 
insists that the value of narratives, whether fictional or historical, lies in their effects in 
the realm of the ethical; it “lies without doubt in their moral tendency.”  But Brown’s 
narratives go beyond inculcating a moral system; indeed, as I aim to show in my analyses 
of the novels Wieland and Ormond, each marked by Gothic sensationalism and 
psychological realism, Brown’s narratives function to challenge the ethics of ethics, to 
subject ideas to reality-grounded counterfactual scenarios so as to expose the humanity 
and justice or lack thereof of moral systems.  Brown’s relentless skepticism coupled with 
his deep-seated concern for moral responsibility, I argue, speaks to problematic formal 
features of the narratives as well.  That is, I want to argue that the novels’ resistance to a 
totalizing explanatory construct serves to prompt a mode of continuous critical 
engagement, a living practice of attentive reading that is, when transposed into the realm 
of interpersonal relations, the active awareness and ethical regarding of the other in its 
true otherness.  As such, the novels’ very weirdness—their inconclusiveness, incongruity, 
and contradictions, in content and form; that which I suggest is best understood as their 
grotesqueness; that which commands attention and resists assimilation—serves an ethical 
end. 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction 
When Charles Brockden Brown’s first novel Wieland; or, The Transformation: 
An American Tale was published in New York City on September 14, 1798, the 
proprietor of Hocquet Caritat’s Circulating Library, Bookshop, and Reading Rooms 
would have given the work pride of place.1  M. Caritat was, after all, the novel’s 
publisher.2  He was also, not coincidentally, the creator of the largest, most diverse 
bookstore and library in the young United States.  Both endeavors were driven by the 
same motivation.  An émigré from Revolutionary France, Caritat was striving to spread 
the revolutionaries’ principles through nurturing a republic of the intellect, a collectivity 
of minds meeting and relating through the medium of the printed word.  It was a clear 
vision that he pursued with a principled dedication and a pragmatic decisiveness.  He 
would later secure the rights to Brown’s next novel Ormond; or, The Secret Witness 
(1799) even before Wieland’s profitability had been ascertained.  And through his 
influence in the book trade, he would help insure the publication of the rest of Brown’s 
novels, including Arthur Mervyn; or, Memoirs of the Year 1793 (part 1 [1799], part 2 
[1800]) and Edgar Huntly; or, Memoirs of a Sleep-Walker (1799).  These efforts in the 
promotion of Gothic novels, stories of spontaneous combustion, female warriors, 
Illuminati plotters, and somnambulistic Indian-fighters, may seem disconnected from his 
lofty Enlightenment goals.  Moreover, in the intervening years since their appearance on 
the shelves, Brown’s novels have gathered to themselves a reputation for being, in a 
word, odd.  They are works that provoke contrary readings and reactions among readers 
and within them, just as they portray in meticulous detail the shaky perceptions and 
startling reactions of severely conflicted characters.  They are works that invite and resist 
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comparison, even as they take as one of their themes the problematic of resemblance and 
otherness.  But they are works that spark dialogue.  As such, they are right in line with 
Caritat’s project.  And for twenty-first century readers, separated by over two hundred 
years from the heady and tempestuous 1790s, peering into Caritat’s establishment, with 
its flow of people, languages, ideas, and print commodities, may offer a useful glimpse of 
the creative-intellectual and political-economic context from which Brown’s novels 
emerge and—importantly—to which they respond.  
Opening his doors in the spring of 1797, the resourceful Caritat quickly 
established himself as an influential figure in the business of books with an ecumenical 
approach to the young nation’s diverse reading habits: he catered to all tastes. 3  In his 
published catalogue, he assures prospective buyers and subscribers that his stock will be 
kept “upon an increasing Plan, [ . . . ] so that there may be a probability that most of the 
Books wanted by the inhabitants of this Country will be found in H. Caritat’s 
Collections” (216).  To make good on this promise he regularly sent to London for the 
latest and most popular titles, occasionally traveling there himself and returning in a ship 
weighted down with his acquisitions.  A great many of these imported goods were novels 
in the Gothic mode, the specialty of London’s infamous and immensely successful 
Minerva Press, for which Caritat was an authorized distributor in the U. S.  Despite the 
moans of critics and moralists, the fans of dark adventure and ghoulish frights on both 
sides of the Atlantic consumed en masse the lurid wares of William Lane’s publishing 
house, which is now best remembered for producing six of the seven Northanger Horrid 
Novels, the Gothic must-reads recommended to the impressionable heroine of Jane 
Austen’s parodic Northanger Abbey (written1803, published 1818).4  Caritat was far 
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from negligent in his attentions to this lucrative market and to its predominantly female 
readership.  As one contemporary put it: 
 His talents were not meanly cultivated by letters; he could tell a good 
book from a bad one, which few modern librarians can do.  But place aux 
dames was his maxim, and all the ladies of New-York declared that the 
library of Mr. Caritat was charming.  Its shelves could scarcely sustain the 
weight of Female Frailty, the Posthumous Daughter, and the Cavern of 
Woe; they required the aid of the carpenter to support the burden of the 
Cottage-on-the-Moor, the House of Tynian, and the Castles of Athlin and 
Dunbayne; or they groaned under the multiplied editions of the Devil in 
Love, More Ghosts, and Rinaldo Rinaldini.  Novels were called for by the 
young and the old; from the tender virgin of thirteen, whose little heart 
went pit-a-pat at the approach of a beau; to the experienced matron of 
three score, who could not read without spectacles. (John Davis 186-7)5  
This admiring yet gently mocking sketch appears in the travel narrative of Englishman 
John Davis, an aspiring young writer who, like Brown, found in Caritat a publisher, and a 
shrewd one at that, a pioneer in the new business of letters.  Davis records that when he 
approached Caritat for career advice, the canny businessman forthrightly told him, “I 
should be happy to serve you, but I have not the hypocrisy to pretend that my offers of 
service are disinterested: interest blends itself with all human actions, and you, sir, have it 
in your power to be useful to me” (19-20).  He soon afterward undertook the distribution 
of Davis’s The Original Letters of the Unfortunate Lovers, Ferdinand and Elisabeth 
(1798), a transcription of the intimate correspondence between the star-crossed couple at 
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the center of a sensational Manhattan murder-suicide case from the winter before.  Of the 
book tradesman, Davis declares, “Few men knew better how to gratify present curiosity” 
(26).   
“The Feast of Reason and the Flow of the Soul” 
Caritat’s dealing in such fare carried the potential to offend some self-appointed 
critics of popular taste.  The final decade of the eighteenth century saw increased 
attention to and anxiety over the politics of print culture.  With the expansion of 
production, the greater quantity and diversity of publishers and authors, and the more 
wide-spread availability of printed materials through circulating libraries and cheaper 
books (courtesy of technological improvements), commentators engaged in a culture war 
that pitted elitist Federalists against populist Jeffersonians.  In this often heated discourse 
about the proper function of literature in the early American republic, Federalists voiced 
resistance to the democratization of print culture, which promoted the production and 
consumption of literary diversions rather than works of more practical value.  As 
Matthew Pethers explains, these advocates of civic humanism argued that literature 
should have the serious social function “to guide the self-interested masses toward a 
synoptic understanding of the universe” (584).  But even useful books were produced at a 
volume that alarmed some.  The increased specialization enabled by and in a sense made 
necessary by the profusion of informative works contravened the republican ideal of 
assimilating all knowledge into a useful, comprehensive system for the benefit and 
advancement of the nation as a civic body.  In contrast, the Jeffersonians held that the 
freedom to follow one’s interests meant all should have access to the print culture, as 
producers and consumers, even if that results in a messy proliferation that thwarts the 
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civic ideal of attaining a practical omniscience.  The Jeffersonians generally favored the 
Smithian idea of “the benefits of rational self-interest” and saw in the democratization of 
print culture the proto-Romantic ideal of imaginative literature serving to express 
personal identity and spiritual insight (587).  As an author of fiction and later as editor of 
a literary magazine, Brown of course was not untouched by this controversy.  Striking a 
defensive posture in a number of writings, including the essays “Novel-Reading” and 
“The Difference between History and Romance,” he directly engages the opponents of 
imaginative literature.  Caritat, too, wrote in favor of novel-reading, but remained on 
good terms with partisans on both sides in the culture war.   
His success may have much to do with the fact that he did not deal solely in 
sensational works intended to warm hearts or to chill blood.  A look at his 1799 catalogue 
evinces his ambition to not only serve the sentimental young girls and myopic 
grandmothers Davis caricaturizes but also to gain the patronage of the high-minded 
moralists, philosophers, and scientists, those who studied law, medicine, history, and 
politics.  Although nearly half his listed offerings aimed at triggering readers’ affective 
responses, drawing sighs and raising goose bumps, much of the rest sought to engage 
readers’ rational faculties, holding out the promise of intellectual stimulation and moral 
elevation.  But even works of amusement he presented in terms of their practical 
advantages, extolling their use as aids in acquiring a new language.  Thus, for the 
thoughtful reader Caritat offered “approved books in English, French, Spanish, Greek, 
Latin, etc. in all arts and sciences,” as the title of a later catalogue announced.  The title of 
his first catalogue, The Feast of Reason and the Flow of the Soul, should serve to suggest 
that Davis’s portrait of the popular Broadway bookshop gives us only a partial view.  Just 
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beyond those shelves sagging under volumes of sensationalism and sentiment are other 
shelves shouldering the weighty arguments and philosophical inquiries of Locke, 
Montesquieu, Condorcet, Rousseau, and Reid; the socio-political subversions of Godwin, 
Paine, and Wollstonecraft; the medico-scientific texts of Erasmus Darwin, Boerhaave, 
Priestley, and Rush; the ideologically-charged historiographies of Burke and Volney; and 
many other works extolled in the “explanatory catalogue” for their utility, wit, taste, 
learnedness, and “correct language,” including the biographies of statesmen, the treatises 
of clergymen, translations of classical texts, essays by various learned men and women, 
exotic travelogues, and the more widely-respected belletristic productions, such as those 
by Shakespeare, Addison, Pope, Johnson, and Goldsmith.  Patrons could also find 
newspapers and journals, both domestic and foreign.  As such, it is easy to see why, as 
one scholar puts it, “his rooms became a regular retreat and gathering place for New 
Yorkers of intellectual and literary bent” (Grabo “Historical Essay” 458). 
One of those intellectual, literary New Yorkers was of course the Philadelphia 
native Charles Brockden Brown, who by the late summer of 1798 had spent a decade in 
desultory pursuit of a literary career.  While still a teenager and an apprentice in a 
Philadelphia law office, Brown saw his work, including a series of Rousseauistic essays 
(“The Rhapsodist”) and a poem on the death of Benjamin Franklin, published in 
newspapers.  But after abandoning his law career in 1793, he spent the next five years 
starting and stopping several projects.  A remarkably frenetic period of publication began 
when his first book Alcuin, a philosophical dialogue on the rights of women, appeared in 
the spring of 1798.  Around this time he was contributing essays, literary reviews, short 
fiction, an excerpt of a now-lost novel, and nine chapters of what would become his third 
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novel Arthur Mervyn to Philadelphia’s Weekly Magazine.6   In July of that year Brown 
began an extended stay in New York, settling into the apartment of his friends William 
Johnson, a lawyer, and Elihu Hubbard Smith, a physician.  It was Smith who soon after 
Brown’s arrival brought the not-yet-complete manuscript of Wieland to Caritat.7  
Given Caritat’s ambition to serve those of all literary tastes, it is not surprising 
that the work of the relatively untried twenty-seven year old Brown would pique the 
interest of the canny salesman and dedicated idealist.  In an advertisement for his lost 
novel, Brown had laid out a literary agenda that paralleled the republican hopes of 
Caritat.  The author’s aim, he declared, was to present to the public a work that would 
keep the attention of those who normally seek only amusement, “the idle and 
thoughtless,” while also winning the homage of “those who study and reflect.”  He 
insisted that despite the perceived divide between popular and serious works “a 
contexture of facts capable of suspending the faculties of every soul in curiosity may be 
joined with depth of views into human nature and all the subtleties of reasoning” 
(“Notice” 202).  The goal of reaching a diverse readership would have certainly resonated 
with Brown’s future publisher.  Brown’s novel seemed to offer in one package just the 
sort of thing Caritat hoped his customers—all his customers—might appreciate.  For 
those who longed for excessive passions and lurid thrills Wieland promised spontaneous 
combustion, a homicidal maniac, and a villainous ventriloquist, all folded into a story 
ripped from the headlines.  And for readers of more “serious” fare, the novel exhibits a 
broad historical and geopolitical allusiveness and explores a number of issues that 
occupied the influential thinkers of the late Enlightenment, including the effects of 
environment on human behavior, the clashing epistemologies of rationalism and revealed 
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religion, the benefits and liabilities of self-determination, as well as the scientific and 
philosophical import of some intriguing, paradigm-challenging curiosities.  Moreover, for 
American readers of all stripes who were eager to cultivate a national cultural identity, 
here was a home-made production set in an American locale and concerned with 
American (albeit colonial American) characters. 
Despite whatever hopes Caritat may have had regarding the work and its function 
in a desired republic of intellect, Brown’s novel elicited little notice from book buyers 
and, at best, a mixed reaction among critics.  All indications are that sales of the novel 
were poor; there would be no second printing of Wieland in Brown’s lifetime.  Of the 
handful of reviews, a few were mostly positive, several were decidedly less so.  
Appreciation would come years later, among British literary lights Percy Shelley, John 
Keats, William Godwin (returning Brown’s), and Mary Shelley, whose Frankenstein and 
The Last Man exhibit Brown’s influence.  American authors James Fenimore Cooper, 
John Neal, Edgar Allan Poe, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Margaret Fuller, John Greenleaf 
Whittier, and George Lippard would cite Brown as an important literary progenitor.  But 
even among these, Brown’s accomplishment seemed to lie in his works’ exertion of a 
certain shadowy power rather than in their beauty.  It was, in a way that appealed to the 
subversive sensibilities of the dark Romantics, a power not to entertain and enlighten but 
to possess and unsettle.  And yet in the narrative of American literary history, developing 
in the writings of such commentators as Fuller, Poe, and the Duyckinck brothers, Brown 
remained a cipher.  Although he is the only American author placed in Hawthorne’s 
imagined Hall of Fantasy, his bust lay off by itself in “an obscure and shadowy niche” 
(735). 
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When juxtaposed with the other books and periodicals on the shelves at Caritat’s 
library, Brown’s works show most fully their simultaneous likeness to and difference 
from a number of antecedents.  With their mélange of bizarre and terrifying events, 
emotional intensities, and explicit engagements with socio-political and philosophical 
issues, Wieland and its three immediate successors were like no other novels written on 
this side of the Atlantic before Brown.8  But any number of Caritat’s patrons, upon 
perusing these, his major novels, would have found something instantly familiar if also 
off-putting in the books’ pages nonetheless.  Brown built his complex narratives by 
drawing from a variety of source materials, both popular and elite literatures, both factual 
and fictive.  In the case of Wieland, the horrific crime and the two “extraordinary and 
rare” incidents that are his first novel’s most memorable features are, as Brown points out 
in footnotes, founded in fact.  From a newspaper item Brown took the shocking, bloody 
deeds committed by his title character.  The strange and mysterious death of Wieland’s 
father is modeled on one reported in “one of the Journals of Florence” and reprinted in a 
Philadelphia newspaper.  And the prodigious power attributed to the enigmatic Carwin 
resembles the subject of the Abbé de la Chapelle’s Le Ventriloque, ou l’engastimythe 
(The Ventriloquist; or, The Belly-talker [1772]), which is referenced in the entry for 
ventriloquism in an American reprint of the Encyclopedia Britannica.9  But even for 
those unfamiliar with these sources, there was of course a more obvious lineage.  As 
works of imaginative literature Wieland and the other major novels exhibit, at least at 
first blush, those conventional formal and affective properties most commonly associated 
with the sensationalist fiction of the era.  In their mystery, terrifying suspense, and flashes 
of horror, Brown’s novels are recognizably part of the well-established European literary 
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phenomenon the Gothic, whose popularity was reaching a crescendo with the recent 
publications of Ann Radcliffe’s bestsellers The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794) and The 
Italian (1797) and Matthew G. Lewis’s succès de scandale The Monk (1796).  
Undoubtedly, Brown’s major fictions and these imports share some common generic 
elements.  Each puts forth convoluted and disjointed narratives involving the supernatural 
or the semblance of the supernatural in a seeming breakdown of common sense reality; 
each features a libidinous villain terrorizing virtuous victims; and each uses picturesque 
locales and ominous interior spaces to emotive and thematic purpose.  Given, however, 
the diverse uses to which such narrative elements were being put, it is not sufficient to 
simply assert that Brown transplanted the Gothic novel to American soil.  Readers then, 
as now, well knew that dark melodramas came in different shades.   
Gothic fiction, although arguably the most recognizable and enduring of 
formulaic genres, was not monolithic, one-dimensional, or limited to one class of reader, 
even in its early stages.  Before the century was out, the literary craze that officially 
began in England with Horace Walpole’s The Castle of Otranto: A Gothic Story (1764) 
had proved itself quite adaptable, as seen by the development of literary sub-genres that 
drew from and expanded upon Walpole’s original formula.  Otranto’s medieval tale of 
supernatural events, dynastic curses, demonic villains, and threats of murder, rape, and 
incest established a set of conventional plot points, stock characters, and gloomy and 
claustrophobic settings that survived censure, parody, and poor execution to transform 
the literary marketplace.  Walpole’s stated aim to blend fantastical medieval romance 
with the realism of the modern novel was inspired, he claims, by a dream; and his work, 
in turn, inspired the creation of many nightmarish novels and tales that offered the 
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vicarious thrill of witnessing recognizably natural human reactions to seemingly 
unnatural events.10  But by the late 1780s, the Gothic no longer served only as escapist 
entertainment—if indeed it ever did.  Scholars have argued that the Gothic, even at its 
most absurd, did more than produce a jolt of pleasurable fear; it functioned to express and 
to shape a worldview.11  To explain the rise and endurance of this dark side of the 
Enlightenment, these scholars have defined the early Gothic as a corollary to the 
eighteenth century’s emerging secular faith in reason, as a manifestation of the aesthetic 
of the sublime, and as a reflection of and response to middle class insecurities concerning 
its fledgling autonomy.   
In some views, the genre operated as a dramatic rendering of the historical 
progress of the human mind from the dark ages to enlightenment, from subjugation to 
sovereignty.  Particularly in its Radcliffean form, distinguished by its “explained 
supernaturalism,” the Gothic could take the form of a bildungsroman that traces the 
overly-sensitive heroine’s path from naivety and superstition to enlightened emotional 
maturity and right reason.  These tales of virtuous victims facing down terror offered a 
picture of the reader as right thinking, right feeling, and superior to the forces that would 
oppose her self-actualization, a sublime affirmation.  In socio-political terms, critics have 
argued, the early Gothic manifested a desire to define the modern worldview and the 
modern subject against the residual influence of the allegedly backward and corrupt 
Middle Ages.  Through entertaining narratives, Gothic novels tracked the inevitable 
victory of the rational, autonomous individual over the oppressive paternalism of 
traditional kinship structures, of feudalistic states, and of a hierarchical church that awed 
and brutalized the submissive masses.  Chris Baldick explains, “The literary Gothic is 
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really anti-Gothic.  At the foundation of Gothic literature’s anti-Gothic sentiment lies this 
nightmare [among the British and Anglo-Irish middle class] of being dragged back to the 
persecutions of the Counter-Reformation” (xvi).12  
“To Expose Error and Vice” 
 Building on this rather covert even unconscious cultural work of the early Gothic 
novels were the more overtly socio-politically purposeful Gothic novels written in Britain 
and the German states.  The narrative structures developed by Walpole and Radcliffe and 
their many imitators presented to some reform-minded activists a ready-made template 
that with a few substitutions could easily serve as a critique of analogously cruel, 
barbarous, and irrational authoritarianism closer to home.  Caritat’s catalogue credits one 
particular author for having “judiciously taken advantage of the taste in Great Britain for 
Novels to expose error and vice” (134).  That author, William Godwin, as well as other 
British radical democrats, including Robert Bage, Thomas Holcroft, Elizabeth Inchbald, 
and Charlotte Turner Smith, all of whom were inspired by the French Revolution, aimed 
to advance a reformist agenda by weaving a message of social progressivism and political 
radicalism into popular literary forms.  Through tales of intrigue, suspense, romance, and 
adventure these English Jacobins, as they came to be called, hoped to appeal to the 
usually apolitical and non-intellectual lower classes.13  The individualist (proto-anarchist) 
philosophy and literary theory of this group, expressly articulated in Godwin’s An 
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness 
(1793) and Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), made an 
immense impression on freethinkers in Europe and America, including Brown, whose 
Arthur Mervyn shares narrative details with Godwin’s own Gothic novel Things As They 
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Are; or, The Adventure of Caleb Williams (1794) and whose deep interest in gender 
issues is evinced not only in Alcuin but in his novelistic works as well.14  Interestingly, 
the Jacobin formula proved so successful, at least in the first half of the decade, that it 
provoked an alarmed reaction from British conservatives, who then penned (without a 
discernible hint of irony) equally sensational Anti-Jacobin novels in an effort to discredit 
the manipulation of the masses through popular culture.15   
Godwin and his circle have long been recognized influences on Brown’s writing; 
but Wieland and some of his other fictions also show the influence of German writers 
who were producing their own politically-charged subset of imaginative literature.  In 
plays, ballads, and schaeuerroman (“shudder” or horror novels), these writers employed 
elements of the fantastical, the macabre, and the terrifying to advance Enlightenment 
reform ideals.  Well-known to young American intellectuals, and of course available at 
Caritat’s library, were such works as Friedrich Schiller’s The Ghost-Seer (1786-89) and 
Cajetan Tschink’s The Victim of Magical Delusion (1795) as well as Ludwig Tieck’s 
William Lovell (1795) and C. M. Wieland’s Peregrinus Proteus (1791).  Scholars Philip 
Barnard and Stephen Shapiro refer to these works as “State Romances that combine 
Gothic themes with anxieties about clandestine networks seeking to overthrow a weak 
state.”16  Brown’s first published novel not only takes its title from poet Christoph Martin 
Wieland, whose Der geprufte Abraham (1764) is a verse treatment of the biblical story 
echoed in Wieland, but also uses Gottfried Bürger’s “Lenore” as the model for the ballad 
upon which his heroine ruminates at a critical juncture in her story.17  Brown borrows 
certain thematic elements from the Germans, as well, particularly the focus on debunking 
superstition, exposing subversive intents behind false displays of supernatural powers, 
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and unveiling the machinations of underground revolutionary organizations.  Moreover, 
Wieland’s Carwin and Ormond’s title character, both men with shady pasts, rare skills, 
and unclear motives, as striking as they are, are not unlike the chameleon-like outsiders in 
Schiller’s and Tschink’s works, which were being read and discussed by Brown and his 
friends as he labored on what would become his first novels.18   
But not in imaginative works alone did Brown find mystery and horror being 
conjured for political purposes.  Writers in the Age of Revolution addressing the violent, 
disillusioning uncertainties of the Western world as it neared the end of the eighteenth 
century expressed their alarm and confusion through Gothic tropes.  Gothic tones sound 
in Edmund Burke’s polemical Reflections on the Revolution in France (1791), 
particularly in its depiction of a half-dressed Marie Antoinette fleeing her Versailles 
boudoir just as it is invaded by the merciless, marauding revolutionaries.19  And it was 
Burke, in his seminal essay on aesthetics A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origins of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), who recognized the political utility of eliciting 
in the public an invigorating even agreeable fear, a sense of awe before great, obscure 
power.  Brown’s fellow-Philadelphian Dr. Benjamin Rush was an early proponent of 
deploying Gothic mystery and terror as tools for social control.  In a 1787 essay “An 
Inquiry into the Effects of Public Punishments upon Criminals, and Upon Society,” the 
eminent physician argues that he could not “conceive anything more calculated to diffuse 
terror through a community, and thereby to prevent crimes, than [the consequences of 
establishing his proposed reform institution].” “Children,” he writes, “will press upon the 
evening fire in listening to the tales that will be spread from this abode of misery.  
Superstition will add to its horrors: and romance will find in it ample materials for fiction, 
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which cannot fail of increasing the terror of its punishments” (qtd. in Shuffleton 94).  In 
the era before the fragmentation of intellectual inquiry into specialized and 
professionalized disciplines, the good doctor’s remarks exemplify the then-common 
understanding that seemingly separate fields of knowledge, including medicine, science, 
politics, education, and art, were not the purview of isolated experts, but were 
interconnected and generally accessible aspects of public discourse.  Similarly, Burke’s 
philosophical discussion of the sublime famously exerted a direct influence on the literary 
practice of Gothic mistress Ann Radcliffe, while his focus on the persuasiveness of 
writing that evokes strong feelings, especially fear, also set the stage for the paranoid 
style of politics soon to come.  
 In the late 1790s, mystery, horror, persecution, perversion, and rape were stock 
elements of the counter-revolutionary narratives that were stoking hysteria among 
conservatives in England and the United States.  Participants in the strident anti-
Illuminati campaign trafficked in supposedly true, decidedly Gothic tales of a group of 
conspiratorial radicals perched to overthrow all governments and eradicate all religion.  
Employing rhetoric that mimicked the storylines of popular melodramatic literature, 
Congregationalist ministers like Jedidiah Morse and Timothy Dwight, president of Yale, 
“projected their fears about the vulnerability of the youthful American republic onto an 
emblematic chaste maiden surrounded by plotting seducers who would stop at nothing to 
corrupt her sacred virtue” (Levine 21).20  The Illuminati scare was reaching its height in 
the summer of 1798 just as Brown was working on both Arthur Mervyn and Wieland.  It 
undoubtedly informed the characterization of the secretive, vaguely foreign, would-be 
seducer Carwin.21  And Arthur Mervyn’s depiction of socio-political and moral vitiation 
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in the face of a yellow fever epidemic, which was popularly linked with the arrival of 
French émigrés fleeing Revolutionary France and slave rebellions in Haiti, would surely 
have tapped into fears of foreign contagion, both of the body and the body politic.  Later 
that year Brown would also complete Ormond, whose title character is an avowed 
member of an Illuminati-like group.   
 But the novels’ connection to the narrative conventions and to the politics of their 
Gothic influences, fictive and factual, is murky.  At least as early as the first twentieth 
century revival of critical interest in Brown (with the publication of new editions of 
Wieland edited by Fred Lewis Pattee, Ormond edited by Ernst Marchand, and Edgar 
Huntly edited by David L. Clark in the 1920s and 30s) scholars have been objecting to 
the term Gothic as too limited to describe the novels’ various literary borrowings, 
intellectual pedigree, and moralizing aims.  Wil Verhoeven repeats this sentiment in 
arguing that one should approach Brown’s fiction as “‘philosophical histories’ (the term 
‘Gothic novels’ clearly being inadequate)” (32).  Moreover, as the term Gothic has 
become more inclusive, some contend that the label is simply too inclusive to be very 
useful in getting a clear understanding of Brown’s literary strategies and philosophical 
concerns.  Donald A. Ringe cautions that “though subsequent writers in England, 
Germany, and the United States freely employed [Gothic] devices, they enlisted them in 
the service of widely divergent systems of thought and created a series of transmutations 
that must be retraced if we are to understand its later use” (American Gothic 18).  Teresa 
Goddu, however, uses Brown’s work in her argument for the resurrection of the Gothic as 
a useful literary term in American literary studies once the formal and affective 
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dissonances endemic to the genre are recognized as subversions of the dominant 
narratives of national identity.22   
The debate over the definition and socio-political valence of the Gothic 
notwithstanding, Brown’s first four novels and several of his short stories are 
acknowledged as much-indebted to the Gothic even as the nature of that debt remains 
problematic.  Goddu points out that “Brown’s critical reputation remains grounded in the 
gothic; his name more than any other author’s (with the exception of Poe) signifies the 
gothic in American literature” (51).  But in his preface to Edgar Huntly, Brown famously 
exclaims against the “puerile superstition and exploded manners; Gothic castles and 
chimeras” of popular sensationalist literature of the time (3).  Accordingly, unlike nearly 
all previous Gothic fictions, Brown’s novels are not set in the haunted ruins or monastic 
dungeons of old Europe.  His novels’ mysteries and horrors play out in what was at the 
time of composition the recent past and for the most part on American soil.  Wieland’s 
story unfolds at the picturesque Mettingen, an idyllic farm of ordered orchards and 
natural grandeur overlooking the Schuylkill River, dotted with a main house, a hilltop 
gazebo, and a second dwelling for the uncommonly independent Clara.  Ormond and 
Arthur Mervyn, Brown’s next novels, follow events in the city of Philadelphia, a modern 
port of international trade and immigration.  The eponymous Edgar Huntly seeks answers 
in the wilds of Norwalk, an area of Indian and settler hostilities just beyond the frontier 
farmlands of north-eastern Pennsylvania.  And although they are like Radcliffe’s novels 
in eschewing supernaturalism and decrying gullibility and superstition, Wieland and its 
successors could not be construed as conventional Enlightenment narratives tracing the 
education of their young protagonists.  Following Clara Wieland’s trajectory, for 
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example, one sees she moves from the smug enjoyment of Enlightenment aesthetic-
intellectual complacency; through moments of terror and confusion; and finally to an 
unconvincing and even ominous re-establishment of right reason.  Although all Brown’s 
novels are distinct in their respective thematic emphases, the ending of each leaves the 
principle character’s psychological and moral well-being a matter of doubt.   
Equally problematic is the way in which Brown’s fiction engages the politics of 
Gothic narratives, including the Godwinian and German forms, in nuanced, often critical 
ways.  Scholars relying on close reading and historical and biographical material to 
expose partisan motivations in Brown’s engagement with contemporary issues, especially 
prevalent in criticism of the 1980s and 90s, established opposing camps and a critical 
impasse, effectively proving only that Brown’s works are “susceptible to multiple, even 
contradictory readings” (Waterman “Revised” 182).  Robert S. Levine rightly asserts that 
“to reduce his writings to a series of political statements, would finally only crudely 
distort his literary intentions and methods” (Conspiracy 25).  Recent critics have sought 
to understand Brown’s writings by widening the scope from the relatively narrow 
confines of national identity and party politics to the larger circum-Atlantic world of 
geopolitics, economics, ideas, and art.  Going beyond the broadly conceived binaries of 
early republic partisanship, these critics have set out to find or invent language to more 
accurately describe the opposing impulses in Brown’s writings.  
It is precisely the disorienting dissimilarities, the vexed relation to narrative 
conventions and contemporary philosophies that seem to speak to modern readers.  
Where yesterday’s critics once saw flawed beauties, today’s scholars now more often see 
functional complexities.  Along with the emergence of new approaches to literary studies, 
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the past few decades have seen a great shift in Brown’s reputation from a historical 
curiosity to the matrix through which the early republic and its wider context can be fully 
engaged.  Taken together the efforts of historians and literary scholars have provided an 
ever richer contextualization, have brought to light points of reference and models for 
comparison, and demonstrated the astoundingly multivalent character of his writings.  In 
the manner of new historicism, scholars of Brown’s writings have usefully drawn 
connections to and analogies from the areas of law, education, economics, art, 
architecture, historiography, and political theory.23  They have, in effect, put his work 
into meaningful dialogue with nearly every item in Caritat’s collection.  Unprecedented 
attention has turned to not only Brown’s major novels but to his entire corpus, including 
other novelistic works, literary criticism, essays, poems, political pamphlets, letters, and 
short fiction, in an effort to gain a more sophisticated understanding of the early 
republic’s cultural milieu.  However, these texts are more than interesting relics that 
pique the curiosity of antiquarians.  For anyone interested in the problems plaguing the 
twenty-first century, Brown’s novels—engaging as they do issues of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism, gender and sexuality, faith and reason,  narrative and authority, among 
others—possess a strong and strange allure.  But this should not be surprising.  Charles 
Brockden Brown was a well-informed, intellectually engaged writer feverishly 
composing during a moment of great crisis in modernity.  In richly realized stories he 
took on the task of registering and responding to the shocks of a transitional period, a 
period out of which developed the paradigms that governed the Western world for the 
better part of the last two hundred years.  The postmodern strain prevalent in current 
Brown scholarship, which puts Brown into dialogue with highly sophisticated twentieth-
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century and contemporary thinkers, is the justifiable recognition of a shared interest in 
interrogating the Enlightenment project.  The only consensus to emerge from all the 
discussion of Brown’s writings is that Brown’s writings, as gateways to the past and 
commentaries on the present, are eminently worth discussing.24  More than two centuries 
on, the writings of Charles Brockden Brown continue to surprise, unsettle, and intrigue. 
What follows in this paper is my own response to the novels and related works of 
Charles Brockden Brown.  It is a response informed by and in debt to the responses of 
many others, even as it aims to articulate and build upon the gut reaction I felt in my 
initial more or less naïve encounter with what continue to be for me endlessly fascinating 
works.  I proceed from the sense that the troublesome elements of these texts, that which 
make them appear incongruous, contradictory, and inconclusive, are in most if not all 
instances functional elements of his artistic-intellectual project and indeed are consistent 
with a certain philosophical orientation.  Rather than focus on trying to settle just where 
Brown comes down on a particular issue, regarding for example the proper form and 
function of government, the place of art in society, the relation of the sexes, classes, or 
races, or the existence and attributes of the divine, I am instead attempting to trace the 
contours of the animating ethos and investigative methodology moving within these texts. 
“A Banquet of Horrors” 
Instead of hesitating before a scruple, and aspiring to avoid a fault, he 
braved criticism, and aimed only at effect.  He was an inventor, but 
without materials.  His strength and his efforts are convulsive throes—his 
works are a banquet of horrors.  The hint of some of them is taken from 
Caleb Williams and St Leon, but infinitely exaggerated, and carried to 
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disgust and outrage.  They are full (to disease) of imagination,—but it is 
forced, violent, and shocking.  This is to be expected, we apprehend, in 
attempts of this kind and in a country like America, where there is, 
generally speaking, no natural imagination.  The mind must be excited by 
overstraining, by pulleys and levers.  Mr. Brown was a man of genius, of 
strong passion, and active fancy; but his genius was not seconded by early 
habit, or by surrounding sympathy.  His story and his interests are not 
wrought out, therefore, in the ordinary course of nature; but are, like the 
monster in Frankenstein, a man made by art and determined by will.25 
William Hazlitt’s words convey a vivid picture of Brown’s work as a sort of 
conceptual and affective assault: “forced, violent, and shocking.”  Products of a diseased 
imagination, they are unnatural exaggerations that evoke disgust and outrage.  Like 
Frankenstein’s monster, they are works of audacity, passion, and genius.  In all but the 
term itself, Hazlitt’s reaction to Brown’s work conjures up the concept of the grotesque.  
While not taking up Hazlitt’s analysis of Brown’s intentions, capacities, and 
circumstances, I will try in this chapter to show that this concept, the grotesque, 
shadowed forth in the visceral reaction of this critic, can serve as a useful starting point 
for tracing the philosophical orientation of Brown’s writings. 
Others have recognized the term grotesque as an adjective well-suited to describe 
Brown’s weird works.  Fred Lewis Pattee, Brown’s first twentieth-century editor, 
describes the novelist’s prose style as “over-ornate and inflated, grotesque with 
circumlocutions,” while the mid-century psychoanalytical critic Leslie Fiedler sees 
Brown’s novels as engagements with “the exaggerated and the grotesque” deep within.26  
22 
 
Jane Tompkins, writing in the 1980s, takes a historicist approach to provide a 
“background against which Brown’s grotesque narrative [Wieland] begins to make sense” 
(47).  Each usage of the term, though only fleeting, registers the general strangeness of 
signifying structures whose meanings are obscured.  Each also registers the particular 
valences of the grotesque within culturally- and historically-situated critical discourses: in 
these cases, formalism, psychological archetypes, and new historicism.27  The critical 
response to Brown’s work thus illustrates one aspect of the grotesque as it is discussed by 
modern theorists: that is, beyond the most general definition, denoting what Virginia E. 
Swain calls the “eternal” or “unchanging” grotesque, the meaning of the grotesque in the 
larger sense of its place and function in the world changes with the cultural-historical 
context (3).  
Makers of modern art and literature of the past one hundred years or so, from the 
avant-garde to camp, express a general fascination with the grotesque.  Just so, some 
modern scholars and philosophers, seeking insight into the complexities of art and of the 
modern world, have grappled with this protean concept.  The past fifty years have seen 
several extended attempts at defining, categorizing, periodizing, and theorizing it.  Of 
course, Brown, writing at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
century, at the turn toward modernity, did not have the conceptual structure or the 
terminology as it is deployed today.  Nevertheless, the most prominent features of 
Brown’s novels—the bizarre and astonishing events, the contradictory and unintelligible 
beings, the problematic prose, and the inconclusive and fragmentary narratives—are 
those that give rise to what Geoffrey Galt Harpham describes as that particular “species 
of confusion” signified by the word grotesque (xxi). 
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As understood in contemporary scholarship, the word grotesque refers to a 
peculiarly incongruous structural quality, one exhibited in both the formal properties of 
an object and in the cognitive, affective, and physiological reactions of the perceiving 
subject.  In Philip Thomson’s brief formulation, the grotesque is “the unresolved clash of 
incompatibles in work and response” (27).  But if this structural quality seems relatively 
easy to understand, little else about the grotesque is so straightforward.  Any comparison 
of the widely-differing visual or conceptual phenomena so described will show that no 
content is immanently grotesque.28  African masks, the paintings of Hieronymus Bosch, 
Italian street theater (commedia dell’ arte), Damien Hirst’s shark suspended in a tank of 
formaldehyde: Theorists attempting to capture what it is that seems to connect all these 
things called grotesque invoke a cluster of terms, including excess, abnormality, 
extravagance, disharmony, and absurdity.29  Taking a taxonomical approach, some 
commentators speak of the grotesque’s “major rhetorical and pictorial devices,” 
formulated in some instances as caricature, inversion, and hybridity (Margaret Miles 96).  
The shared element of each is the violation of normative boundaries and definitions.  As 
such, the grotesque signifies as a relation, a position relative to a standard.  However, 
what is conceived as a grotesque violation of norms depends on the often unconscious 
and culturally- and historically-determined construction of what is normal, natural, or 
logical. 
Toward an Understanding of the Grotesque 
From the dark, grotto-like excavations of some ancient Roman ruins, the 
ornamental style subsequently referred to as grottesche emerged in the late fifteenth 
century and immediately inspired artists like Raphael and Udine, who covered the loggias 
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of the Vatican with satyrs, mermaids, and those other fantastical, combinatory creatures, 
half-human and half-animal, -plant, or -architectural feature, that they saw gamboling on 
the frescoed walls of Nero’s Golden House (Domus Aurea).  Clearly beautiful, these 
images are at the same time evocative of some other, hard to describe sensation—
perhaps, the sense of the familiar yet alien.  Since that time the grotesque has drawn 
praise and drawn fire from numerous commentators.  It prompted critical analyses in the 
late eighteenth and again in the mid-nineteenth centuries.  But the most useful treatments, 
for my purposes, are those by the major twentieth-century theorists of the grotesque: 
Wolfgang Kayser, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Geoffrey Galt Harpham. 
After reviewing the etymology of the grotesque, and the history of attempts to 
define it, Kayser presents his rather grim analysis.  For Kayser, the grotesque is the 
experience of the sudden estrangement of the world.  He describes it as the 
transformation of familiar norms, “the abolition of the law of status, the loss of identity, 
the distortion of ‘natural’ sign and shape, the suspension of the category of objects, the 
destruction of personality, and the fragmentation of the historical order” that inspire the 
fear, not of death, but of life in such an alienated world.  Kayser also offers a somewhat 
vague but intriguing contention that the grotesque arises from and points back to the 
bleak, impersonal realm of nonbeing, the “ghostly ‘IT’” (185).  Both of these premises 
resonate with the psychological drama I will trace in Wieland and with elements of the 
ethical philosophy I will explore later in this paper.  
Building on Kayser’s assertion that “the grotesque world is—and is not—our own 
world,” Agata Krzychylkiewicz explains that in the grotesque work “the ‘real’ and the 
‘unreal,’ [ . . . ] are forced by the artist to coexist [ . . . ] as an undivided entity, leading to 
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total confusion between reality and fiction.”  She observes that “the ‘unreal’ can be 
synonymous with [ . . . ] fantastic, invented, contrived, dreamlike, illusory, or fictitious.  
If used in the sense of ‘untrue,’ the ‘unreal’ means fake or fraudulent, implying a certain 
trickery and manipulation with reality—its deliberate deformation” (13). 
Krzychylkiewicz’s discussion of the grotesque world brings to the fore ideas I pursue in 
the chapter on Ormond. 
In Rabelais and His World (1936, 1964), Mikhail Bakhtin investigates the socio-
political functions of the grotesque, focusing particularly on the medieval collapse or 
inversion of social norms in the tradition of carnival.  Using Rabelais’s Gargantua and 
Pantagruel, he examines grotesque realism and the grotesque body as marking the 
continuities among people in society and between people and the material world, a 
continuity that defies artificial social and political distinctions.  Bakhtin’s ideas speak to 
the mind-body philosophy that, I will argue, creates the conditions for the Wieland 
family’s destruction.  
Other scholars of the grotesque draw on Bakhtinian concepts to explore the link 
between the grotesque and issues of gender and sex.  If there is a recurring grotesque 
content, Mary Russo observes, it is the deviant bodily form, the body being a more or less 
constant experience throughout human cultures.  Not surprisingly, therefore, in 
patriarchal societies, the female body is not uncommonly the site of grotesqueness.30  
Russo and others, including Margaret Miles, have investigated the Western history of 
philosophical, theological, and cultural constructions of “woman” as the other, as a 
naturally grotesque being.  Miles asserts, “The association of the female body with 
materiality, sex, and reproduction in the female body makes it an essential—not an 
26 
 
accidental—aspect of the grotesque” (90).  Thus, not only does the grotesque symbolize 
the violation of taboos, the blurring of socio-political distinctions, but often it very 
specifically figures as the female body and those behaviors conventionally figured as 
female.  These insights are particularly relevant to a consideration of Brown’s Ormond, 
which prominently features non-normative females. 
Geoffrey Galt Harpham, like the others, calls attention to the importance of the 
culturally- and historically-determined normative order, the accepted boundaries and 
categorical distinctions, as that against which the grotesque disruptively emerges.  
Additionally, he conceptualizes what he terms the “grotesque interval,” or the gap 
between the initial confusion occasioned by the encounter with the grotesque and the 
moment ordered thought reasserts itself.  This interval, he argues, is a space of 
possibility.  From this space one may re-emerge having discounted the phenomena as an 
inferior instance of a type—having, in other words, assimilated it into the dualistic, 
categorical system of thought.  Or one may re-emerge from this space having gained a 
new insight from beyond the confines of the normative system of thought.  He compares 
this state of possibility to Thomas Kuhn’s discussion of the paradigm shift, the sudden 
transformation in scientific thinking that occurs once the data unable to be assimilated by 
the reigning paradigm reaches a certain critical mass or tipping point.  “It is one 
characteristic of revolutions, whether literary, political, or scientific,” he writes, “that 
they liberate, dignify, and pass through the grotesque” (24).  Harpham goes on to connect 
the grotesque to myth and to mythic consciousness, a “permanent potentiality of mind 
that is ‘mostly suppressed, denied or compromised’ in our own day yet is nevertheless, 
‘always vital’” (Adams and Yates 35).  I want to suggest that each of these premises, 
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comparable to concepts in other discussions of the grotesque, finds their reflection in 
Brown’s novels and, importantly, in discussions of the kind of ethical philosophy 
informing Brown’s works. 
The Grotesque in the Late Enlightenment 
The grotesque, as scholars have argued, can be traced back to prehistoric cave 
paintings—at least the formal qualities we now associate with the term grotesque, for, of 
course, the affective responses sought by their creators and the reactions of their original 
viewers are not known.31  Grotesqueness, once again, is historically-culturally relational; 
and therefore, as Harpham points out, we are often doubly alienated from the grotesque 
work of the past, alienated both from its context and from its particular alienation from 
that context.  With this in mind, looking back upon the Age of Enlightenment should help 
us get a better understanding of the grotesqueness of Brown’s work within the norms of 
his historical-cultural moment.   
Perhaps this period, which may be dated from the late seventeenth century 
through the end of the eighteenth, seems an overly broad timespan for consideration.  But 
Brown himself took the long view of history.  In a letter to his friend Samuel Miller, then 
preparing a second volume of his A Brief Retrospect of the Eighteenth Century, Brown 
shares his thoughts on the most important aspects of the past hundred years.  Tellingly he 
writes not of specific events or prominent people but of the continuation of a centuries-
long struggle for authority linking the shift from an emperor to a pope, then from a 
unified to a divided Christianity, and then from a universal religiosity to a contest over 
“the truth of any form of religion whatsoever” (Letters 611).32  With his further remarks 
on the developments most likely to exert a lasting influence, including the greatly 
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increased commercial and territorial expansion of European powers, the explosion in 
printed materials, and the emergence of a wide-spread print culture, Brown’s overview 
presents history as a continual state of flux, a dynamic process of increasing complexity, 
fragmentation, and interconnectedness. 
It is not hard to see how, looking back from the end of the eighteenth century, 
Brown could have taken such a view.  The manifold and multivalent circulations of the 
European-Atlantic world at that time belied the concrete reality of all manner of borders 
and boundaries.  The 1790s saw the extreme expressions of those revolutions within all 
the major realms of human activity that are the defining characteristic of the Age of 
Enlightenment.  In the chaotic last years of the century, it seemed to many that the 
Enlightenment world had devolved into division and delusion.  This is the decade, not 
incidentally, that coined the terms ideology and phantasmagoria.33  So how did it come to 
this?   
Beginning in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, re-examinations of 
religious and socio-political doctrines as well as of the nature and function of literature 
and art emerged in tandem with developments in the scientific approach to understanding 
the physical universe.  With new instruments, technologies, and mathematical constructs 
(such as the invention of calculus), natural philosophers challenged not only long-
unquestioned teachings and abstract religious conceptions, but also, in some cases, 
refuted everyday perceptions.  Scientific discoveries of the long eighteenth century 
revealed intriguing new wonders of an invisible world, wonders that coexisted with and 
were an integral part of the familiar, visible world.34  Pioneering investigators posited the 
existence of material forces and gases that were imperceptible to the eye, demonstrated 
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the marvelous properties of electricity and magnetism, peered into the hidden workings 
of living tissue, and spied upon the secret life of microscopic creatures, all phenomena 
that eluded common experience or even ran counter to it.  
Such developments had a profound influence on the way Westerners looked upon 
and explained the world.  But the course of human understanding does not run smooth.  It 
is tempting to conceive of the increase of scientific knowledge throughout the eighteenth 
century as a steady march toward an objective understanding of an increasingly 
predictable and comprehensible world.  Scientific breakthroughs, however, did not 
necessarily lead to an era of universal consensus and clarity even among the most 
accomplished scientists.  Brown, who maintained close ties with Quaker friends in 
Philadelphia and his deist friends in New York, well knew that science was not self-
evidently superior to religious doctrine in the views of many living at the time, nor was it 
a world apart, impervious to human vice and error.  For evidence of the fallibility of the 
seers into the workings of the natural world, Brown need look no further than his 
hometown and the fruitless bickering of Philadelphia’s medical community over the 
prevention and treatment of the ruinous yellow fever.35  References throughout his 
writings show that he was quite familiar with the many, often politically-charged 
conflicts over which system of order, which definitions, classifications, and explanatory 
theories would win out.  Partisans of Carolus Linnaeus and of the Comte de Buffon took 
part in a bitter feud over which classificatory system for living things was best.  Scientists 
and English government officials followed with great interest the controversy between 
Benjamin Franklin and Benjamin Wilson regarding whether a lightning rod should have a 
sharp or a blunt tip.  Chemists Joseph Priestley and Antoine Lavoisier disagreed over the 
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existence of an essence of combustion, while the field of physiology remained staunchly 
divided between mechanists and vitalists, that is, between those who viewed the body as 
a hydro-dynamic, electro-chemical system and those who held that living matter was 
infused with an animus or spirit of vitality. 
Beyond these internecine disputes were controversial claims that blurred the line 
between those legitimate scientific views about which reasonable people could disagree 
and that which was pure unscientific hokum.  In 1784, the French Royal Academy of 
Sciences set up a committee (which included Franklin) tasked with investigating Franz 
Anton Mesmer’s claims about his animal magnetism cures.  Even after the committee’s 
finding that animal magnetism did not exist, a pamphlet war between his defenders and 
his opponents continued unabated.36  Indeed, the surprising nature of the era’s scientific 
discoveries lent a sheen of plausibility to a number of other rather incredible theories and 
wild assertions.  In the 1790s, genuine scientific progress tied to testable hypotheses and 
reproducible results coexisted awkwardly with the dead weight of persistent fallacies, like 
phlogiston, aether, bodily humors, and electrical fluid.  The waning of the century saw 
the rise of sensational pseudo-scientific marvels and now-discredited constructs like 
animal electricity and physiognomy that nevertheless enjoyed a thriving afterlife in 
popular culture.  These latter, presented in the form of theatrical spectacles, parlor tricks, 
and quasi-scholarly monographs, played well to a growing and general fascination with 
scientific anomalies and curiosities.  Indeed, something like a cottage industry of pop 
science emerged.  Entrepreneurs in major cities like Philadelphia and New York lured 
ticket buyers with new-fangled optical devices, like solar microscopes, perspective boxes, 
and magic lanterns that presented startling, alienating views of the world.37  Throughout 
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the century, new ideas about and investigations into the human mind produced serious 
materialist and metaphysical speculation as well as curious accounts of “the force of 
imagination” that fascinated popular and elite minds alike.  The Toft Case of 1726, in 
which a woman claimed to have given birth to a litter of rabbits, spurred a quite public 
controversy among medical professionals regarding the susceptibility of the developing 
fetus to the mother’s emotional state.38  Late in the century, the continued popularity of 
the force of the imagination genre is evinced by the numerous sensational accounts of this 
phenomenon included in Erasmus Darwin’s 1796 compendium of mental disease 
Zoonomia, the American edition of which Brown’s friend Elihu Hubbard Smith ushered 
through the press.  Science in the eighteenth century was a prolific generator of 
grotesquery. 
Not to be outdone, the proponents of magic and spiritualism, which not only held 
out but thrived throughout and well after the Age of Reason, conjured their own 
grotesqueries.  Whether seen as a reaction against the rationalism of the Enlightenment or 
perhaps as an extension of it, the burgeoning Romantic interest in mystery and in the 
Middle Ages found expression not only in the popular Gothic fictions but also sometimes 
in more hands-on explorations of the occult.  Such interest in mystery and the occult, one 
scholar explains, was driven by “a strong desire to reconcile the findings of modern 
science with a religious view that could restore man to a position of centrality and dignity 
in the universe” (Goodrick-Clark 29).  The corpus of the mystical Hermes Trismegistus 
fascinated the pious Isaac Newton at the beginning of the Enlightenment.  By the end of 
the eighteenth century, with the power and prestige of religion waning, it may be that 
some educated people intrigued by displays and tales of the seemingly supernatural 
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looked upon such phenomena with a certain half-serious, half-facetious wonder.  
Although freemasonry may be the most famous example of the era’s adoption of the 
trappings if not necessarily the mystical substance of the occult, the blasphemous 
mockeries of the Hell-Fire Club may be the most infamous.  In a former abbey, Sir 
Francis Dashwood, who is the probable namesake of a would-be seducer in Brown’s 
Wieland, led his “monks” in bacchanals with “nuns” (prostitutes).39  The occultist Count 
Cagliostro, a forger, counterfeiter, and dealer in artefacts and nostrums of magical power, 
cut a colorful swath through the courts and salons of Europe, gathering aristocratic 
devotees, and inspiring Gothic fictions by Goethe and Schiller, favorite authors of Brown 
and his circle.40  
With the paradigm shifts of the long eighteenth century, the grotesque takes on a 
new significance in relation to human understanding and aspirations.  The spiritual or 
theological meaningfulness of that which we might call the grotesque finds itself at odds 
with the emergent faith in reason.  In the deeply religious thought of early American 
writers, the otherness exhibited by grotesque phenomena is believed to be the incursion 
of agents of the supernatural realm into the realm of man and nature.  As exemplified in 
Cotton Mather’s writings, wonders were signs of the invisible, spiritual world, a world 
separate from the natural laws that ordered the familiar realm of human experience.  The 
otherwise inexplicable could be understood as demonstrations of the divine will or as the 
machinations of the devil.  In short, bizarre and surprising phenomena could indicate the 
agency of angels or demons, the work of beings of a separate sphere of reality.  This 
understanding of the workings of the world held great moral significance.  In this view, 
personhood, or the subject, was understood as the site of the conflict between 
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otherworldly forces for influence.  According to the traditional view, which was 
expressed in and shaped by narratives as well as argumentation, demonic agents offer the 
gratifications of material, bodily desires, graphically figured as grotesquery in the works 
of Mather, John Winthrop (the description of Ann Hutchinson’s monstrous birth) and 
Michael Wigglesworth, while angelic agents work to inspire spiritual priorities.  
But in the Age of Reason, beginning later in the seventeenth century, the 
otherness exhibited by what we call the grotesque gradually came to be viewed in terms 
of an anomaly in an otherwise knowable universe, something to be eventually explained 
in accordance with known principles and, where practicable, brought into line with them.  
The grotesque, in the new language of science and logic, transforms from the signs and 
wonders of a divine order, into an otherness relative to logical and moral constructs.  
Physical and pictorial wonders are termed anomalies, prodigies, or, as in Lord Kames’s 
words, “remarkable deviations from the standard.”41  Over the course of this new era in 
the human approach to understanding the universe, the term monster loses its sense of 
warning or demonstration of God’s will (the same Latin root lies in both monster and 
demonstration) and dispassionately denotes a grossly, radically abnormal physical 
specimen.42  Thus, monstrosity transforms from a source of religious awe to an object of 
scientific curiosity where the normal, logical, and nominally natural is the basis of all 
reality, the default against which remarkable deviations serve to affirm the superiority of 
the known order.  Further, the divide between two realms of existence was no longer 
something out there in any real sense; it was internalized such that the mind and the body 
(the knowing “I” and the material self) became the new, secular terms of the old moral 
dichotomy.  In the view of some, reason became the new religion, the source of our 
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understanding of ourselves and our place in the universe, of the order and occasional 
disruptions of order, and the means by which humans attain moral understanding.43   
These ideas about the nature of the physical world and of human understanding 
had tremendous political implications, as well, implications that became a new site for 
the grotesque.  Agitators for reform posited or popularized radical ideas extrapolated 
from Newtonian and Lockean views of nature, the mind, and society.  Some mounted 
direct challenges against the traditional power structures throughout society, rejecting 
feudal, aristocratic, monarchical, and religious claims of authority in favor of the 
principle of natural rights and the guidance of reason and a universal moral sense.  Thus, 
while through much of the century imperial wars for colonies and commodities continued 
to keep cartographers busily updating the political map, the last third of the century 
engendered a new kind of warfare, an ideological warfare that kept political theorists, 
lawmakers, clergymen, and self-appointed spokespersons busily drawing and defending 
the lines between right and wrong, lawful and criminal, natural and adulterated.44  Some 
of these contenders fought to preserve society from the corrupting effects of specious 
new doctrines, while others fought to purify society from the delusive and pernicious 
dogmas of antiquity.45  Continental and British radical thinkers voiced variously the 
arguments that man is a machine, mind is material, religion is false, and civilization is 
bondage.  But any monolithic constructions of the combatants in the contest of ideas 
elides the confounding complexity of the issues, the great number of contrasting 
viewpoints, and the mutability of superficially stable and unified concepts.  Innovation 
and tradition, for example, were not the exclusive idols of one side or the other in the 
socio-political conflicts.  Some reformists saw their cause in essentially conservative 
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terms, as a return to a truer form of government, either the English tradition of limited 
power or the ancient models of republican government; others fervently rejected the past 
in favor of visions of a new world order.  The anti-revolutionaries too might embrace 
modern innovations but stop short of drastic changes, like those who championed 
enlightened absolutism, which was put into practice in Prussia and, for a time, Russia.  
Closer to home, the leaders of the American Revolution generally championed the kind 
of updated classical republicanism born of Locke’s Two Treatises on Government and 
Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws.  But in the 1780s and 1790s, divided over Jean Jacques 
Rousseau’s conceptions of the social contract and by the French Revolution, the unity of 
the revolutionary generation broke down into bitter and vociferous division.  Steeped in 
the conflicts, calamities, and controversies of his times and possessed of a voracious and 
inventive mind, Charles Brockden Brown could well be expected to have delved into the 
causes and consequences of such momentous happenings and to have critically engaged 
the proffered explanations, correctives, and countermeasures.  Modern art’s association 
with the grotesque can be linked to the philosophical disenchantment following the 
enormities that mark the twentieth century.  Brown’s grotesque narratives are a measure 
of and an answer to the enthusiasms and disillusionments of the late eighteenth century.  
The nature of his engagement, however, has long been debated.  Endeavoring to 
position him along a two-poled spectrum, a few critics have located Brown somewhere 
between neo-classicism and romanticism in his literary practice and judgments.46  When 
it comes to political outlook, critics alternately register either Brown’s conviction or his 
confusion.  If writing from a place of firm conviction, he must be found somewhere 
between Federalist and Jeffersonian, between acolyte and critic of British radical 
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democrats, between republicanism and individualism.47  But if considered confused or 
perhaps simply unsettled in his outlook, he vacillates in the critical record.  In Stephen 
Watt’s biography, Brown progresses along the common trajectory of a youthful radical 
wending toward a stodgy, conservative middle age.  Jane Tompkins sees a confusing 
transformation from author of reactionary nightmares to agent of progressive subversion.  
The opposing impulses within single texts, some assert, evince a deep and almost 
pathological ambivalence.48  In contrast, still others contend that the inconclusiveness and 
indeterminacies are the signs of an immanently rational, intellectual objectivity and 
disinterestedness.49  But if we posit that Brown’s work evinces both purposefulness and 
grotesqueness, then how does his brand of willed weirdness work within / against his 
cultural moment? 
With reason as its guide, the movement for enlightened judgment and for the 
creation of enlightened forms of government, social structures, and cultural productions 
took a different view of remarkable deviations from the standard.  In the rage to measure 
and describe, to quantify and categorize, so characteristic of the turn toward scientism, 
the people of Enlightenment worldviews sought to take the discomfort and disorientation 
out of mysterious or confusing phenomena, even if only through labeling.  Lord Kames 
asserts that a human propensity for cataloguing and categorizing experience based on 
likeness results in the undeniable wonder and grave discomfort when encountering what 
he calls remarkable deviations from the standard. “Monstrous births,” he observes, 
“exciting the curiosity of a philosopher, fail not at the same time to excite a sort of 
horror” (483-4).   
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Against a standard derived from an innate moral sense or from the refinement of 
the universal human capacity for reason, the grotesque stands as a lack or a failing; it 
exists only in a negative sense.  In Kant’s early work on aesthetics, the grotesque is 
characteristic of the backward and the barbaric as well as of the excessively refined.  In 
his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime (1764), he invokes the 
term grotesque to signify an extremely degraded form of beauty and sublimity, a 
declension far from the ideal, exemplified for him by certain cultural practices, such as 
dueling and monastic rituals, and by certain cultural expressions, namely the 
Metamorphoses of Ovid and French fabliaux (“the most miserable grotesqueries ever 
hatched”) (57).  For many, the term grotesque, outside of design terminology, maintained 
an exclusively pejorative connotation.50 
In contrast to grotesques that invoked divine mysteries or provoked profane 
laughter, the art of the period that came closest to the grotesque often took the form of 
caricatures that served to critique the corruption and absurdity of contemporary life.  
From Jonathan Swift’s acerbic A Modest Proposal to Thomas Rowlandson’s and James 
Gillray’s political cartoons, the eighteenth century was a golden age of British satire both 
in belles lettres and visual art.  Popular targets, not surprisingly, include French fashion 
trends, as well as native political figures, policies, and institutions.  English painter and 
cartoonist William Hogarth’s chaotic city scenes of debauchery, cruelty, ugliness, and 
criminality, however, reflect the horrors and absurdities of modern urban life.  Similarly, 
the Spaniard Francisco Goya’s series of etchings Los Caprichos (1799), a mix of realistic 
and fantastical images, depict outrageous and often grimly ludicrous acts of degradation 
and inhumanity.51  The satires of Hogarth and Goya, one art historian observes, 
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exemplify a civic humanist concern with “clarifying the public’s moral vision” (Craske 
146-7).   
Satire exaggerates so as to better reveal folly, vice, ugliness, and error and is 
founded on the idea of unmasking active deception and hypocrisy; but satire, often taking 
the form of caricature, is not in the strictest sense grotesque.  That is, the work that 
pushes distortion and absurdity to the point of the grotesque undermines its own implicit 
reference to a standard of truth, goodness, and beauty.  In a piece from 1775, Christoph 
Martin Wieland, expressing one of the earliest theories of the modern grotesque, 
distinguishes caricature from the grotesque.  His model of the latter is the religious 
imagery of Pieter Brueghel which, he reports, provoked in him “surprise, laughter, and 
disgust” at the apparent absence of any connection to truth or natural order (Kayser 30).  
Thomson explains, “Unlike the satirist, the grotesque writer does not analyse and instruct 
in terms of right and wrong, or true or false, nor does he attempt to distinguish between 
these.  On the contrary, he is concerned to demonstrate their inseparability” (42).   
In contrast to Hogarth and Goya, other artists, they too confronting what they saw 
as cultural failings, use grotesque imagery to express a wary skepticism regarding 
rationality.  Scientific approaches to human affairs are depicted as a potential source of 
perverse logical and moral outcomes.  Piranesi’s imaginary interiors, oppressively 
gloomy and impossibly overbuilt and cavernous, decry the diminution of the emotional, 
spiritual, and aesthetic aspects of human experience.  The Gothic grotesques of Henry 
Fuseli blend the horrific and the erotic in a despairing vision that stands in direct contrast 
with the age’s optimism about the progress of civilization. 
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However, still others considered the possibility that the grotesque held a kind of 
secret knowledge or dark wisdom about the human condition and the complexity of the 
natural and human worlds, whether that understanding was conceived of in spiritual 
terms or in terms more compatible with the rational conception of sublimity.  Some 
artists, including L. J. Desprez and Philippe De Loutherbourg, both of them followers of 
Cagliostro, seemed enamored with the diabolical and darkly mysterious, believing it 
freed the mind of the artist from the rationalists’ imposed limitations on invention 
(Craske 204-7). 
Brown’s novels appeared in the midst of this transition from eighteenth century 
notions toward Romantic notions of the grotesque as expressed first by Germans, like 
Wieland, Schlegel and Jean Paul, and then by Frenchmen, especially Hugo and 
Baudelaire, and, later, by Englishman John Ruskin.  Where Brown actually uses the term 
grotesque, in both his fiction and essays, he retains the neo-classical connotation.  In a 
work of literary criticism, “On the Portraits of Death,” for example, he couples the term 
with the idea of vagueness, with lesser poets, and with the vulgar mass of readers 
(Literary Essays 112).52  When in Ormond the well-to-do, white title character dons a 
blackface disguise and the persona of a simple-minded chimney sweep, the narrator 
pronounces it “the most entire and grotesque metamorphosis imaginable.” “It was,” she 
continues, “stepping from the highest to the lowest rank in society, and shifting himself 
into a form, as remote from his own, as those recorded by Ovid” (134).  The word 
grotesque appears twice in Edgar Huntly where it is used to describe, first, the primitive 
ornamentation of a Native American moccasin and, second, the Native American woman 
Old Deb, who in the eyes of the settler community is a primal being, almost as one with 
40 
 
her dogs.  Thus, the term grotesque and the term chimera, used synonymously at the 
time, convey in Brown’s usage the then-conventional notion of an objectionable 
deficiency, absurdity, or savagery.  But in practice, as we shall see, Brown anticipates the 
modern, post-classicist conception of the grotesque.53 
His grotesques exhibit the resolute indeterminacy of this modern conception, 
which is also the recovery of the eternal or unchanging grotesque, as opposed to the 
assumption of fundamental truths underlying both serious and satirical works.  And in 
this his works appear distinct from his contemporary literary world.  Indeed, in their 
refusal to provide clear-cut moral instruction and the pleasure that comes from fulfilling 
reader expectations, Brown’s grotesque novels are inherently antagonistic to the age’s 
artistic imperatives.  Unlike the social reformers Goya and Hogarth, Brown did not 
position himself as a sane man disgustedly holding up for derisive laughter and scorn a 
portrait of the irrational and corrupt world.  One could pursue, however, some similarities 
with the grotesques that express skepticism toward the optimistic faith in enlightened 
reason, like that of Piranesi and Fuseli; but Brown’s works do not carry the same tone of 
despair or of longing for a lost era. 
Questioning Meaning 
Brown’s fiction explores not merely ideas per se but more inclusively that which 
is driving human actions and human history.  He seems driven by a curiosity about what 
it is that moves people and about the mechanics of belief (what he often refers to as “the 
springs of action”).  In his fiction, he tracks these concerns through a phenomenological 
examination of human belief and human behavior, sketching the outlines of the 
problematic of meaning making.  In showing the evolution of thoughts and feelings in the 
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minds of characters in situations that blur for them the line between the clearly objective 
and the merely subjective, his fictions show that the operation of meaning-making 
involves more than simple conversions of sensory data into ideas.  Human actions and 
judgments, his characters demonstrate, arise from passions and interests shaped by 
circumstance and passing through the available terms and ideas of the historical-cultural 
milieu.  Given Brown’s own historical and cultural milieu we might ask, what particular 
circumstances made him respond to it the way he did?  His personal history may suggest 
something toward an answer.   
From childhood Brown was sickly, bookish, and somewhat socially-reticent.  
Although he would be an early and vigorous champion of a national cultural identity, the 
very young Brown had a mixed experience of the triumph of the American Revolution.  
His father had been among a dozen or so Quakers singled out by a special committee for 
arrest and an eight-month-long detainment early in the war after they had invoked 
religious objections to swearing an oath of loyalty to the revolutionary cause.  Brown, the 
fourth of five sons and one daughter that grew to adulthood, was doted on by his parents 
Elijah, a conveyancer, dry goods retailer, and importer, and Mary Armitt Brown, part of a 
well-off family, who gave him the freethinking intellectual background of the Society of 
Friends and sent him to Robert Proud’s Latin Grammar School.  Classmates there cajoled 
him into joining the Belles Lettres Society, which later became the Society for the 
Attainment of Useful Knowledge; and, after beginning his apprenticeship in the office of 
prominent Philadelphia lawyer Alexander Wilcocks, he participated in the Law Society. 
Both groups were dedicated in their respective fields to honing the skills of writing, 
analysis, and discourse.  In 1793, the year he quit his law apprenticeship, he was witness 
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at close quarters to the physical and moral horrors of a devastating plague and the 
associated panic.  At the same time, the violent vicissitudes of the French Revolution 
presented an on-going demonstration of the paradoxes of human conduct and the human 
condition.   
It was during this period that he had the great good fortune to enjoy the friendship 
as well as the intellectual, moral, and, possibly, material support of some extraordinary, 
up-and-coming young men and women, most importantly a Yale graduate and 
contemporary in age, Elihu Hubbard Smith.  After becoming one of the university’s 
youngest ever graduates at age fifteen, Smith continued his medical studies first in 
Connecticut and then in 1791 in Philadelphia under the illustrious Dr. Benjamin Rush.  
Sometime in the fall or winter of that year he met and befriended Brown.  When a few 
years later Smith settled in New York City to set up his practice, Brown visited often and 
became a member of a conversation circle that Smith founded named the New York 
Friendly Club.  It seems likely that the model of literary industry held before in him in the 
form of Smith, who found time to edit the first anthology of American poetry (1793) and 
write an opera libretto, influenced his decision to leave the law.  Smith, a deist and 
voracious reader of the writings that inspired or were inspired by the French Revolution, 
certainly would have spurred his companion’s engagement with big ideas about reason, 
faith, science, history, and art.  This time would serve as Brown’s ersatz college years, 
and Smith and the people he met through him would have a profound influence on the 
aspiring writer’s intellectual and emotional development as well as his craft and career.   
The Friendly Club, one of many in this era of voluntary associations and societies, 
met weekly for the purpose of intellectual exchange, mutual improvement, and 
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enlightened sociality.  Its members were or would soon become some of the most 
accomplished figures of their generation, including playwright and painter William 
Dunlap; future state supreme court justice James Kent; Samuel Miller, a Presbyterian 
minister; his brother Dr. Edward Miller; and Samuel Latham Mitchell, a future U. S. 
senator.  The latter two were both physicians and co-editors (along with Smith) of the 
nation’s first medical journal Medical Repository (1797-1824).  Together the group 
debated a wide range of issues, informed by and usually in response to recent 
publications from Europe.  Some members reached out to their favored authors, 
exchanging letters across the Atlantic with the thinkers who so inspired them, including 
philosopher and novelist William Godwin and the physician, poet, and natural 
philosopher Erasmus Darwin.  As with these figures, Smith’s circle considered 
compositional skill and literary artistry no secondary attainment.  “Central to the Friendly 
Club’s mission,” Bryan Waterman, author of a monograph on the group explains, “was 
the refinement of their literary sensibilities”; and it was among these friends that Brown 
circulated his fiction as works-in-progress, receiving encouragement, advice, and 
critiques.54  
He wrote at an incredible pace.  In the four years from 1798 through 1801, in 
addition to all six of his published novels (the four major works already mentioned, plus 
Clara Howard and Jane Talbot), a serialized book-length fiction, and a large fragment of 
an unfinished novel, Brown composed the majority of the pieces published in the 
Monthly Magazine, which he edited from its launch in April 1799 until its last issue in 
December 1800.  In his major fiction, Brown combines actual events and the gloomy 
plots of his invention in a bid to call attention to the complex relation of imagination and 
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reality.  Adhering to his own notions of probability (no supernaturalism), he punctuates 
his realism with bizarre occurrences, incredible coincidences, and shocking 
transgressions that court disbelief and perhaps, as we have seen, disgust.  
Brown wrote not finished, closed texts, but rather open-ended and fractured 
narratives, which is not to say that his plots were haphazardly constructed or merely 
meandering streams of invention.55  Responding to this apparent resistance to closure, 
some critics take the view that Brown’s works are test labs of various philosophical 
positions, counterfactual histories that ultimately serve as intellectual exercises in 
disinterested enquiry rather than as a partisan argument.  Although the works do maintain 
integrity in entertaining different viewpoints, in resisting a one-sided presentation, 
Brown, I would argue, does not seek only an idealized state of philosophical objectivity 
for its own sake, as if striving for a position outside the argument, above it.  But this does 
not mean that he offers any straightforward answers either.  Rather he offers a heuristic 
exercise, an experience that evokes a sense of a rich and ever-evolving encounter, more 
like real life, rather than a philosophical argument.   
Constructing the Other and the Self 
Brown’s bizarre gothic tales and chronicles of hopeless romantic dilemmas are in 
essence meditations on the relation between the self and the other, which accounts for 
their being so open to modern critical approaches concerned with constructions of 
otherness, whether colonial, racial, sexual, gendered, or socio-economic.  The narrators 
even expressly address the construction of otherness, particularly its failures.  Clara 
Wieland, justifying her arming herself before meeting with Carwin, declares: “Let that 
man who shall purpose to assign motives to the actions of another, blush at his folly and 
45 
 
forbear.  Not more presumptuous would it be to attempt the classification of all nature, 
and the scanning of supreme intelligence” (146).  And this sentiment echoes through 
subsequent narratives, all told by narrators who either explicitly disclaim or 
unconsciously belie objectivity and special knowledge.  
All of that which in the characters’ minds appears inconsistent, inconclusive, and 
contradictory calls attention to the uncertainty surrounding the self’s constructions of the 
other.  Through encounters with human beings whose appearance, sentiments, or 
behaviors seem to counter expectations, violate categories or concepts, and embody 
contradictions, characters come to discover (or at least reveal to the reader) the 
insuperable limits of those characteristic faculties of the conscious self: perception, 
judgment, imagination, reason, and will.  Sensational incidents, from seemingly 
supernatural phenomena to horrific epidemics to improbable coincidences, engender 
uncertainty about origins and consequences and frustrate the self’s efforts to reduce all 
experience to a pleasing sense of order or comprehension.  
Brown’s novels are portraits of the self estranged from the world and from itself.  
And indeed the failings of the self’s constructions of otherness lead to the self becoming 
an object of its own reflections, in effect, becoming another enigmatical other.  Decades 
before Poe, Brown would use Gothicisms to explore this otherness within.  In his best-
known works Brown uses what he admits in the preface to Wieland are “extraordinary 
and rare” incidents to illustrate the dissociation of the individual’s conscious self from his 
or her emotional and physiological reactions, a sometimes antagonistic bifurcation in the 
ostensibly stable, unified, and knowable self.  This potential for self-conflict is 
spectacularly realized in the spontaneous combustion of the elder Wieland, who tries in 
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vain to repress the demands of his conscience and is killed by a fire originating within.  
But the destructive power of this internal conflict reaches out beyond the self.  Consider 
the unconscious actions of the sleepwalkers in Edgar Huntly and the virtual blackout 
obscuring Constantia’s fatal encounter with Ormond.  Even if such gaps in consciousness 
occur only in rare and extreme instances, they nevertheless demonstrate the self’s 
inability to always know its own motivations or to square its feelings and actions with its 
beliefs and intentions. 56  And even as some characters acknowledge a lack of control 
over or insight into otherness, they do so only to suggest one still has the power and the 
duty to minimize the distortions in the chain of perception, interpretation, and response.  
Adopting an associative psychology like David Hartley’s, Clara Wieland posits, “The 
will is the tool of the understanding, which must fashion its conclusions on the notices of 
sense.  If the senses be depraved it is impossible to calculate the evils that may flow from 
the consequent deductions of the understanding” (Wieland 35).  But even this is too 
optimistic an appraisal of the self’s relative autonomy, for as events shall demonstrate the 
will is the tool of not only the understanding but of unconscious forces and external 
stimuli hidden from conscious awareness.  Clara Wieland herself exemplifies self-
conflicted conduct on more than one occasion, as when she finds herself fascinated with a 
visually unappealing but vocally well-endowed rustic and when she moves to confront 
rather than flee from a closeted intruder.  Later, she wonders at her acquiescing to the 
villainous Carwin’s invitation to meet her: “What was it that swayed me?  I felt myself 
divested of the power to will contrary to the motives that determined me to seek his 
presence.  My mind seemed to be split into separate parts, and these parts to have entered 
into furious and implacable contention” (140).  Despite her name she is unable to achieve 
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clarity regarding her own behavior.  Even her grammatical constructions, although often 
considered examples of Brown’s bad writing, could be read as expressing her experience 
of the dissociation of her will from her actions, as when she slips into passive voice and 
reports the movements of her hand and the knife it holds as if they acted against her wish 
to not harm her menacing brother. 57  The protagonist of another novel, Edgar Huntly, 
laments this perversity of human nature: “Disastrous and humiliating is the state of man!  
By his own hands, is constructed the mass of misery and error in which his steps are 
forever involved” (278).  And Jane Talbot’s lover Henry Colden wonders whether such 
perversity springs from human nature or elsewhere: “And whence this incurable folly—
this rooted incapacity of acting as every motive, generous and selfish, combine to 
recommend?  Constitution; habit; insanity; the dominion of some evil spirit who 
insinuates his baneful power between the will and the act?” (382).  Thus, the novels’ 
grotesqueries demonstrate not only the instability of constructions of the other, but 
equally important the instability of the one making the constructions.  With the loss of the 
self’s stability and credibility, with the unreliability of the faculties of perception, 
imagination, judgment, and will comes the loss of the self’s pretensions to cognitive and 
moral authority. 
Importantly, all the pain caused by the (often extravagant) attempts to overcome 
uncertainty signify not just an epistemological but an ethical critique of the self’s deeply-
rooted habit of categorizing, assigning causes, calculating effects, and otherwise reducing 
all experience to comprehension.  The drive to bring alterity into the realm of the known, 
to transcend all limits on the self’s knowledge and being, comes with a cost.  Considering 
the liabilities of the self, aiming at absolute, transcendent truth, even with the good of 
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others in mind, seems fraught with risk.  Disastrous consequences follow the ostensibly 
selfless actions of many of the characters who seek or claim certainty.  Clithero 
excoriates the well-meaning and obsessively curious Edgar Huntly for his reckless 
intervention:  
You, like others, are blind to the most momentous consequences of your 
own actions.  You talk of imparting consolation.  You boast the 
beneficence of your intentions.  You set yourself to do me a benefit.  What 
are the effects of your misguided zeal and random efforts?  They have 
brought my life to a miserable close.  They have shrouded the last scene of 
it in blood.  They have put the seal to my perdition. (36)  
Before the novel’s end, Edgar’s benevolent actions will result in Euphemia Lorimer’s 
miscarriage and Clithero’s apparent suicide.  In contrast to Edgar’s dedication to the 
cause of serving another, Ormond takes a pessimistic view, believing that “efforts 
designed to ameliorate the condition of an individual, were sure of answering a contrary 
purpose.  The principles of the social machine must be rectified, before men can be 
beneficially active” (112).  In espousing radical Enlightenment views, he disdains 
reigning bourgeois values as an arbitrary and pernicious influence on happiness.  The 
greater good can only be achieved, he argues, by empowering worthy minds to access 
universal truth through true subjectivity.  Blind to the contradictions in his doctrines, he 
zealously promotes Constantia’s enlightenment with an Illuminati-like willingness to 
employ any means necessary, even, in this case, rape or, if need be, necrophilia.  Narrator 
Sophia Courtland says of Ormond, “Considerations of justice and pity were made, by a 
fatal perverseness of reasoning, champions and bulwarks of his most atrocious mistakes” 
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(283); and it is equally true of Brown’s other seekers and ideologues, including Wieland, 
Clithero, Edgar Huntly, Clara Howard, and arguably Arthur Mervyn, all of different 
views but all liable to the errors of false transcendence.  The novels ultimately discredit 
the benevolent intentions of both republicanism’s ideal of civic virtues and the ethical 
subjectivism of liberalism.  Their outcomes demonstrate the futility and indeed ethical 
danger of founding judgments on the false authority of the self.   
Brown’s grotesques suggest that what passes as our knowledge and understanding 
is merely the imposition of meaning onto a fundamentally unknowable universe.  Indeed, 
encounters with the grotesque can be viewed as an opportunity to move toward the 
outside of our systems of thought and beyond systemizing consciousness generally to 
engage otherness qua otherness, rather than reduce it to a cognitive construct, to 
assimilate it into a system of thought.  Such a movement toward the outside requires not 
that the intellect be turned off but that it be put into a continual dialogue with experience 
as it unfolds, experience of the outer world of sensible phenomena and experience of the 
inner world of one’s thoughts and emotions.   
In the chapters that follow, I focus my efforts on attending to a limited number of 
works in great detail in an attempt to exercise the kind of fine awareness of and 
continuous attention to the otherness of these writings that I believe they counsel as an 
ethical praxis.  I begin with a detailed analysis of Wieland and the manner in which the 
novel seems to challenge the conventional moral judgment underscoring the era’s Gothic 
murder narratives.  Taking a close look at the various philosophical outlooks of the major 
characters, I find that each rests upon a distinction between body and mind, between 
selfishness and beneficence that proves untenable.  The appearance of mysterious 
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phenomena and the entrance of an oddly alluring stranger are enough to expose a latent 
and dangerous dynamic within the group of self-consciously enlightened young adults 
who seem oblivious to their own ostensibly virtuous but ultimately murderously 
narcissistic impulses.  My next chapter focuses on Ormond, placing that work in the 
context of the era’s profound concern over and experimentation with the fictionality of 
social and political life.  Whether reactionary or exploitative, the characters’ various 
responses to the increasing malleability of appearances in an ever more commercialized 
and individualistic world prove disastrously misguided.  Ordering schemes that rely on 
the assumption of an underlying, fixed reality and a moral system indexed to it not only 
fail to promote ethical responsibility but even sanction the exploitative and deadly 
instrumentalization of other human beings.  In the actions of the eminently responsive 
and responsible Constantia, Brown offers an alternative to the moral economy of limited 
liability.  Moving on, I dedicate the last chapter to examining the various strands of 
thought that together inform Brown’s remarkable literary practice and find expression in 
his equally remarkable literary essays and reviews.  My aim is to reiterate and reconsider 
the question of the novels’ depictions of truth and the ethical and to trace the sources and 
development of his understanding of literature, of the art of the story-telling moralist, as 
“the most efficacious of moral instruments” (“Walstein’s” 35). 
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Chapter 2: “Abortive Creations”: Incest and Conceptions of Morality in Wieland 
In his courthouse confession, as “faithfully recorded” by one of his hearers, 
Theodore Wieland presents an explicit and, considering the circumstances, somewhat 
straightforward recital of the central event in Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland; or, 
The Transformation: An American Tale [1798](163).  “With a mild countenance,” he tells 
of the night he murdered his wife and children (164).  The account is chilling, not only 
for the subject matter but for the remorselessness even haughtiness with which it is 
delivered.  And as scholars point out, it retains many of the particulars of the actual event 
from which Brown drew his inspiration.  The anonymous “An Account of a Murder 
Committed by Mr. J---Y---, upon His Family, in December, A.D. 1781” appeared in New 
York and Philadelphia newspapers in the summer of 1796 and included the recorded 
statements of the confessed killer James Yates and of the only survivor of his attacks, his 
sister (3).58  In 1801 an early reviewer of Wieland identified this case as that to which 
Brown refers in the prefatory “Advertisement” as a “remarkably similar” incident. 59  And 
indeed the incidents are remarkably similar; a comparison reveals several direct 
borrowings.  Just as in Brown’s fictional work, the real-life father and husband who 
murdered his family was an American farmer, both pious and loving, until a divine 
injunction triggered his sudden violent outburst.  In both accounts, the killer, after slaying 
his nuclear family, goes to the house of his sister to complete his sacrificial offering, only 
to be captured.  And both killers, after their capture, refuse to accept the authority of 
human law to hold them accountable.   
However, Brown makes selective use of his sources, changing and expanding the 
original material in ways that go beyond the literary imperative of crafting a compelling 
52 
 
story.  Much attention has naturally been given to the more substantial additions to the 
central murder narrative: the bizarre and traumatic death of the Wieland siblings’ father 
and, more especially, the introduction of Francis Carwin, a wanderer who wields a 
powerful tool of deception.  To some, Brown’s use of spontaneous human combustion 
and “biloquism,” presented as they are as seemingly wondrous phenomena that are 
nevertheless grounded in “established laws” and “known principles,” suggests the work 
be read as an example of deistic skepticism (19, 3).60  Other readings of Wieland focus on 
the device of biloquism (which combines both mimicry and ventriloquy) as a trope for 
the operations of representative democracy with all its promises and perils.61  Several 
commentators find in Carwin’s manipulations a meta-fictional interrogation of the 
profession of authorship and the place of imagination in the young republic.62  And some 
critics investigating Wieland’s relation to the Yates narrative have focused on some small 
yet thematically significant differences.  Brown, for example, moves the timeframe of 
events to the years between the end of the French and Indian War (1763) and the start of 
the Revolutionary War (1775), the era of America’s incipient self-fashioning.  He also 
changes the location from the Yates’s humble farm in Tomhannock, New York to a large 
estate outside of his hometown of Philadelphia, the cultural and economic center of the 
colonies.  As part of the trend in Brown criticism (and Early American criticism more 
widely) toward the tracing of trans-Atlantic connections, some have argued such changes 
serve to place local events against a background of imperial wars, revolutions, and shifts 
in political and economic power.63   
A common thread running through a good deal of the recent work on Brown’s 
writings is an interest in what can be called their discursive and performative aspects.64  
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However, despite a general consensus in current criticism regarding Brown’s exhumation 
and exploitation of the assumptions embedded in narrative forms, critics otherwise differ 
widely in their conclusions about the novel’s engagement with issues of authority, 
transparency, and transcendence.65  I hope to move beyond, or sidestep, the critical 
impasse as I focus not on a political but on a moral reading and on how the novel calls 
into question the grounds of narrativity and subjectivity through the grotesqueries of the 
sensual body.  
“Beyond the Conception of Human Beings” 
The newspaper notice of the Yates incident was only one of many entries in an 
increasingly popular genre in the latter part of the eighteenth century: the true-crime 
murder narrative.  In Murder Most Foul: The Killer and the Gothic American 
Imagination (1998), historian Karen Halttunen examines many such published accounts 
of homicidal mayhem, tracing in them the development of new narrative strategies for 
coming to terms with human evil in America.  From the seventeenth through the early 
parts of the eighteenth centuries, she explains, public responses to some horrific deed, 
nearly all composed by clergymen, aimed at using the event as an occasion to reflect 
upon the Calvinist doctrine of the innate depravity of all men.  The reader or listener was 
exhorted toward identification with the criminal; the crime was conceived of as a warning 
that God’s grace alone is all that keeps any one of us from committing similar atrocities.  
But as the explanatory power of religious doctrine began to give way to the 
Enlightenment faith in reason, she argues, new narratives emerged, narratives linking the 
criminal act not to mankind’s sinful nature but to more humanistic causes.  As Lockean 
psychology gained adherents, murder narratives, now increasingly penned by laypersons, 
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reflected a newfound interest in environmental factors and their influence on individual 
dispositions and physiologies.  With this rising belief in the individual’s capacity for 
unlimited intellectual and moral development (or degeneration), the origins of murderous 
acts were increasingly sought in the perpetrator’s poor upbringing, in the misapplication 
of his or her reason toward some misbegotten end, in a failure of will in the face of 
passion, or in a derangement of the senses.  And yet, developing in tandem with such 
naturalistic approaches was a fascination with the extraordinary cases, those instances for 
which these explanations did not fit the facts.  In defiance of the supposedly universal 
moral sense, some who were raised in good environments killed dispassionately and 
without apparent illicit motive.  Troubled by such explanatory failures, Halttunen argues, 
“the emerging secular literature organized the popular response to murder within a set of 
narrative conventions that are most usefully characterized as Gothic” (3).  Referring to 
both factual and fictive murder narratives, she explains, “The gothic tale of murder 
repeatedly and ritualistically failed to assign meaning to the crime because it sought to 
comprehend radical human evil within the larger intellectual context of Enlightenment 
liberalism, which did not recognize radical human evil” (4).  Newspaper articles, 
broadsides of criminal confessions, and pamphlets concerned with sensational crimes, 
especially murder, focused more and more on the horrific details of the criminal act and 
on its seemingly unaccountable nature.  The graphic account of the Yates familicide, in 
which children’s brains are dashed out, a wife’s face battered beyond recognition, and a 
young girl’s forehead split with an axe, ends with expressions of bafflement and terrible 
awe: “The cause of his wonderfully cruel proceedings,” the writer declares, “is beyond 
the conception of human beings” (rpt. in Waterman Wieland 270).  
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And it is in the apparent lack of any clear explanation that the meaning, the moral 
of the story, is embedded.  Gothic horror and mystery, whether adopted consciously or 
not, became a means of accounting for evil doings, a way of defending against the 
unsettling notion of an inherent, irreducible irrationality in human nature and conduct.  
Halttunen argues that even the “narratives of incomprehension, whose common pattern 
was to try and fail to come to terms with the crime within the contemporary liberal view 
of human nature” ultimately upheld the underlying view of human nature as innately 
good, rational, and capable of self-government (46).  They did so by characterizing the 
killer as a “a moral monster from whom readers were instructed to shrink, with a sense of 
horror that confirmed their own ‘normalcy’ in the face of the morally alien, and with a 
sense of mystery that testified to their own inability even to conceive of such an aberrant 
act” (5).  Thus, the evil that men do, according to the early Gothic narrative, is not done 
by men (or women) at all, properly understood, but by those who have lost their claim to 
humanity: the madmen, the savages, and the perverts.  “The new Gothic murderer—like 
the villain in Gothic fiction–was first and last a moral monster, between whom and the 
normal majority yawned an impassable gulf,” Halttunen writes (5).  
Against this exhaustively researched and cogent analysis of the embedded 
assumptions in non-fiction murder narratives and the manner in which they reflect and 
shape the emergent modern subject and its moral self-image, Brown’s novelization of the 
Yates account appears all the more strange.66  For its readers, Wieland offers neither the 
consolation of rational explanation nor the moral absolution of blaming the inconceivably 
evil other.  Or perhaps one could say that through its multiplicity of voices it 
incongruously and inconclusively offers both.  The bizarre occurrences strangely, 
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incompletely explained reveal the limitations of human reason, as do those of preceding 
Gothic narratives.  But the resolute uncertainties of Wieland, obtaining in the face of 
different explanatory structures, call into question the very ground of truth and meaning 
and serve to dissolve any absolute distinction between reality and illusion, reason and 
madness, word and world, even subject and object.  And the fractured and confessedly 
confused first-person narrative, which in preceding Gothic works implicitly manifests the 
virtuous incomprehension of the narrator (and the gentle reader), in this novel works to 
undermine any categorical separation of good men and grotesque monsters.  
“The Moral Constitution of Man” 
In the prefatory “Advertisement,” Brown claims the aim of the work is “the 
illustration of some important branches of the moral constitution of man” and goes on to 
defend his use of “extraordinary and rare” incidents by asserting that “it is the business of 
moral painters to exhibit their subject in its most instructive and memorable forms” (3).  
That moral instruction, however, passes through the opaque medium of an unreliable 
narrator, the archly named Clara Wieland.67  Obscuring matters more, Clara’s narrative 
comprises multiple perspectives on the strange events, perspectives that vary not only 
from person to person but also within individuals and, particularly in her own case, from 
one time to another.  As we first encounter her, writing soon after her brother’s suicide, 
the historicizing Clara introduces a detailed narrative of the events leading up to the 
destruction of her entire family and of her will to live.  She endeavors, as she claims, not 
for her sake, but only to inform her unnamed family friend or friends of everything that 
has happened and to perhaps offer some benefit to mankind in the form of a 
psychological case study and cautionary tale.  But this initial stoicism and magnanimity 
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yield in the next breath to an upwelling of dismay and outrage—“Listen to my narrative, 
and then say what it is that has made me deserve to be placed on this dreadful eminence, 
if, indeed, every faculty be not suspended in wonder that I am still alive, and am able to 
relate it”—before settling into a more dispassionate, reportorial tone (6).68  After 
summarizing her father’s “turbulent life and mysterious end,” her and her brother’s 
otherwise idyllic childhood, and their leisured life of enlightened conviviality with the 
Pleyel siblings, Catharine, whom Theodore marries, and Henry, who is the object of 
Clara’s romantic visions, this Clara, however, appears only intermittently throughout the 
narrative, often to comment upon the extreme difficulty of writing it (83).  Clara the 
historian more often fades into the background as she channels the immediate 
impressions and interpretations of the Clara-within-the-story, the “sufferer of these 
disasters” (147).  It is yet another, rather changed Clara that narrates the last chapter, an 
epilogue composed three years after the much longer preceding letter.  And each of these 
Claras takes a different view of what happens and what it all means, most especially in 
regards to the assignment of blame and the attitude toward the supposed Gothic villain, 
Francis Carwin. 
Throughout their acquaintance with him, everything Clara and the others thought 
they knew about Carwin proves to be wrong.  He simply does not fit into the narratives 
by which they try to solve the problem of his identity and intentions.  On first seeing him, 
Clara infers from his clothing that he is a stereotypical rustic and reflects “on the alliance 
which commonly subsists between ignorance and the practice of agriculture” (51).  Upon 
the next encounter, however, he shocks her with his classical eloquence.  Similarly, 
Pleyel, who had met Carwin on his travels in Europe, believed him to be a native of 
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Spain before accepting his assertion that he is an Englishman by birth.  Yet, the 
newcomer later tells Clara he is like them, a fellow Pennsylvanian (199).  Also, despite 
his own apparent confession, he is not a “ravisher” (97, 209).  His explanation that he has 
hidden in Clara’s closet in order to lay siege to her honor is, as he subsequently admits, 
merely a cover story improvised to preserve the secret of his biloquial talents.  That she 
readily accepts his assertions about his predatory intentions and their being thwarted by a 
supernatural foe speaks to how neatly his fiction reproduces the Gothic and seduction 
narratives by which the era was increasingly expressing and ordering its worldview.   
But in striking contrast to the mantle of mystery adorning the sublimely diabolical 
evil-doers of the conventional Gothic melodrama, the indeterminacy of Carwin is, like his 
rustic attire, more homespun.  He seems both too sympathetic and too pathetic a character 
to be a Gothic villain.  His duplicity and evasions, as later revealed, are the products of 
his all-too-human insecurities and impulses, of both the self-serving and the benevolent 
sort.  And his auditory illusions, like his false confession to being a phantom-haunted 
would-be rapist, succeed due less to his demoniacal cleverness and more to his auditors’ 
preconceptions.  As to his having uttered the decree that spurred the killings, Carwin’s 
accuser, reflectively citing the signs of surprise and horror she read in his body language, 
finds she cannot convict him.69  Finally, after struggling and failing to rationalize her 
indictment of him as the agent ultimately responsible for her family’s destruction, the 
historicizing Clara ends the penultimate chapter with a suicidal resignation to her 
miserable fate and to the vexed question of Carwin’s guilt.   
Even after confronting the true killer, Clara finds less certainty not more.  The 
unrepentant murderer Theodore Wieland, though behaving like a madman, is not the 
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moral alien one expects to find in a Gothic narrative either.  Before his bloody rampage, 
Wieland is a paragon of virtue and reasonableness.  He is pious and, in a way aligned 
with progressive Enlightenment views, he is egalitarian in his relations with women.  
And Clara, knowing that the mysterious voices were heard by more than just her brother 
alone, cannot accept Dr. Cambridge’s explanation that the well-intentioned man has 
fallen victim to maniacal illusions “not more difficult of explication and cure than most 
affections of our frame” (179).  As long as science can neither account for the strange 
phenomena nor, as Clara avers, disprove supernatural intelligences, Wieland’s 
interpretation of events remains not altogether implausible (181).  Given what appeared 
to be the case, then, this confessed killer’s actions are not, strictly speaking, irrational; 
and, if conscious intent is the measure, neither are they unethical.70  Moreover, Clara 
expressly admires his near Christ-like faith in the very act that makes him the destroyer 
of her family and almost of her own life.  Even after her brother’s repeated attempts to 
kill her, she thinks of him as one “who has vied with the great teacher of [his] faith in 
sanctity of motives, and elevation above sensual and selfish!” (231).   
Unlike other early Gothic narratives, Wieland’s ostensible villains and heroes 
seem to carry the source of their grandiose errors and spectacular vices in their very 
humanity, in that with which readers can identify, not as foreign influence, like the 
dæmonic intercession hypothesized by Clara, not as a perversion of the natural order of 
the human mind, the view of Dr. Cambridge, but as an extension of their supposed virtues 
of goodness, rationality, and self-governance.  Writing of her brother, Clara sums up her 
rather un-Gothic circumstances:  
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What a tale had thus been unfolded!  I was hunted to death, not by one 
whom my misconduct had exasperated, who was conscious of illicit 
motives, and who sought his end by circumvention and surprise; but by 
one who deemed himself commissioned for this act by heaven, who 
regarded this career of horror as the last refinement of virtue, whose 
implacability was proportioned to the reverence and love which he felt for 
me, and who was inaccessible to the fear of punishment and ignominy! 
(189) 
Thus, when one considers the common pattern of the era’s murder narratives, which 
approached the problem of human evil by denying the humanity of the evil-doer, it 
becomes apparent that Clara’s attempts to construct such a narrative, one that “tries and 
fails to come to terms with the crime within the contemporary liberal view of human 
nature,” is itself a failure.  Readers expecting the exposure of the villain as an inhuman 
moral alien are left at a loss.   
Notwithstanding the explanations and pat moralizations offered by Clara the 
revisionist in the final chapter (to which I will return later), the causes, meanings, and 
very reality of events remain hopelessly obscured.  Despite some similarities to the 
“explained supernaturalism” exemplified by Anne Radcliffe’s novels, the mysteries of 
Mettingen do not fall to rational explanation; they do not conform to any coherent 
narrative structure.71  That is, for each of the strange incidents, the novel offers enough 
detail to support a number of provisional conjectures, some complementary, some 
mutually exclusive; but in the final analysis none is without serious flaws.  Questions 
both factual and moral remain unanswered.72   
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But in the characters’ repeated efforts to make sense of these experiences and of 
their own actions and inner worlds, Wieland quite effectively calls attention to the 
complex operations of human comprehension and human conduct, to the contending 
means of ascertaining truth, and to what might be broadly thought of as the problematic 
relation of content and form.  The grotesqueries of the elder Wieland’s demise and of 
Francis Carwin’s person and performances disrupt and denaturalize the relation of form 
to content, complicating notions of symbolic representations (the relation of language and 
narrative to events and meaning) and of personal identity (the relation of mind to body, of 
subject to object, and of inside to outside).  Moreover, the grotesqueries are not limited to 
what is in the narrative (its content) but also obtain in the language and structure of the 
narrative (its form).   
As Mark Seltzer has already pointed out, much of the strangeness of this story’s 
content arises from the fact that language in the narrative repeatedly transforms as if by 
sympathetic magic into actual events: metaphor becomes reality, or as Seltzer puts it, 
“saying makes it so.”  Taking Seltzer’s insight further, we notice that not only do 
characters’ words become their realities; these transformations reverberate throughout 
their social network.73  Connecting the experiences of different characters are events, 
language, and actions that occur, recur, and recur again in a repeating pattern of like 
meeting and mating with like, producing copies of itself, but with increasing intensity and 
evermore exaggerated effect.  In the proliferation of seemingly commonplace and 
innocuous imagery—for example, the light of truth and transcendence and the precipices, 
abysses, storms, billows, and fiery eruptions of worldly danger and destruction—we see a 
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kind of conceptual inbreeding, an incestuous relation producing monstrous effects in the 
material world. 
The presentation of an earlier incident, the “strange and terrible” end of Clara and 
Theodore Wieland’s father, initiates the narrative’s extended engagement with the 
mysteries of physical and symbolic embodiment (13).  Although on the night of his death 
the elder Wieland spoke of his being doomed for neglecting to carry out a command from 
God (a doom announced to him in a voice that only he could hear), Clara’s uncle, the 
surgeon Thomas Cambridge, who is the source of her knowledge of the incident, 
considers more naturalistic explanations for the catastrophe that soon followed.  A 
mysterious bang and flash calling him to the temple where the elder Wieland performed 
his solitary midnight orations, Cambridge finds the badly burned man dying from horrific 
injuries.  The more immediate ideas that the elder Wieland had been struck by lightning, 
however, or that he had been attacked (first, cudgeled by someone carrying a lantern, 
then, intentionally or not, set ablaze) appear unsatisfactory to the narrator’s mind, 
because such explanations, we are told, are inconsistent with a number of details, 
including the father’s “gloomy anticipations and unconquerable anxiety,” his assumed 
security from harm due to his character and “the place and conditions of the times,” as 
well as the cloudless skies.  Readers may be right to note that the narrator, who we must 
remember is the victim’s daughter, too easily dismisses the possibility of an attack.  The 
dying elder Wieland’s account strikes his brother-in-law as “an imperfect tale” such that 
he “was inclined to believe that half the truth had been suppressed” (18).  This the 
victim’s evasiveness along with the glancing reference to slave labor forming the basis of 
the Wieland fortune may suggest to readers both a possible nearby killer and a motive.74  
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But if Cambridge’s own eyewitness testimony is to be believed, and Clara argues it 
should be “because no man’s temper is more skeptical, and his belief is unalterably 
attached to natural causes,” then we are still left unable to account for such details as “the 
fiery cloud that enveloped [the victim], without detriment to the structure, though 
composed of combustible materials” and “the sudden vanishing of this cloud at [her] 
uncle’s approach” (19).  Clara considers another explanation: the (pseudo-) naturalistic 
phenomenon of spontaneous human combustion, or to use her terms, “the irregular 
expansion of the fluid that imparts warmth to our heart and our blood caused by the 
fatigue of the preceding day, or flowing, by established laws, from the condition of his 
thoughts” (19).  Here is appended an academic-style footnote referencing an actual Italian 
journal’s account of an apparent case of spontaneous human combustion that resulted in 
injuries exactly like those of the elder Wieland.  Both the novel’s author (that is, the 
author as he presents himself here, what we might call the author character) and its 
narrator seem to draw on the language and the authority of science.  However, just as in 
the original account, pieces of the puzzle do not fit—such as the victim’s testimony that a 
spark fell upon his clothes, igniting them as from an external source—and science seems 
to have only an imperfect grasp on the phenomenon.  And thus, despite the stated claim 
that researchers have “thrown some light upon this subject,” the authorial intervention 
seems only to cloud the issue (19).75  As the noxious stench of “insupportable exhalations 
and crawling putrefactions” drives everyone from the house to seek escape, the father’s 
grotesque body, we might say, provokes an ideological retreat, with characters fleeing 
this existential threat, seeking, according to their background and makeup, various 
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comforting notions of an objective reality and of a language able to faithfully convey it 
(18). 
“Sublimer Views” 
In their reflections upon this foundational event, Clara and her brother evince 
their respective epistemologies and emotional dispositions, as well as their aesthetic and 
moral sensibilities—all of which the text serves to call into question and call to account.  
Clara’s tale of her father’s demise, ending as it does without resolution, with only a list of 
conjectures in the form of unanswered queries, is in keeping with her younger self’s 
unexamined notions of the nature and the grounds of knowledge.  By her own admission, 
hers was a rather undisciplined search for truth.  Whether in regard to material or spiritual 
truth, she was apt to focus less on ordering her thoughts than on attending to her 
sensations.  Describing the nature and development of her worldview, she insists, “It 
must not be supposed that we [she and Catharine, with whom she shares a temperament 
and an education,] were without religion, but with us it was the product of lively feelings, 
excited by reflection on our own happiness, and by the grandeur of external nature” (22).  
Clara perceives and judges according to the dictates of sentiment and a vaguely defined 
moral sensibility, less an epistemology than an aesthetic.  When confronted with the 
unknown, her attention turns to the pleasurable sensations mystery affords:   
My reflections [on my father’s death] never conducted me to certainty, but 
the doubts that existed were not of a tormenting kind.  I could not deny 
that the event was miraculous, and yet I was invincibly averse to that 
method of solution.  My wonder was excited by the inscrutableness of the 
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cause, but my wonder was unmixed with sorrow or fear.  It begat in me a 
thrilling, and not unpleasing solemnity. (34-5)  
What she describes here is a taste for the sublime, what Enlightenment thinkers like 
Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant defined as the species of delight arising from 
contemplating at a safe distance that which evokes fear and awe.76  Her valorization of 
sublime affect is also in evidence in her remarks on the deadly imperialist conflicts raging 
somewhere out beyond the boundaries of the Wielands’ comfortable estate:  
The sound of war had been heard, but it was at such a distance as to 
enhance our enjoyment by affording objects of comparison.  The Indians 
were repulsed on the one side, and Canada was conquered on the other.  
Revolutions and battles, however calamitous to those who occupied the 
scene, contributed in some sort to our happiness, by agitating our minds 
with curiosity, and furnishing causes of patriotic exultation. (26) 
Although these remarks may suggest a lack of compassion or at least a kind of 
obliviousness, they are certainly intended to reflect something like an acute sensitivity.  
In Enlightenment thought, the refinement of one’s ability to appreciate the sublime, that 
is, the development of one’s aesthetic sensibility, or taste, was considered an exercise of 
the same mental faculty responsible for moral judgment.77  The sensations elicited by 
great spectacles and delicate beauties, whether artistic productions, epic human events, or 
“the grandeur of external nature,” were dependent upon the perceiving subject’s 
perfection of disinterested discernment, the degree to which one could appreciate 
phenomena that offered no direct material benefit, that served no personal needs and 
gratified no base, that is, merely bodily desires.78   
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 Clara represents the era’s proto-romantic faith in sensibility, both an outgrowth of 
and reaction against Enlightenment rationalism.  Distrustful of a strict reliance on abstract 
logic and skeptical of the adequacy and transparency of language, she defers instead to a 
natural language of true feelings faithfully conveyed in tones, gestures, looks, and other 
non-verbal cues.  Born of the Lockean idea that knowledge derives from sensory 
experience and sensitive to questions of both truth and values, the school of sensibility 
recognized the need to guard against false appearances and specious claims.  Clara 
writes, “The will is the tool of understanding, which must fashion its conclusions on the 
notices of sense.  If the senses be depraved, it is impossible to calculate the evils that may 
flow from the consequent deductions of the understanding” (35).  And reflecting upon her 
own later behavior, her unaccountable fixation with Carwin’s face, Clara observes, “So 
flexible, and yet so stubborn, is the human mind.  So obedient to impulses the most 
transient and brief, and yet so unalterably observant of the direction which is given to it!” 
(54).  This mechanistic view of the workings of the mind, of its susceptibility to external 
influence, serves, on one hand, to deflect responsibility for one’s thoughts and actions but 
also carries an admonition to be vigilant against deception and the infectious power of 
words, what John Adams called the “soft compulsion” (qtd. in Fliegelman xxxvi).  Unlike 
The Mystery of Udolpho’s Emily St. Aubert and, of course, Northanger Abbey’s 
Catherine Morland, Clara Wieland projects an image of cultivated sensibility as well as 
great self-control.  Exemplifying her relative independence and her desire to be “an 
economist of pleasure,” she insists upon living apart from Wieland and his wife, alone, 
but for her young maid Judith, in a house three quarters of a mile distant from the main 
house (22).  Refined and sensible, she is unimpressed by tales of ghosts and robbers and 
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explicitly disdains the plebian pleasures of terror novels.  Instead, she and her cohorts 
indulge their thoroughly modern tastes in the study of Ciceronian rhetoric, in 
performances of German productions of an “adventurous and lawless fancy,” and in 
discussions of natural spectacles, such as the waterfall at Monongahela, all of which 
marks the group’s elite sensitivity to and rational, disinterested appreciation of the effects 
of the sublime, the beautiful, and the picturesque. 
Yet the balance of sensibility and reason varies in each of the Mettingenites.  
Turning in her remarks from her and her friend’s outlook to Wieland’s rather more sober 
deportment, Clara in her equivocal, noncommittal way states that she “will not say 
whether he was indebted to sublimer views for this disposition,” once again conflating 
aesthetics, epistemology, and moral being (22).  In contrast to the sensational 
epistemology of Clara and Catharine who “sought not a basis for [their] faith, in the 
weighing of proofs, and the dissection of creeds” and whose “devotion was a mixed and 
casual sentiment, seldom verbally expressed, or solicitously sought, or carefully 
retained,” Wieland’s rigid certainty regarding his father’s death— he always saw it “as 
flowing from a direct and supernatural decree”—and his considered philosophical views 
more broadly, arise from a deep religious faith combined with the diligent pursuit of truth 
through intense study and the exercise of strict logic (35, 22).  “All his actions and 
practical sentiments,” Clara writes, “are linked with long abstruse deductions from the 
system of divine government and the laws of our intellectual constitution.  He is, in some 
respects, an enthusiast, but is fortified in his belief by innumerable arguments and 
subtilties” (35).  Thus, in character he is much like his father, Clara explains, “but the 
mind of the son was enriched by science, and embellished with literature” (23).  Like the 
68 
 
elder Wieland, whose narrow constructions of religious scripture, starting with the 
injunction “Seek and ye shall find,” results in his finding only what he seeks, the younger 
Wieland too “discovers only confirmations of his faith” (25).  In Theodore’s worldview, 
we see the father’s Manichean binaries of good and evil (derived from Albigensian 
teachings that associated good with the realm of spirit and evil with the world of physical 
being) strengthened by their parallels with Enlightenment optimism regarding the quasi-
divine power of human reason and with the liberal view of human nature in which evil 
actions evince the usurpation of rationality by sensuality.   
The sober and pious Wieland meets his match in erudition and discernment, we 
are told, when Catharine’s brother, the glib and irreverent Henry Pleyel, enters the picture 
after some years in Europe.  As his French surname and German educational background 
suggest, Pleyel brings to the group the ideas advanced by the philosophes and the 
aufklarer, those progressive thinkers who opposed traditional ideas of authority in favor 
of individualism and humanist rationalism.  Comparing the two young men, Clara 
reports: 
Their creeds [ . . . ] were in many respects opposite.  Where one 
discovered [in the history and metaphysics of religion] only confirmations 
of his faith, the other could find nothing but reasons for doubt.  Moral 
necessity, and calvinistic inspiration, were the props on which my brother 
thought proper to repose.  Pleyel was the champion of intellectual liberty, 
and rejected all guidance but that of his reason. (25) 
Turning away from theological arguments to a system of theorizing based on logical 
extrapolation from empirical evidence, the purveyors of Pleyel’s way of thinking strove 
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to naturalize the traditional hierarchical division found in both the Cartesian duality of 
mind and body and the Calvinistic antinomies of selfless faith and fleshly sin.  What were 
once considered separate and qualitatively different ontological realms came to be 
reconciled by Enlightenment thinkers into a “dynamic natural system subject to general 
laws of growth and development” (Martin and Barresi 141).  However, the underlying 
value structure stayed in place.  In the new, modern view, the individual progressed, with 
proper external guidance and with internal will power and discipline, from venal 
sensuality to disinterested reason.79 
  As such, Clara’s assertion that Henry and Theodore espoused contending systems 
of thought, both of which contrasted with her and Catharine’s less aggressively 
intellectual dispositions, belies an underlying commonality.  Each in their own way, the 
inhabitants of Mettingen believe they can achieve and ought to strive for the ascension of 
the mind over the body, the ethereal psyche over the sensual and corporeal form.  
Whether it is a rationalistic spirituality that privileges the soul over the earthly container 
(as with Wieland) or an aesthetic intellectuality that privileges reason and refined 
sensibility, over the limitations and corruptibility of the senses (as with Pleyel and, 
somewhat differently, with Clara), the different conceptions of the self portrayed in the 
novel share a common idealization of immaterial consciousness, of what may be 
conceptualized as a disembodied intelligence. 
Enter Carwin.  Trouble erupts when the ideal of disembodied intelligence is made 
literal by this newcomer whose talent for mimicry combined with ventriloquy enables 
him to produce voices (metonym for consciousnesses, souls, or minds) that seemingly 
exist independent of a speaking body.  After his entrance upon the stage, storm clouds 
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(both external and internal) roil Clara’s peace of mind.  “Something whispered that the 
happiness we at present enjoyed was set on mutable foundations,” she laments (54).  
Indeed, the illusion of unmediated access to transcendent truth precipitates an “uproar of 
the elements” in which the basic constituents of the group’s physical and symbolic 
realities quickly lose their stability and their coherence.  In ways both figurative and 
literal, the seemingly solid grounds of their belief open up beneath their feet, the light of 
truth flares into infernal delusions, and their picturesque stream echoes with their darkest 
fears and desires.  The once immutable verities of Mettingen, the assumption of their 
virtue and integrity as individuals and as a group and the belief that the future held only 
happiness, all devolve into terror, cruelty, and death. 
Worse yet is that the near obliteration of their world is born of a dynamic of 
attempted and failed self-perpetuation.  In their construction of meaning—the way in 
which they both construe and create their reality—is a pattern of repetition and 
amplification in which a characteristic certitude becomes more pronounced until it attains 
a palpable and grotesque materiality.  This dynamic, I argue, is best understood in terms 
of a feature of the narrative that has still more to yield to critical attention: its irregular 
sexuality. 
“A Different Sex” 
 In his biography of Brown, William Dunlap offers this description of one of his 
friend’s most memorable creations: “The great cause of all the evils, which befall 
Wieland and his family, Carwin the biloquist, is a character approaching to the sublime, 
from the mystery thrown around him, and yet at times inspiring sentiments of disgust, 
and even contempt” (15).  Although Dunlap’s attribution of the “great cause of all the 
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evils” is misleading, if not outright wrong—Carwin’s presence and his vocal trickery do 
not directly cause but rather occasion the implosion of the enlightened yet insular circle at 
Mettingen—, the description does capture something of the effect the character has on the 
Wieland group and on readers.  Carwin’s mysterious otherness calls up something like 
the awe and astonishment of the sublime; but instead of self-ennobling feelings, like 
those inspired by external grandeur or displays of terrible power, characters and readers 
who encounter the itinerant illusionist experience the strange and disabling sensation of 
being fascinated by the repulsive.  Notably the only character in the narrative given any 
physical description, Carwin is marked by both his seemingly otherworldly ability to 
transcend material trappings and physical laws and by his undeniably ugly corporeality.  
That is, more than simply a challenge to the group’s systems of thought, Carwin’s 
sensational deceptions and his non-normative physical being are provocations of their 
embodied selves.  One might say, in keeping with the novel’s recurring image of light 
and combustion, that he provides the spark that ignites the Mettingenites’ volatile 
carnality.   
Upon his first introduction in the narrative, the enigmatic stranger arouses an 
intellectual curiosity, but also a vague unease and, significantly, an erotic fascination.  
Seen from a distance traversing and apparently savoring the grandeur of Mettingen, 
Carwin, in the garb of a country bumpkin, draws the notice of Clara, who studies him 
“with more than ordinary attention” for reasons she knows not why and lingers on his 
image long after he is gone from view (50-1).  The cut, material, and fit of his clothes, the 
dust on his shoes, as well as the proportions of his frame and the character of his gait 
come under her gaze; but not recognizing the nature of her unusual interest in him she 
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intellectualizes on “the alliance which commonly subsists between ignorance and the 
practice of agriculture” (51).  Although she reduces the man to a type, an object of 
contemplation, his unusual hold on her attention calls into question just who is the subject 
and who the object.  Her musings, too, express a combination of condescension and 
infatuation.  For as she indulges in (or submits to) “airy speculations as to the influence 
of progressive knowledge in dissolving this alliance, and embodying the dreams of the 
poets,” she is formulating her ideal man in the image of this rustic farmer of refined 
sensibilities.  (It is an ideal, we might note, drawn also from that gentleman farmer, her 
much-admired brother.)   
This ambiguous reverie serves as prelude to that which she “count[s] among the 
most extraordinary incidents of [her] life” (53).  When half an hour later a visitor at the 
door accosts Clara’s maid with what may be a veiled sexual solicitation, Clara overhears 
the dialogue from another room.80  The stranger’s words, though pregnant with obscure 
meanings, are noted merely as “somewhat singular,” while the tones and the manner of 
their delivery, Clara confesses, have a strong effect on her.  Her initial “involuntary and 
incontrollable” response to his oratorical display—she “mechanically” and symbolically 
drops her cloth, she feels an overflowing from her heart and eyes—blurs the line between 
the effects of the sublime and the tokens of a sexual arousal.  Her inability to see the 
owner of the powerfully affecting voice heightens her awareness of the body hidden from 
sight; and as she listens, her fancy conjures up a “form, and attitude, and garb worthy to 
accompany such elocution” (52).  The body’s absence serves to make it all the more 
present to her consciousness, but only as an imagined extension of or lucid index to the 
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orator’s character and intellect; she expects the material form to faithfully express the 
masterful mentality.  
  Her fantasy, however, is short-lived; and her faith in the revelations of natural 
language as with so many other expectations, conjectures, and assumptions in this 
narrative, is exposed and exploded.  When the two unexpectedly meet moments later, she 
is stunned by the speaker’s “inverted cone” of a face, his gangly physique, and his 
uncouth attire.  In a sudden reverse, Carwin’s clothing, body, and physiognomy—
deviating far from standards of correctness and “wide of beauty”—challenge the 
normative ideas of embodiment, of the connection between physical being and 
immaterial identity (53).81  His problematic physicality stymies her habitual attempt to 
read outward appearances as more or less faithful indices of some meaning beyond.  She 
seems forced instead to look at, not through him.  Indeed, for a time she seems unable to 
do anything other than fixate on the image of him in her mind’s eye.  The transports of 
the sublime give way to the incapacitation of the grotesque. 
But the conscious self will not abide the sense of powerlessness and uncertainty 
for long.  It is in keeping with her sensibilities that, not knowing what else to do with 
these incongruous thoughts and feelings triggered by him, Clara turns the stranger into an 
art object, putting a psychological distance between herself and the stranger by spending 
the rest of the day meticulously drawing his likeness, aestheticizing his fascinating 
otherness.82  In admiring the resulting composition as “unexceptionable,” she, in effect, 
momentarily transforms the unnerving experience into an occasion for self-satisfaction 
(53).  However, this reassertion of reason’s sovereignty over her ungovernable affectivity 
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falters as she becomes absorbed by the image she has composed.  In what serves as a kind 
of veiled confession of her sexual attraction, Clara demurs, 
I can account for my devotion to this image no otherwise, than by 
supposing that its properties were rare and prodigious.  Perhaps you will 
suspect that such were the first inroads of a passion incident to every 
female heart, and which frequently gains a footing by means even more 
slight, and more improbable than these.  I shall not controvert the 
reasonableness of the suspicion, but leave you at liberty to draw, from my 
narrative, what conclusions you please. (54)                               
The (probably) unintended pun in the last sentence calls attention to the way in which her 
drawing serves to satisfy her need for—if not meaning, then—a sense of closure or 
containment. 
And yet the experience of stormy passions, externally realized in the torrential 
rain and echoing thunder outside, leaves her rattled.  The encounter with Carwin has 
shaken her faith in a grounded, orderly, and benevolent universe.  In her mind, she dwells 
upon the images of her brother and his children in vain, as the thought of them only 
increases her dread of “the uncertainty of life” (55).  Thoughts of death flow as if quite 
naturally from her erotic reverie.  And in a clever bit of plotting, her thoughts seem to 
materialize again (in the form of one of Carwin’s ruses) into actual menaces of murder in 
a scene in which voices from her closet can be overheard arguing over how best to 
murder her.  This linking of sexual desire and death becomes a recurring theme in her 
narrative.  Later, when her physical longings again threaten to overturn her rational self-
possession, when Pleyel’s unexpected absence tempts her to flaunt convention and 
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declare her love openly, Clara further develops her association of erotic passion with not 
only desire and suffering (the two senses of the word) but, indeed, with a kind of death 
wish.  She comes to blame the “hateful and degrading impulses which had lately 
controuled me” for making her mind “the victim of [ . . . ] imbecility.”  It is an imbecility, 
she reflects, that may have been “coeval with the first inroads of a fatal passion; a passion 
that will never rank me in the number of its eulogists; it was alone sufficient to the 
extermination of my peace: it was itself a plenteous source of calamity, and needed not 
the concurrence of other evils to take away the attractions of existence, and dig for me an 
untimely grave” (83).  Thus, again her mind moves from the consciousness of 
ungovernable desires to the indignities and liabilities of embodied existence.  As she puts 
it, “the state of my mind naturally introduced a train of reflections upon the dangers and 
cares which inevitably beset an human being.  By no violent transition was I led to 
ponder on the turbulent life and mysterious end of my father” (83).   
She is not alone in equating the loss of reason’s sovereignty over the body’s 
passions with the end of life as she knows and values it, that is, with the end of her 
identity.  Neither is she alone in her active response to this existential threat.  Aware of 
and appalled at the disunity of her own thoughts, she seeks out some touchstone, a 
confirmation of an absolute truth and a true language.  Unable to sleep, Clara seeks 
solace in reconnecting with her father through his memoirs.  To her mind this manuscript, 
“by no means recommended by its eloquence,” is a kind of artless text with an 
“unaffected and picturesque simplicity” that thereby faithfully transmits a “most useful” 
understanding of “human manners and passions” (83).  Clara’s sublimation of her 
unsettling sensuality, of bodily desires and aversions, into an ostensibly virtuous 
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sensibility—one yearning to discern and embrace transcendent truth, beauty, and 
goodness—will find echoes in the psychologies of each of the other major characters.  So 
too will its consequent failure. 
At Mettingen, corporeality, that is, the material self and its connection to the 
physical world through its needs, its urges, its susceptibilities to influence, appears 
(conspicuous in its concealment) in the form of a muted, denied, and refracted sexuality.  
Each member of the group manifests a desire to exercise sovereignty over the sexual 
body, to be independent of the social and biological constraints and compulsions of 
gendered embodiment, to be, finally, what the phantom voice seems to be and what 
Carwin claims he can be: “of a different sex” (205).  Explaining how he could have 
extraordinary, seemingly supernatural insight into her private world, Carwin boasts to 
Clara, “I was of a different sex.  I was not your husband; I was not even your friend; yet 
my knowledge of you was of that kind, which conjugal intimacies can give, and, in some 
respects, more accurate” (205).  Such a one, it seems, may be privy to knowledge of the 
other without being exposed to the messiness of mutual intimacy, to the vulnerabilities 
and obligations of relationships and the rules of propriety, or to the emotional and 
biological consequences of carnal knowledge.  With disembodied being comes not only 
freedom from the pangs and privations of passion, but the quasi-divine power to peer 
unobserved into the private lives of others.  
Over the course of the narrative, each character seeks out this kind of power, the 
power to penetrate the “inmost soul” of another while retaining the integrity of the self, to 
feel like the observer of sublimities, taking in awful grandeur while secure in her 
(emotional) distance.  And each engages in ethically suspect, if not altogether criminal 
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activities to gain such knowledge of the other while avoiding the risk of self-exposure 
inherent in face-to-face encounters.  Carwin, of course, through his extraordinary skills, 
manipulates the Wieland group while remaining invisible, leading to disastrous and 
unanticipated results.  But his double-tongued doings call out the group’s own deceptions 
and duplicities.  Under cover of curiosity or even benevolent concern, the other major 
characters justify transgressions like eavesdropping, reading private journals, and 
otherwise gathering intelligence through means indirect and less-than-forthright.  Carwin 
himself is the object of much surreptitious scrutiny: the members of the Mettingen circle 
formulate conjectures; they analyze his looks and behaviors; and when in his presence 
they try to obliquely coax disclosures from him.  When these efforts fail, his hosts choose 
not to force the issue, for, as Clara explains, “If the disclosure was productive of pain or 
disgrace, it was inhuman to extort it” (73).  But in matters of the heart, one does not give 
in to such scruples so easily.  Nurturing a secret romantic fantasy formulated along 
gendered rules of propriety, Clara considers how best to manipulate Pleyel into disclosing 
his hidden feelings for her while confiding her own amorous feelings for him only to a 
journal, which she keeps locked in a drawer and encoded in a short-hand of her own 
devising.  Reflecting on this behavior, the historian Clara mournfully intones, “My errors 
have taught me thus much wisdom; that those sentiments we ought not to disclose, it is 
criminal to harbor” (80).  And yet even this seemingly more mature expression of the 
injustice of insincerity seems of only limited validity given the narrative’s repeated 
demonstrations that one’s self-knowledge is partial, in both senses.  For his part, Henry 
Pleyel has been hiding his own passionate obsession behind a mask of insouciance and 
self-possession.  But when the biloquist performs an impromptu dialogue calculated to pit 
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Pleyel’s rationality against his secret adoration, a dialogue that grotesquely realizes 
Clara’s figurative criminality, these hypocrisies and his own erupt into the open.  
Rushing to warn Clara of Carwin’s status as a wanted thief and murderer, he 
suddenly stops to listen to a whispered drama in the bushes. What this secret admirer 
overhears at the recess by the river is true to his beloved’s form, that is, to the sound of 
her voice; but it is shockingly incongruous in its content.  The tones, the laugh, and some 
“general sentiments” are hers, but the salacious tenor of her dialogue stands in striking 
contrast to what he formerly believed to be her high standards of truth and decency (210).  
Despite his avowed reliance on disinterested reason, the “man of cold reserves and 
exquisite sagacity” accepts the conclusion that accords not with cool logic but panders to 
his hidden, half-strangled fear and desire regarding Clara (210).  By descending into “a 
cavity beside the building,” Pleyel, not for the first time, turns aside from direct 
intercourse with the dreaded object of his desire (133).  In effect, Carwin’s machinations 
serve to make more overt Pleyel’s long-standing secret surveillance of Clara.  In a way 
not unlike Clara’s artistic response to the troublesome stirrings evoked by Carwin, Pleyel 
has been refracting his desires into an aesthetic-intellectual project, cataloguing in his 
journal every aspect of her being down to the color of her shoes and the arrangement of 
her toilet, so as not to “omit the slightest shade, or the most petty line in [her] portrait.”  
“I was desirous that others should profit by an example so rare,” he explains (122).  But 
this deist has more in mind than selflessly redirecting personal longings into a religious 
devotion to his divinity, reason.  In addition to holding up this sublunary saint as a model 
for the world, he had “another and more interesting object in view” (123).  In the heat of 
his diatribe against her, he admits to Clara, without any apparent reservation, his one-time 
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intention of transforming his fiancé, the baroness Theresa de Stolberg, into a copy of her, 
calling upon the woman “as she wished to secure and enhance my esteem, to mould her 
thoughts, her words, her countenance, her actions, by this pattern” (123).  If the 
eminently rational man cannot possess this “union between intellect and form, which has 
hitherto existed only in the conceptions of the poet” (121), then he can at least strive to 
make the unattainable incarnate in the Saxon lady who holds a prior claim to his 
tenderness.  But with the revelation of the clandestine rendezvous, the disgusted Pleyel 
renounces Clara, both to her face and to her brother, as “the most profligate of women” 
(104).  Her protestations of innocence and appeals to his reason notwithstanding, he 
decides to leave immediately and for good.   
This subplot’s focus on the loss of romantic hopes and the ruin of reputation 
seems trivial next to the disasters yet to come; but, in fact, the incident is inextricable 
from the main plot’s chain of events and from the complex moral of the story.  Once 
again thoughts strain toward material being and metaphor toward literality.  Pleyel’s 
“murderous invectives,” as Clara styles them, will become embodied in Wieland’s actual 
murders (139).   In concrete terms, his accusation and Clara’s attempted refutation set the 
scene for the killing spree, calling Wieland out into the night and to the deserted place in 
which he will have his mystic vision.  But on the thematic level, one can see that the 
obsessive behavior exhibited by Pleyel, his search for communion with the poets’ ideal 
made flesh, will reverberate with his friend’s driving compulsion to be admitted into the 
physical presence of God.  And both pursue their eidolons through the person of Clara, 
who, like the tragic heroine of Gottfried Burger’s ballad of the specter bridegroom (to 
which Clara alludes just after her first erotic experience), heedlessly seeks to embrace her 
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own phantom lover (55).  In Clara’s case, the impossible consummation she desires, and 
for the sake of which she courts death, is not that of a bride and groom or of a wanton and 
her paramour, but that of a sister and a brother. 
“Monstrous Conception” 
What has often been noted but rarely given extensive analysis is the dynamic of 
incest in the narrative.83  The fact and nature of Clara’s fears and desires regarding her 
brother Theodore emerge in the dream of the pit.  After falling asleep at the latticed 
shelter in the recess of the riverbank, she dreams she is walking to her brother’s house at 
twilight.  “A pit, methought, had been dug in the path I had taken, of which I was not 
aware,” she recalls (62).  Her being simultaneously the knowing me and the oblivious I 
manifests her double consciousness, embodying her sense of desire and of her (possibly 
willful) ignorance.  When she sees her brother “beckoning her and calling [her] to make 
haste” from the far side, she hurries ahead; but just before she takes a plunge into the 
abyss, an arm grabs her from behind while a voice exclaims “Hold! Hold!” (62).  Is 
Wieland luring her to her death?  Is he inviting her to follow him into madness?  Critics 
differ in their interpretations; this being a dream, it not surprisingly yields multiple 
meanings.84  But Clara explicitly draws parallels between this dream and a subsequent 
scene over which hangs not only death and madness, but also, and most immediately, a 
conflicted sexuality. 
In a previous incident Clara fled her house in panic upon hearing what seemed to 
be a whispered conspiracy to murder her carried on between two ruffians hiding in her 
bedroom closet.  But on another occasion, subsequent to her erotically-charged encounter 
with Carwin and to the dream of the pit, her behavior is quite different.  After rising to 
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retrieve her father’s journal, she suddenly senses the presence of someone in that same 
closet.  She is again alone and defenseless; and yet despite a recurrence of the terrified 
disembodied voice exclaiming those same words of warning “Hold! Hold!” she fails to 
flee.  In fact, after collecting herself, she resumes her steps toward the door.   But while 
her body is moving as if by mechanical impulse, her mind marks “the similitude existing 
between these incidents and those of my dream”; it marks, that is, the resemblance of the 
voice, the words, and the “war” between her “actions and persuasions” (86).   Interpreting 
the dream as an omen (in other words, seeing the language of images come into material 
being), she is quickly convinced she knows both who lies in wait for her and why.  
Questions race through her mind: “What minister or implement of ill was shut up in this 
recess?  Who was it whose suffocating grasp I was to feel, should I dare to enter it?  What 
monstrous conception is this?”  But they serve only to introduce the foregone conclusion: 
“my brother!” (87).   
The form her understanding takes says much; it is grotesque.  Like her larger 
narrative, the phrase monstrous conception carries within it coexisting yet seemingly 
contradictory meanings.  It seems at first glance to simply denote the terrifying and 
irrational nature of the thought that her brother is the intruder shut up in her closet.  And 
yet, the coupling of the terms monstrous and conception evokes a biological phenomenon 
analogous to her state of mind.  Clara’s characterization of the conception as monstrous 
signals an awareness on some level of the incestuous overtones of her and her brother’s 
relationship, its potential for conceiving in-bred monsters, a term once used to denote 
severely deformed offspring.  Connecting both of these ideas in dizzying circuitry, the 
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phrase also conveys her repugnance, her abjection of that conception, the union of 
brother and sister, as illegitimate, as a terrible transgression of accepted standards.   
And yet her actions are those of one welcoming her fate.  Now actively reifying 
her dream, she again takes the role of the victim and the victimizer, the beckoner and the 
beckoned.  Certain of the identity of the intruder in the closet—she is both the asker of 
questions and the giver of answers in her sort of incestuous internal intercourse—she 
again places her hand on the lock; and with no means, indeed, no intent to stop her 
assailant’s designs, she tries to open the door.  When the door does not yield to her 
pulling, the first confirmation that someone lies within, she exerts all her force to open it, 
thereby becoming the aggressor countering the ravisher’s resistance.  Describing these 
actions as having been “dictated by phrenzy,” and not, she explicitly notes, by any 
laudable strength of mind, she in effect denies responsibility for behavior that even she 
acknowledges seems suicidal.  “Sacred duty combined with every spontaneous sentiment 
to endear me to my being,” she assures her reader before asking, “Why then did I again 
approach the closet and withdraw the bolt?” (87).  
If, as she believes, Wieland waits to destroy her, Clara’s behavior suggests 
something irresistibly compelling about “relinquish[ing]” her being to her brother (87).  
Her initial impetus to open the closet was to read her father’s manuscript.  Perhaps, we 
might see her otherwise unaccountable actions as manifesting not a death wish, per se, or 
even a strictly sexual fantasy, but a manifestation of a wish to return to the 
undifferentiated state of being, that expanded sphere of self, “the house and name of 
Wieland,” now threatened by her passing through her sexual awakening into adulthood 
(151).85  In the passage immediately preceding this incident she had already complained 
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of the evils of irrational passion, of its taking away “the attractions of existence.”  Now 
apparently under its sway, she finds herself unable to conform to the era’s philosophical 
imperative to obey the dictates of reason and moral sensibility, much as her father failed 
to carry out his God’s injunction.  Although she venerates the man, his death serves as a 
cautionary tale.  The fantasy of a union with her brother, though terrifying, seems to 
represent the alternative (albeit a narcissistic one) to fully engaging the chaotic 
indeterminacy introduced into her world in the form of Carwin, he who “afforded [ . . . ] 
no ground on which to build even a plausible conjecture” (72).  But  beyond illustrating 
the identity crisis of an individual meeting the outside world for the first time, Brown’s 
treatment of Clara’s individuation, bound up as it is with profound epistemological and 
moral uncertainty, speaks more broadly about the very ground of existence and meaning, 
and of her and her brother’s desperate need to examine and verify that ground.  
“To Love with a Passion More Than Fraternal” 
While Wieland, as the accused murderer, does offer an account of his reasons for 
going to his sister’s house at that late hour on the night of the massacre, he fails to inform 
his auditors of the wider circumstances.  Not explicitly noted in the court transcript is the 
fact that Wieland’s sudden transformation into parricide occurs on the very day Henry 
Pleyel brings to him his report of the overheard dialogue at the recess.  As recounted to 
his sister, Wieland’s response to Pleyel’s report that morning, at the time he received it, 
seems eminently reasonable, being both open-minded toward his friend’s earnest account 
of what was heard and guardedly skeptical given the history of his sister’s actions and 
sentiments.  However, despite his coolly rational demeanor, when later that same day 
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Clara does not appear for her promised overnight visit, hints of a deep, unsettling concern 
emerge.86   
Telling the court of his errand into the night to learn the reason for Clara’s 
absence, Wieland positively affirms his lack of anxiety: “My mind was contemplative 
and calm; not wholly devoid of apprehension on account of my sister’s safety.  Recent 
events, not easily explained, had suggested the existence of some danger; but this danger 
was without a distinct form in our imagination, and scarcely ruffled our tranquility” 
(166).  But this equanimity seems extraordinary given that what he dismisses as “recent 
events, not easily explained” includes not only a series of mysterious voices, but also the 
overheard threat of rape and murder that sent the hysterical Clara running to and finally 
collapsing unconscious at her brother’s door.  Nor does the unresolved issue of Pleyel’s 
outrageous allegations against Clara merit a mention.  Instead, he tells the courtroom, 
“On my way my mind was full of those ideas which related to my intellectual condition” 
(166).  His “intellectual condition,” as he has explained, is that of one whose tireless 
research into the true will of God has revealed to him only the limitations of merely 
human understanding unaided by “direct communication”: “I solicited direction: I turned 
on every side where glimmerings of light could be discovered.  I have not been wholly 
uninformed; but my knowledge has always stopped short of certainty” (165).  That is, 
admittedly, while nominally engaged in a search for his sister, it is his own well-being 
and his own place in the divine order upon which he is brooding.    
On the fateful night, the two purposes, the search for his sister and his ongoing 
search for the will of God, become for him indistinguishable.  One is subsumed into the 
other as they are each, at bottom, a search for assurance of his own metaphysical well-
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being, an affirmation of his self-image.  For Wieland as for Pleyel, Clara has become a 
stand-in for the transcendent completeness—the union with the other part of himself—
that seems somehow attainable here in this realm.  She is the “sister he was wont to love 
with a passion more than fraternal,” the “angel whom [he] was wont to worship,” for 
whose sake he was “ready to question his own senses when they plead against [her]” 
(185, 224, 109).  His welfare and hers are self-same.  “There is no human being whom I 
love with more tenderness, and whose welfare is nearer my heart,” he tells her when she 
comes to refute Pleyel’s accusations (109).  But his sister’s absence that night, in light of 
Pleyel’s story of her having “fallen into wickedness,” could not fail to cast the shadow of 
a doubt upon his conviction of her true character and perhaps, more fundamentally, his 
very understanding of selfhood (110).87   
And just such doubt and confusion roar in his mind that night.  After starting for 
his sister’s house, Wieland recalls, he lost sight of his purpose and wandered aimlessly 
amid a “torrent of fervid conceptions” (166).  (The phrase echoes his doomed father’s 
complaint that his “brain was scorched to cinders” and, like his father’s, prefigures, 
though to different effect, the “fiery stream” that will soon engulf him [14, 167]).  
However it may have come about, this enflamed state of mind comprises an 
overwhelming sense of appreciation for his conjugal and parental blessings.  Casually 
asserting that “the series of [his] thoughts is easily traced,” an allusion to the era’s 
Lockean-inspired associative psychology, he marks the progress from joy, to gratitude, to 
the desire to demonstrate that gratitude to the author of his being.88  But he leaves it to his 
hearers to consider the logical connection between his errand and this sudden paroxysm 
of these perpetual feelings, which unaccountably recurred with such “unusual energy” at 
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that particular moment (166).  His thoughts, we note, are on that in which he has his 
being; his personal identity, as he reminds the courtroom auditors, is that of a husband, a 
father, and a friend.  Behind the gush of good feelings is a desperate clinging onto that 
which he feels to be slipping away, his sense of self. 
In the agony of devotion, he is moved to utter aloud a prayer that he may be 
shown an “unambiguous token” of God’s presence.  The night not answering, however, 
he continues on into Clara’s house, up the stairs, and into her private chambers.  She is 
not there.  Both his searches have come up short.  His insecurity might be thought to be 
reaching a climax.  Then suddenly, and not coincidentally, his looked-for divine 
instructions come to him just as he is leaving Clara’s bedroom, whose emptiness at that 
hour further supports the possibility that Pleyel’s accusations were accurate and that his 
sister may be even then hastening to some illicit assignation.  We are not told whether 
this doubt (or any other thought regarding her) rose to his consciousness only that the 
fateful epiphany bursts upon him at that very moment.  “I stretched out my hand to seize 
the balustrade by which I might regulate my steps,” he explains, his physical action 
paralleling the metaphorical grasping for a guiding principle and direction (167).  In an 
instant, everything around him radiates a brilliant light; and from behind booms the 
divine and fatal pronouncement, the answer to his prayer.  Having up to this moment 
received no sign of God’s presence and having not confirmed his sister’s safety and her 
purity, he seems to have in effect willed this extraordinary event into being.   
This epiphany is the latest in a series of seemingly miraculous interventions that 
arrive to kindle or to reaffirm the recipient’s faith in an ultimate, transcendent meaning.  
Just so, the elder Wieland, as an angst-ridden young apprentice in a cluttered garret, 
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happened to rest his wandering eye upon an open book and upon the phrase “Seek and ye 
shall find” (8).  In the French Protestant text, Clara tells us, “the craving which had 
haunted him was now supplied with an object” and his life of religious devotion began 
(8).  And Pleyel, at the point of despairing over “the inexpressible importance of 
unveiling the designs and character of Carwin, and the utter improbability that this ever 
would be effected,” receives a reviving jolt (128-9).  In an “act [. . .] rather mechanical 
than voluntary,” he placed his hand on a newspaper and “threw a languid glance at the 
first column that presented itself,” at once finding the information he so desperately 
desired (129).  In words that prefigure the effulgent epiphany of his religiously-minded 
friend, Pleyel asserts, “The ideas which flowed in upon my mind, affected me like an 
instant transition from death to life.  The purpose dearest to my heart was thus effected, at 
a time and by means the least of all others within in the scope of my foresight. [ . . . ] 
Here was evidence which imparted to my understanding the most luminous certainty” 
(129).  But in this and the other examples of incidents that “approach as nearly to the 
nature of miracles as can be done by that which is not truly miraculous,” (to borrow from 
Brown’s preface) we see not random chance or the impersonal force of fate but the 
desperate meaning-making of anguished souls (3).  We see also the dangerous potential 
of such self-generated constructions.   
The palpable evidence of a supernatural order and of a mode of existence in 
which consciousness exists independent of the material body not only serves to validate 
the younger Wieland’s faith in miraculous intervention, as evinced by his subsequently 
undertaking to write a treatise on the Dæmon of Socrates; it seems also to spur Wieland 
to perfect his own sublime detachment from the physical, his own “elevation above 
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sensual and selfish” (48, 231).  And his conception of the self as a virtuous immateriality 
confined within a fallible, fallen materiality makes all but inevitable the outcome of 
Wieland’s fervent pleas for a way to prove his piety.  By the logic of this worldview, the 
voice he hears, in effect, could only demand that he manifest his virtue and devotion by 
sacrificing his most precious earthly attachments.  Specifically, to accomplish his quest 
for perfect communion, he must kill his wife, whom he calls God’s “last and best gift”; 
and he must do so there at that spot (172).  Not without a great struggle does he accept 
the decree as irrevocable and unalterable.  Yet, after the deed is done, he sees his murder 
of Catharine as a triumph over the weaknesses of the flesh, as his having “successfully 
subdued the stubbornness of human passions” and having “soared above frailty” (172).89  
But as the narrative reveals, his act is simultaneously a disavowal of and a gluttonous 
indulgence in self-directed desires.  
“Call her hither, and here let her fall,” the being spoke (168).  But this is Brown’s 
own invention, a detail not derived from the Yates account.  And there is nothing 
arbitrary about the specifics of the decree.  The change of setting for the wife’s death 
places the event against a background of Clara’s private inner world and her emergent 
sexuality.  For even after he drags Catharine back to the entry way of Clara’s house, 
Wieland finds he can only work up to the deed once he has drawn his victim into his 
sister’s bedroom.  And when Catharine’s struggles end and he finally relinquishes the 
exterminating grasp, he places the sacrificial corpse in his sister’s bed.  This suggestive 
detail, too, springs from the novelist’s mind and not from the source material, raising the 
question of its meaning or purpose.  
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Following this trail one notices that Wieland’s account of his motives and actions 
proves to be rather less straightforward than at first it seems and more like the “mazy 
paths” referenced in the novel’s epigraph.  Despite Wieland’s show of fearless candor in 
depicting his state of mind, the succession of his thoughts and feelings, and apparently 
every one of his movements, his narrative of the fateful night is missing something.  
Recall that when Clara discovered her sister-in-law’s corpse in the immediate aftermath 
of the murder, she reacted with horror to visible signs of not only strangulation but also 
of “an evil” that preceded her death, a “violation” suffered while under “a suffocating and 
polluting grasp” (150).  However, in his address to the courtroom, Wieland, though not 
sparing in his description of Catharine’s pathetic cries and ghastly convulsions, gives no 
hint that before (or while) strangling his wife to death he also raped her.   
Whether Wieland’s bloody sacrifice is prompted by Carwin, God, insanity, or 
“hellish illusions” is a question left unanswered (187).  Yet its primary object and its 
execution, as the novel strongly implies, are informed by a desire carnal in its expression 
and deeply, ruinously narcissistic at its core.  When Clara assumes that she and not 
Catharine was the intended target of “violation and death,” she touches upon a truth 
darker than she knows.  The malleable Catharine, Clara’s intimate companion since 
childhood, corresponding in age and temper, partaker of all Clara’s thoughts, cares and 
wishes, has performed her last as Clara’s double.  
“Begotten Upon Selfishness” 
 Wieland understands his murder of Catharine as a religious sacrifice, a 
demonstration of “perfect virtue and the extinction of selfishness and error” (176).  But it 
is his very self-love that drives his mania.  His conviction that he is driven by a righteous 
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desire to know God’s will and to perform his duty selflessly is, ironically, a source of 
immeasurable pride.  As Dr. Cambridge explains,  
 He conceives himself to have reached a loftier degree of virtue, than any 
other human being.  The merit of his sacrifice is only enhanced in the eyes 
of superior beings, by the detestation that pursues him here, and the 
sufferings to which he is condemned.  The belief that even his sister has 
deserted him, and gone over to his enemies, adds to his sublimity of 
feeling, and his confidence in divine approbation and future recompense. 
(186-7) 
In his egotistical pursuit of transcendence, perceived in and shaped by the terms common 
to the rhetoric of spirituality and of sensuality (“God is the object of my supreme 
passion,” “I have burnt with ardour to approve my faith and my obedience” [165]), 
Wieland pushes the metaphors toward a literal enactment, in effect transforming the 
sublimities of ineffable mystery into the grotesqueries of paradox embodied.  And for a 
moment, looking into the face of his dead wife, he is appalled by the metamorphosis: 
“Grimness and distortion took place of all that used to bewitch me into transport, and 
subdue me into reverence” (172).  His quest for the perfect union of form and content has 
produced an abomination. 
 Wieland’s is an extreme case, but there is a long history of believers blurring the 
line between eros and agape, that is, between sexual or romantic love and the sacrificial 
love of God.  (The eroticism of Bernini’s statue The Ecstasy of Saint Theresa comes to 
mind.)  And Wieland’s coupling of sensual desire and religious devotion was not 
unprecedented in Brown’s eighteenth century.  In fact, some minor details seem 
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calculated to suggest the inheritance of just such a legacy.  Although the elder Wieland’s 
religiosity appears the most consequential to his children’s sensibilities, Clara notes that 
he did not force his beliefs on his wife.  Their mother’s religious practices, Clara 
explains, were molded on the practices “of the disciples of Zinzendorf,” that is, the 
Moravian church (12).  Here Brown is once again connecting his fictional family to 
historical personages.  Despite its being reinforced twice in the narrative, this connection 
has attracted little critical notice.90  But a closer look suggests the detail does more work 
than has been previously recognized.   
 In 1722, Count Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf became the benefactor then 
leader of a reformist denomination originating in Moravia, a region in present-day Czech 
Republic.  Under the bishopric of Zinzendorf, this remnant of an early (pre-Luther) 
Protestant sect that had been forced underground by the Catholic Church established 
communities in Upper Lusatia, now the eastern part of Germany.  The Wieland family’s 
connection to Zinzendorf is obliquely referenced in the narrative when Pleyel informs 
Theodore that he has an ancestral claim to large estates in this same German principality 
(37). 91  Also, in the early 1740s Zinzendorf traveled widely to establish missionary 
communities throughout the Caribbean and North America, including one just north of 
Philadelphia, called Bethlehem, from whence, presumably, the unnamed Wieland mother 
received her religious education.  In hindsight, we might see that the mother’s Moravian 
form of piety serves as the alternative model to the elder Wieland’s devotion to an 
ultimately failed strategy of self-denial, an alternative in which personal desires, rather 
than suppressed until they erupt (as they do so spectacularly in the father’s case), could 
be redirected into one’s sacred duties.   
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 Historian Paul Peucker explains that in Zinzendorf’s “marriage religion” the 
Moravians took up the medieval idea of the mystical marriage between the believer and 
the divine.  Medieval mystics believed “the ultimate goal of the believer, though difficult 
to attain, should [ . . . ] be to be united with the divine lover in a mystical embrace” (50).  
“In the 1740s,” he writes, “Moravians discovered this tradition and used similar erotic 
language to describe this spiritual relationship,” adding that “Moravians not only 
described the relationship between Christ and mankind with the image of marriage, they 
also made religion into an almost sexual experience” (50, 45).  Sex between married 
couples was considered a sacred sacrament and a living reenactment of the coupling of 
the soul (figured, as in the gendered Latin form, as female) and the bridegroom Christ.  
Sex outside of marriage and even the relations between husband and wife that were 
rooted not in sacramental love but in lust were considered transgressions against God.  
We hear a more generalized version of this precept when Wieland asserts, “My social 
sentiments were indebted to their alliance with devotion for all their value.  All passions 
are base, all joys feeble, all energies malignant, which are not drawn from this source” 
(166).  Zinzendorf counseled the devoted to sublimate their merely personal desires, to 
refract them into expressions of transcendent selflessness.  The aim was for a meeting of 
the mystical and sensual in which one might achieve through the disciplining of the 
worldly life a more intimate relation with God.  But as Brown recognizes, and dramatizes 
in the actions of Wieland, Clara, and Pleyel, the quest for pure and unified being—
whether undertaken in terms of religion, sensibility, or rational humanism—can all too 
easily be perverted toward selfish ends.   
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 In fact, Zinzendorf was made intimately aware of this danger.  However well-
intended and theologically justified it may have been, the rhetorical conflation of 
sexuality and spirituality engendered problems both outside and inside the church.  The 
hyper-erotic language of the church’s hymns and liturgy raised eyebrows and gave 
ammunition to antagonistic sects and political entities.  And when Zinzendorf’s son, the 
much adored Christian Renatus, an unmarried man and minister to the choir (or cohort) 
of single brethren, began pushing metaphor toward literality, inspiring and inciting 
ecstatic displays of what we today would recognize as homoeroticism, his father the 
count, who had been away establishing missions, had to step in to head off scandal.92  
The incident involving Christian Renatus may or may not have been known to Brown—
the church moved to contain the dissemination of such embarrassing information—but in 
Wieland we see the pattern of the son taking the parent’s conceptualizations too far.  The 
Zinzendorf connection, which insinuates the doctrine of sublimation instead of 
repression, may help explain why the younger Wieland was able to obey the divine 
command when his father failed and, more particularly, why, seemingly following his 
father’s footsteps, he arrived not at the temple but at his sister’s bedroom. 
While the historical example suggests a metaphysical vulnerability, a model of 
Wieland’s particular form of depravity may have been drawn from another source.  A 
literary antecedent to Wieland’s jealous fixation with God’s favor and to the sexual 
grotesqueries born of it lies in a well-known work of modern Christian mythology.93  
Brown was not alone among his contemporaries in his familiarity with and high regard 
for John Milton’s Paradise Lost.94  In particular, something about the early scene in Book 
II, the allegory of Satan, Sin, and Death, fascinated eighteenth century readers.95  Leading 
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artists of the time, including William Hogarth, William Blake, and Henry Fuseli, made 
this scene a subject of their own artistic endeavors, helping to make the congress of this 
unholy trinity the era’s most widely illustrated episode from Milton’s epic.96  In the 
passage, Milton uses the violation of the incest taboo to dramatize a more fundamental 
spiritual sin; through the shocking transgression of the flesh, he underscores the 
repugnant and ruinous evil of the narcissistic ego that in favoring itself forsakes all 
others—most particularly for Milton, the ultimate other, God.  Exploiting the two senses 
of the word conception, the poet imagines that the moment the angel Lucifer first 
conceived of rebellion a loathsome daughter was brought into being, springing from his 
head as a “snaky sorceress” named Sin.  Born only of him, she is the offspring of his 
deep-seated self-regard.  And it is upon this creature, that is, upon his own progeny, that 
Satan, “enamored” with the “perfect image” of himself he viewed in her, begat Death 
himself (II. lines 763-7).  Death in turn chased down and raped his mother, begetting the 
brood of monsters “hourly conceived and hourly born,” who as Jean Hagstrum writes, “in 
another in this complex nest of parodies, provide a kind of grotesque equivalent of 
consanguinity by gnawing at their mother’s entrails” (43). 
Pleyel reiterates both the imagery and the moral of this infernal tableau, albeit 
through the new framework of a deistic, liberal view of human nature: 
The process by which the sympathies of nature are extinguished in our 
hearts, by which evil is made our good, and by which we are made 
susceptible of no activity but in the infliction, and no joy but in the 
spectacle of woes, is an obvious process.  As to an alliance with evil 
geniuses, the power and the malice of dæmons have been a thousand times 
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exemplified in human beings.  There are no devils but those which are 
begotten upon selfishness, and reared by cunning. (131-2) 
Characteristically, Pleyel speaks in terms of nature and processes, of an environmental 
and genealogical determinism as opposed to diabolical influence and original sin.  He 
puts his faith in reason as a form of secular, self-administered grace, a prophylactic 
against selfishness, even as he undercuts that faith by signaling the possibility that reason, 
in the form of cunning, can be recruited for selfish purposes.  
As presented in the fantastical figures of Milton’s free verse, graphically 
portrayed by the many illustrators of this scene, and bodied forth in the grotesque realism 
of Brown’s novel, the overweening concern for self-validation, like inbreeding, results in 
the conception of an ill-formed, horrific, monstrous being, that is, a moral abomination.  
Wieland’s murder of his wife, children, and a beloved ward is a travesty of the faithful 
devotion of Abraham, which he enacts with the self-directed lust of Satan.  His killing of 
these earthly treasures neither eliminates nor sublimates his material and sensual hungers, 
but only refracts and transforms them into impious carnage.97   
But having gone thus far, he appears unwilling or unable to acknowledge the 
perversity of this mindset.  After the revelation of Carwin’s powers of deception, he 
moves even more inward, as he denies the irreducible otherness of all around him, 
subsuming them into a master narrative of God’s cosmic schemes for his (Wieland’s) 
salvation.  In the end, all that is left is to take his denial of the selfish and sensual, this 
grasping for his ideal identity, to its logical extreme, albeit still not without a type of 
sexualized gratification.  In an act of self-penetration, he thrusts his sister’s penknife—
fittingly, a tool of authorship and a phallic weapon of authority—into his neck and dies.   
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“Phantastical Incongruities” 
With Wieland’s death, Clara plunges into bottomless despair, indifferent to 
Carwin’s guilt, and morbidly determined to remain in her home and feed on her misery 
just long enough to finish the task of composing this memoir.  But the narrative does not 
end here.  A second letter, a sort of epilogue, relates Clara’s unexpected return to life and 
takes up the lost thread of a neglected subplot.  This last chapter, widely lamented by 
literary critics, affords Clara, now a reborn disciple of reason, the opportunity to moralize 
on these disasters.    
 The time between the writing of the first letter and the second effects a drastic 
change in Clara.  When she had first learned of Wieland’s responsibility for the massacre, 
Clara strained to make sense of it by attributing all to the evil agency of Carwin.  But as 
narrative strategies for containing and explaining fail her, even the Gothic strategy of 
failure, Clara faced a prospect even more terrifying than that of death at the hands of a 
monster.  She feared becoming a grotesque monster herself, something beyond the 
constructs of reason, beyond moral order, and beyond even language: 
Now was I stupefied with tenfold wonder in contemplating myself.  Was I 
not likewise transformed from rational and human into a creature of 
nameless and fearful attributes?  Was I not transported to the brink of the 
same abyss?  Ere a new day should come, my hands might be embrued in 
blood, and my remaining life be consigned to a dungeon and chains. (179-
80)  
Here and throughout the narrative, the recurring images of abysses, pits, and “gulphs” 
graphically convey the group’s existential dread of the loss of that absolute truth, that 
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ground of reality upon which all their knowledge, their conjectures, and their being is 
built.  Moreover, Clara’s mind repeatedly conjures tempests, raging volcanoes, and 
merciless waves, the obliterating forces of elemental chaos suggestive of the tortures of 
existence in a universe without a single, stable, knowable center.98  Another of her 
dreams bodies forth this fear of self-disintegration, her fear of falling into that abyss of 
oblivion.  In the aftermath of her brother’s suicide, lying in her house alone, after having 
vehemently even violently refused to be led away, she dreams of her body being tossed 
about amid “phantastical incongruities,” or “abortive creations,” in which appear 
successively the men who represent different schemes of truth, different grounds of 
identity: her uncle Thomas Cambridge, Wieland, Pleyel, and Carwin.  But in what seems 
a final miraculous intervention, she is pulled out of this nightmare.  Again thought turns 
to event as the flames of volcanic chaos become a real-life inferno: her house is engulfed 
by a fire rising from the cellar.  That is, from a space down below and deep within, the 
palpable flames of her father’s body, the fiery stream of her brother’s vision return in yet 
another form of internal combustion.   
 But Clara avoids the fate of her kinsmen, succumbing neither to horrific death nor 
to homicidal madness and imprisonment.  Her salvation, however, is due only to the 
intervention of another.  Drawn by the sight of the flames, witnesses race to the house.  
As she moved confusedly through the burning house, as in the dream of the pit, Clara 
admits, “I was unable to think or act for my own preservation; I was incapable, indeed, of 
comprehending my danger” (236).  And just as an unspecified “someone” snatched her 
from the edge of the abyss, a nameless, faceless person identified only as “a pair of 
sinewy arms” takes her out of her almost self-willed immolation (236).  This mysterious 
98 
 
other, possibly Carwin, is never identified; his otherness is never reduced to a name or 
even a complete form.   
 Her house in ashes, and with it all that nourished her melancholy, Clara recovers 
her health and some degree of tranquility; and after leaving behind them the mutable 
foundations of Mettingen, she and her uncle, the embodiment of medico-scientific 
authority and rational skepticism,  “set [their] feet on the shore of the ancient world” 
(237).  When they settle in the Languedoc region of southern France, site of the bloody 
Albigensian crusade, the Camisard uprising, and the Manichean ideology that gave shape 
to the sensibilities of the elder Wieland and his son, the multi-generational story of this 
family, comprising a series of recurring narrative echoes, comes back to its beginning, 
closing in upon itself.99  The Louisa and Jane Conway (Stuart) subplot remains to 
protrude awkwardly out of the narrative.  But when Clara and Pleyel marry after the 
death of Pleyel’s wife and child on the birthing bed, their union serves as an emblem of 
the survivors’ self-protective retreat into a sterile rationalism.  And wielding that cool, 
confident logic, Clara, committed again to the idea of a centered universe, neatly folds 
the tale of the Stuarts, together with her own family’s disaster, into the generic confines 
of a melodrama.  She blames all on external threats suffered by the undisciplined mind to 
gain access into the individual’s interior life where they will turn the will of the virtuous 
against them.  But note the subtle grammatical shift in the phrase centered on her part in 
these events; the agency belongs not to her but to one who failed to adequately supply her 
“with ordinary foresight and equanimity” (244).  In her facile didacticism, Clara 
exemplifies the age-old yearning for an absolute truth and, more particularly, the modern 
subject’s misguided faith in the transcendent power of self-knowledge and self-mastery.   
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Interlude: Annus Mirabiles / Horribiles 
In 1798, with the partially completed manuscript of Wieland in hand, Charles 
Brockden Brown rejoined friends William Johnson and Elihu Hubbard Smith in New 
York City on July 3.  After years of extended visits, he finally moved into their apartment 
at 45 Pine Street, with a view toward living the life of a professional man of letters and 
cosmopolitan devotee of reason, sensibility, benevolence, civility, discernment, and taste.  
There he would dedicate his every waking hour to reading, going to the theater (even 
once attending a theatrical performance of a ventriloquist), walking along the Battery, 
paying visits to an extended circle of acquaintances, attending the Saturday night 
meetings of the Friendly Club with the roommates, and writing, always writing.  It had 
been five years since he left his apprenticeship at the law office of Alexander Wilcocks 
with a strong distaste for what one Ormond character calls “the rubbish of the law” and a 
growing hunger for literary glory.  But when sometime around 1793, against the advice 
of friends and the wishes of his family, he officially began his pursuit of a literary life, 
there came only a long stretch of grand plans, experiments, and well-begun projects with 
no finished works and no publications.  During his time as a lawyer-in-training, he had 
seen a dozen of his rather conventional poems printed in newspapers.100  And in his 
correspondence with his friends, he found a forum for literary experimentation; that is, he 
would engage in fictional conceits in which he would write from some far-off locale 
about adventures he never had and would express sentiments often extravagant and 
probably put on.  The Henrietta Letters and the Godolphin Letters were even thought by 
one Brown biographer to be a genuine correspondence.101  Then beginning in February 
1798, James Watters’s Weekly Magazine (Philadelphia) began featuring dozens of pieces 
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by Brown, including serialized fiction, book reviews, and essays of cultural criticism, 
beginning with two on the theater and its effects on society.  He submitted to Watters the 
first parts of his dialogue “The Rights of Woman” which would be published in book 
form as Alcuin.  He left with him also the manuscript of his first completed novel, an 
excerpt of which appeared in the Weekly Magazine along with the announcement that 
Sky-Walk; or, The Man Unknown to Himself would soon be published.  Around this time, 
his brief romance with one Susan Potts ended because neither had money enough for a 
union and because his family disapproved of a match with a non-Quaker.  Brown was 
then and had been for some time presumably living off of the indulgence of his family as 
he struggled to find his place.  
Now, however, among his friends in New York, it was a time of intellectual and 
artistic camaraderie, an all-too-fleeting moment of triumph, optimism, and confidence.  
In a jointly-written letter from Brown, Johnson, and Smith to their friend William Dunlap 
in early September, Johnson happily reports,  
Charles feels all the joy and parental exultation of an Author having this 
day, been delivered, by the aid of H Caritat & T & J Swords of an 
handsome duodecimo, the offspring of that fertile brain which already 
engendered, two more volumes. This borders upon the prodigious!—300 
pages in a month! Yet he is neither in a delirium or a fever! What an 
admirable antidote is philosophy! (Letters 418) 
The imagery of a “prodigious” offspring born from the author’s “fertile brain” is striking, 
especially, of course, to this reader.  But for all the resonance of Johnson’s word choice 
with the above reading of Wieland, what is most striking, for all who know what is to 
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follow, is the tone of celebration and more particularly the bidding defiance to death.  
Wieland would be published on the fourteenth of September.  Five days later Elihu 
Hubbard Smith, at age 27, was dead.  
Weeks before, sometime around the end of August, an outbreak of yellow fever, 
by now an annual occurrence in port cities, had begun sweeping New York; and Brown’s 
friend and new roommate Smith had been busily tending to the sick and dying of 
Manhattan even as other physicians were among those claimed by the disease.  In fact, 
hearing that one such fellow practitioner was ill and alone at a coffee house, the young 
doctor sought out, took home, and personally tended to Giambattista “Joseph” Scandella.  
Dr. Scandella, a noted Italian physician, scientist, and recently-inducted member of the 
American Philosophical Society, had left his adopted home of Philadelphia days before.  
As it happens, Scandella had been attempting to flee another kind of toxic 
atmosphere.102  The summer that ended with the rapidly spreading hemorrhagic fever 
began with a sharp increase in public anxiety over the real or imagined presence of 
foreign agents working to corrupt the body politic.  Recent developments had excited 
fears of a coming war with France.  And some prominent voices, informed by alarmist 
publications on the subversive schemes of a secret international organization, the 
Illuminati, warned of attacks from within by carriers and disseminators of radical 
doctrines.  Despite the distinguished Italian doctor’s acquaintance with the likes of 
George Washington and Benjamin Rush, that summer’s overheated air of suspicion, 
culminating in President Adams’ signing of the Alien and Sedition Acts, made for an 
inhospitable climate for those like himself: foreigners with libertarian and radical views.  
Scandella had been on his way to New York City to seek passage back to Europe when 
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he contracted the mosquito-borne disease in the swamps of New Jersey.  Smith’s heroic 
efforts notwithstanding, Scandella died in the Pine Street apartment on the seventeenth.  
His would-be rescuer, by this time, having also fallen under the fever’s malignant sway 
had been confined to bed; and, after two days more of rapidly deteriorating health—
victims typically suffered fevers, terrible aches, jaundiced skin, and bleeding from the 
nose and gums—Smith, as Dunlap would later write, “saw the last symptom of the 
disease, black vomit, pronounced the word ‘decomposition’ and died” (Life II. 8).  
Brown, meanwhile, also showing some of the early signs of infection and facing the 
prospect of an equally horrible fate, had been taken away to the house of another 
physician friend.  He wrote to his brother of the news: “The die is cast.  E. H. S. is dead.  
O the folly of prediction and the vanity of systems” (Letters 435). 
Over two thousand New Yorkers died of the fever that summer and early fall.103  
Brown, possibly having obtained life-long immunity after a non-fatal bout during the 
1793 outbreak in Philadelphia, would recover enough in a few days’ time to travel out of 
the pestilential city.  Along with Johnson, Brown took the half-day journey to Perth 
Amboy, New Jersey, to the country home of Dunlap’s family.  And in a letter written 
after his arrival, Brown assures his brother James that the best course of treatment for him 
is to be in the company of friends, now bound closer together in their “sacred fellowship” 
for their shared loss (Letters 440).  
It was Smith who arranged for Alcuin (1798) to be published, perhaps even 
without Brown’s knowledge.  And it was Smith who had brought the manuscript of 
Wieland to its future publisher Caritat.  Moreover, it was through his association with 
Smith and his circle that Brown graduated from a bookish dreamer to a highly informed, 
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actively engaged, and productive public intellectual, one truly capable of the kind of 
expansive critical thinking many current critics ascribe to him and his writings.  But now, 
just as Brown’s career as a professional man of letters was getting under way, the 
enabler, the critic, the task-master was gone. 
While convalescing in the “enjoyment of the purest air and wholesome exercise” 
amid the “the odors and the sprightly atmosphere of this village,” Brown put on hold two 
novelistic projects: the Memoirs of Carwin, a prequel of sorts to Wieland, and Stephen 
Calvert (Letters 441).  And according to Sidney Krause, he likely did not begin work on 
what would be his next published novel until after his return to New York around mid-
November.104  Once started, however, he would attack the writing project like a man 
possessed, completing Ormond; or, The Secret Witness in six weeks.  In it Brown turns 
real life into a romance, or perhaps simply recognizes it as such. 
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Chapter 3: Spectators, Spectacle, and Speculation: Picturing Reality in Ormond 
The interpenetration of the real and the fictitious Brown takes as his method and 
his subject matter in Ormond: or, The Secret Witness (1799).  The plot abounds in 
fraudulent fictions—disguise, forgeries, counterfeits, and other deceptive appearances—
as well as voyeurism, eavesdropping, and other stratagems for piercing obscuring or 
illusory surfaces.  And throughout all these manipulations and countermoves, a 
conspicuous profusion of factual content, both general circumstances and specific details, 
seems selected with an eye for how it reinforces the invented story’s meditation on the 
deathless philosophical problem of separating appearance from reality.  
To be sure, history was at that moment quite generous in its offering of intense 
and confounding perplexities.  Choosing, however, not his immediate present or most 
recent past, Brown returned again to one particular setting that loomed large in his 
memory and imagination.  The central plot of Ormond, although embedded with 
backstories, spans just over a year’s time from the summer of 1793 into the fall of 1794.  
At the beginning of this period, a pestilential disease began creeping ominously through 
the alleys of Philadelphia, spreading death and panic in the capital of the new United 
States, Brown’s hometown.  This historic epidemic, which would claim the lives of 
almost five thousand in a city of about fifty thousand, features in two of Brown’s 
previous fictions, “The Man at Home” and Arthur Mervyn (the first chapters of which 
were published serially in the summer of 1798).   
In this crisis Brown found a site for exploring his intellectual and moral 
preoccupations.  “The evils of pestilence,” Brown asserts in the preface to Arthur 
Mervyn, “have already supplied new and copious materials for reflection to the physician 
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and the political economist.  They have not been less fertile of instruction to the moral 
observer, to whom they have furnished new displays of the influence of human passions 
and motives” (3).  But unlike Brown’s earlier treatments of the epidemic, Ormond rather 
emphatically positions this event within its broader, global context (and implicitly, 
against its still unfolding consequences), thus extending the reach of his moral 
observations, his explorations of consciousness and conscientiousness, out beyond the 
solitary self, the family, the city, and the nation to address “the inextricability of human 
events” as they play out on the world stage (264).  
In the form of a single, long manuscript composed by a friend, the novel relates 
the story of Constantia Dudley, offering a portrait of a young woman in 1790s 
Philadelphia as she confronts and ultimately overcomes a series of crises.  After a con 
man dupes her artist-cum-apothecary father, leaving the family in economic ruin, the 
sixteen year old, exhibiting a prodigious rational self-control and concern for the 
common good, survives the trials of poverty; the loss of one parent to death and the 
incapacitation of the other due to despair, drunkenness, and blindness; the threat of sexual 
assault and of a merely mercenary marriage; as well as the depredations of the epidemic.  
Her resourcefulness, benevolence, and fortitude—she is “a paragon of practical 
republican virtue,” as more than one critic has pointed out—carry her through and indeed 
afford her a degree of self-possession (Cahill 180).105  They also bring her into contact 
with the radical freethinker, Ormond; his mistress, Helena; a transgressive revolutionary 
named Martinette de Beauvais; and a long-lost friend, revealed late in the novel as the 
story’s narrator.  Along the way, characters contemplate contemporary controversies 
regarding female education, the inequities of marriage, the artificiality of polite society, 
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the relation of benevolence and self-interest, and the justifications for violence.  But this 
is only the barest outline of a narrative overflowing with incidents, interpolations, and 
back stories, a narrative that seems to have taken on the fragmented and disjointed 
character as well as the overwrought concerns of its historical moment.  
In the convolutions and coincidences of this plot Brown traces the complicated 
links between incidents intimate and international while also exploring the imbrications 
of the past, present, and future.  And by taking advantage of a particular historical 
convergence that allows him to combine into one narrative the concurrent spread of 
disease, of fear, and of ideology, Brown makes visible these complex and ever-changing 
connections—physical, emotional, intellectual, and moral—that prove the instability of 
boundaries, of signs and symbols, of principles and doctrines, and all means of imposing 
fixed meaning on the contingency of experience. 
Through Ormond’s exhibition of the psychological and social dynamics of truth 
and morality, Brown discloses the limitations, liabilities, and unintended consequences of 
the era’s understanding of how the world works; he discloses, to use his words, “the folly 
of prediction and the vanity of systems” (Letters 435).  The characters’ repeated failures 
to discern the true nature of phenomena and of other people—to descry their origins, their 
inner workings, their purposes or meanings, and even their status as real or fictitious—
belie their supposedly superior late Enlightenment mindset.  As Constantia and those 
around her become entangled in the epistemological and ontological difficulties of both 
direct experience and artistic or artful representations, Ormond prompts its reader into a 
meta-critical inquiry, a critique of critical practices.  Approaches to art and to narrative, 
motifs featured in the incidents and imagery of the story as well as embodied in the 
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novel’s formal structure, serve to illustrate the era’s prevalent paradigms of causality, 
calculations of probability, and criteria for judging the true and the false.  The novel’s 
relentless resistance to resolution calls into question not merely one or another version of 
events or analysis of appearances but rather that which underwrites all the various 
operative theories and methods of reading and of representing the world, namely, an 
unyielding faith in and a destructive quest for certainty.  Ultimately, in debunking the 
characters’ presumption of clear-sighted discernment and predictive powers, the novel 
asks the reader to consider not only the efficacy but also the ethics of the characters’, the 
author’s, and his or her own means of picturing reality.  
“An Authentic, and Not a Fictitious Tale” 
The first inkling that all is not as it seems in Ormond comes in the form of a letter 
addressed to a mystery person.  When in the opening chapter Stephen Dudley a semi-
retired gentleman of leisure innocently opens and reads the seemingly misdirected letter 
left at his door, he quite unexpectedly catches a glimpse of what lies behind his young 
business partner’s trusty persona.  Later, shielded from view by his study’s open door, 
Dudley secretly witnesses his protégé’s odd reaction to the open envelope on the mantle.  
But only after the young man later feigns surprise at news of the letter’s arrival does 
Dudley’s confidence turn to suspicion.  Too late, after the duplicitous Thomas Craig has 
absconded to the West Indies with the family’s fortune, credit, and good name, Dudley 
learns of the con artist’s elaborate deception from the meticulous records he left behind in 
a locked trunk, records that “perfectly explained [ . . . ] the part which Craig had been 
playing for some years, with so much success” (16).   
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The revelation is devastating and far from what Dudley expected.  Craig’s 
deception carried to the forging of letters from his fictitious family, letters full of 
sentiments of “the most appropriate simplicity and tenderness” in styles and hands 
“distinct and characteristical,” which he shared with his master (9).  The enterprising 
fraud even managed to circumvent Dudley’s secret attempt to have a friend drop in on the 
family in England.  And yet, the narrator observes, “Plans however skillfully contrived, if 
founded on imposture, cannot fail of being sometime detected” (12).  As Dudley 
discovers, “The history of [Craig’s] Wakefield family, specious and complicated as it 
was, was entirely fictitious” (16).  
 In the end, mere chance, the unlooked-for introduction of some new and 
incongruent information, provides the hint of what Dudley’s close observation and 
enlightened judgment seem unable to detect.  It is true that after initially dismissing the 
mystery letter as a simple mistake, Dudley does not fail to follow up on subsequent clues.  
However, the damage has been done; and the moral seems clear: The deceptions 
practiced by others are aided by distortions in our own vision, distortions arising from our 
ignorance, our passions, or our self-interestedness.  In this case, the overweening desire 
to return to his beloved pencil and brush blind Dudley to the notion that Craig’s complete 
self-abnegation just might be too good to be true.  To the eye of the employer, “all his 
[Craig’s] propensities appeared to concentre in his occupation and the promotion of his 
master’s interest, from which he was drawn aside by no allurements of sensual or 
intellectual pleasure,” the narrator reports.  This appearance, however, takes on greater 
credibility from its agreement with Dudley’s own desires.  With Craig installed as his 
new partner, Dudley “flattered himself that his career which had hitherto been exempt 
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from any considerable impediment, would terminate in tranquility” (11).  His shocking 
reversal of fortune, the reader learns, “was imbittered by the consciousness of his own 
imprudence, and by recollecting that the serpent which had stung him, was nurtured in his 
own bosom” (18).  The bosom serpent, of course, is not only Craig, but also Dudley’s 
own egotism.  Certainly the incident should serve to put the reader on notice that his or 
her picture of reality, too, is susceptible to distortions and dissimulations.   
In fact, the astute reader, taking this advice to heart, just might put the principle 
into immediate action; for this is not the first such mystery letter of the novel.  Just such a 
letter, it too addressed to an unknown person, is of course precisely what the reader has 
been perusing.  Just past the book’s title page, a prefatory note, superscribed “To I. E. 
Rosenberg” and signed “S. C.,” proclaims the note writer’s intention to relate “the history 
of Constantia Dudley” and to do so “in no artificial or elaborate order, and without that 
harmonious congruity and luminous amplification, which might justly be displayed in a 
tale flowing merely from invention” (3).  The novel’s multi-layered play with 
authenticity and fictitiousness actually begins here at the very outset with this formal 
conceit.  Just where this play leads, however, remains a matter of some critical doubt. 
It was a common even trite literary device by the time Brown began writing.  
Many of the century’s best-known, best-selling works are purely invented tales of 
purportedly factual events presented often in the form of letters or the recorded 
recollections of one or more witnesses or participants in some real-life affair.  Samuel 
Richardson’s novels set the standard here.  Richardson’s Pamela grew out of a planned 
letter-writing sampler that would offer models of correct grammar and style, proper 
etiquette, and commendable moral sentiments.  Its popularity spawned innumerable 
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imitations (and a few parodies), such that the epistolary form maintained dominance well 
into the next century.  Although this masquerade is conventional, so much so that we 
hardly notice, in a work that foregrounds the problems of imposture, deception, forgery, 
counterfeits, and false identities, it cannot be overlooked that Ormond, a fiction posing as 
a faithful biography, wears the disguise (not unlike Craig) of an apparently sincere, if 
ostentatious, show of artlessness.  
Of course, like other imitative arts, the novelists’ is a transparent deception, one 
readily even instantaneously seen through yet willingly entertained.  With its epistolary 
structure and seduction plot, Ormond seems a comfortingly familiar imitation of the 
Richardson model.  Readers of popular fiction then as now likely would not have looked 
twice at this imitation of an imitation of life.  But S. C.’s strenuous insistence on the 
factuality of her narrative points to the fact that others were wary of fictions of all sorts.  
Anyone familiar with novels from this decade will recognize the common 
apologia that these works are based on a true story and intended to inculcate the moral 
lessons derived from real life experience.  The freedom from undue and morally-dubious 
embellishments is the theme of many prefaces and the direct claim of many titles, 
including William Hill Brown’s The Power of Sympathy; or, The Triumph of Nature; 
Founded in Truth (1789), Susannah Rowson’s Charlotte Temple (published in England as 
Charlotte, a Tale of Truth [1791]), and Hannah Webster Foster’s The Coquette; or, The 
History of Eliza Wharton; A Novel; Founded on Fact (1797).  This phenomenon speaks 
to the ongoing discussion regarding the work of art’s reflection of the real world and its 
influence upon it, which, in turn, is part of a broader set of issues that include the era’s 
concern with the artful performance of social identity, its various responses to the artifice 
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of disguise and illusion, and its felt need to cultivate a sophisticated attitude toward 
imitation and imposture in art and life.  
The problem of deception was “a cultural preoccupation” throughout the 
eighteenth century (Craske 146).106  The intellectual investigations into this problem 
flowed through the Lockean psychology of the day in which all knowledge is derived 
from experience.  If there is no innate knowledge, one’s conceptions of reality and of 
moral value are determined by environmental stimuli.  This reliance upon sense data, in 
turn, occasions the human susceptibility to being led astray by deceptive appearances.  
What then of the phenomenon of the imitative arts?  Philosophers, art historian Matthew 
Craske observes, have long pondered “how a man of intellectual rigour whose mind was 
trained to search out fundamental principles should respond to arts which set out to 
deceive his senses” (145).  But thinkers of this period took special interest in the basic 
deception of art, its presenting a version or copy of reality at some remove from the truth, 
and the strange allure it held in the minds of even quite rational observers.   
In the social world of the era, this strange allure manifests in some circles as a 
play with ambiguity.  In high-culture, as modeled by the French, there arose a mid-
century vogue for social artifice and a polite sensibility marked by an enlightened and 
urbane attitude toward theatricality and masquerade.  This is the era of outrageously 
cumbersome, uncomfortable, and expensive attire, made desirable in part for its ability to 
distinguish its wearer from his or her “perceived social inferiors” (147).  This is the age, 
that is, of Madame Pompadour and her namesake towering wigs, and the age of the 
British Macaroni.   
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Others took a considerably more circumspect approach to the specious pleasures 
of dissimulation.  Distrust of artifice, prosthetic fashion, florid rhetoric, and the 
increasing “fictitiousness of the world” emerged as a correlate to the rise of 
republicanism in the last quarter of the century (148).  The Lockean view of the basic 
equality of all minds, the equal potential for developing rather than merely inheriting 
intellectual capacity and moral character, bolstered the emerging bourgeoisie’s rejection 
of socio-political ranking.  Such egalitarian or at least anti-aristocratic views carried to a 
reaction against the artificial markings of distinction and superiority, those put on airs, 
protocols, and fashions of the theatre mundi.  Those who rejected the aristocratic pretense 
and the hazy morality of the masked revelers of high society favored the simple, the 
natural, and the sincere in language, in personal appearance, and in behavior.   
Brown’s title character Ormond, exemplifying this latter group, disdains and 
disregards the conventional façades of polite society with its perfunctory formalities, its 
“impertinent circuities and scruples” (153).  “He treated with systematic negligence, the 
etiquette that regulates the intercourse of persons of a certain class,” the narrator informs 
us (113).  “He loved to mortify, by his negligence, the pride of his equals and superiors, 
but a lower class had nothing to fear from his insolence” (148).  To Constantia, upon her 
first interview with him, he displays his principled authenticity and sincerity: “I have [ . . 
. ] overlooked ordinary forms; a negligence that has been systematic with me. [ . . . ] It is 
my way [ . . . ] to say what I think.  I care little for consequences” (153, 149).  In his 
unceremonious manners and unfiltered declarations, he proudly eschews false postures 
and feigned personae.  And yet a socio-political principle may be only a secondary 
motivation for this stance.  “His aversion to duplicity,” we are told, “had flowed from 
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experience of its evils.  He had frequently been made its victim; In consequence of this 
his temper had become suspicious, and he was apt to impute deceit on occasions when 
others, of no inconsiderable sagacity, were abundantly disposed to confidence” (115).  
Possessed of a cynical even paranoiac bent of mind and a probing eye, he takes pains to 
see through the polished surfaces, the frivolous pursuits, petty facetiousness, and foolish 
puffery of the so-called polite society. 
However, sophisticated revelers as well as earnest republicans, all those who 
considered themselves enlightened, believed in the power of reason to discern reality, to 
discover the causes behind effects, the true situation behind deceptive appearances.  “The 
very idea of intellectual ‘enlightenment’ was frequently associated with the exercise of 
‘penetrative’ insight,” Craske explains.  “To be enlightened was to show a capacity to 
transcend the alluring deceit of surface appearances and to see through those seductive 
fictions which encouraged irrational fears and beliefs” (146).  This enlightenment mode 
of reasoning confidently applied logic, disciplined and unbiased observation, as well as a 
certain sensibility, a sensibility universal yet susceptible of refinement, to penetrate the 
obscurities of the text of experience.  Thinkers, like Francis Hutcheson and Lord Kames, 
acknowledged the benefits derived from that deception of the senses that was art and 
debated whether the charms it cast upon the perceiving subject were a harmless diversion 
or were justified by a high moral purpose.  Kames, like Shaftesbury, believed sensations 
were accurate enough conveyors of external realities to form the basis for sure knowledge 
and for aesthetic and moral judgment.  Our moral sense, according to this Scottish 
Common Sense view, sees virtue as moral beauty, as something pleasing to us when we 
see it, and vice as moral ugliness or deformity that evokes a painful emotion.  Fiction and 
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drama, by virtue of their artificiality, can model good and evil in their most instructive 
forms.   
Similarly, artists William Hogarth and Francisco Goya, exemplars of the civic 
humanist theory of illusion, as Craske explains, felt the deception that was imitative art 
should be used to reform the morals of society and to sharpen the “‘percipience and 
intellectual agility of all people’” (151).  Often exaggerating their depicted subjects for 
greater effect, these satirists aimed to pierce superficial appearances and expose the truth 
behind artifice.  Goya, in particular, deplored masquerade.  He regarded the indulgence in 
imposture and social performance merely an “opportunity to commit morally repugnant 
acts under the cover of anonymity” (155).  For Goya, as for some others, the culture of 
deception found its emblem in the image of a bespectacled man diligently scrutinizing a 
woman whose appearance of respectability may be only an all-but-impenetrable disguise.  
In some works, however, it is the lady, now the emblem of menaced innocence, who is 
shamelessly ogled and pecked at by costumed men.  Brown’s Constantia, a young woman 
alone in the city, endures these cultural practices of visual penetration, coming under the 
intense gaze of a number of men, some looking with “inquisitive eye,” some with the an 
artist’s judgment, and others with a grossly acquisitive leer (51).107  Employing his 
theatrical skills developed both in spite of and because of his aversion to deception, 
Ormond even transforms himself into a black chimney sweep and messenger so as to eye 
Constantia and her father where they live.   
“This Mode of Multiplying Faces” 
Although Ormond recreates scenes found in the satirists’ images, Brown takes on 
this problem of deceptive appearance through not only subject matter alone but also 
115 
 
through the narrative form, a form that blurs the line between illusion and reality.  And as 
such the better point of comparison may be the illusory productions of trompe l’oeil, 
paintings created to bemuse and confuse the senses, which as it happens were achieving a 
zenith in production and public interest during the period of Brown’s novel writing.  
Perfecting a photorealistic image, the creator of the trompe l’oeil painting intends the 
content of the image to be perceived, at least for a moment, as actual, the thing itself and 
not a representation.  The success of this optical illusion (the name is French for “fools 
the eye”) rides on how well it imitates the depicted object’s observable qualities, 
including its three-dimensionality, on some two-dimensional surface, often a wall or a 
framed sheet of canvas.  The genre is centuries old and its function as a test of the artist’s 
skill and as a pleasing deception for the observer is illustrated in the often retold story of 
the competition of Zeuxis and Parrhasius, Greek painters of the fifth century BC.  After 
Zeuxis boasted that he had painted grapes so realistic that birds pecked at and attempted 
to eat them, fellow artist Parrhasius invited him to see his latest work, which was hanging 
behind a curtain. When Zeuxis reached out to draw aside the curtain, he found that it (the 
curtain) was the painting.  I fooled animals, but you have bested me, Zeuxis conceded, 
for you have fooled a man, and an artist at that. 
In her book-length examination of the political valences of illusionistic art in the 
early republic, Wendy Bellion argues that trompe l’oeil paintings produced by American 
artists in this era responded to and capitalized upon emergent ideas about perception, 
representation, and subjectivity.  Some, she argues, operated as training exercises in 
discernment, as heuristic tools for sharpening the skills required for responsible 
republican citizenship.  The idea was that careful scrutiny of the artful illusions in the 
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gallery, exhibition halls, and performance venues rewarded the perceptive observer with 
an understanding of the true state of affairs.  This educative purpose she argues is the 
impetus behind the trompe l’oeil works of Philadelphia’s Charles Wilson Peale and his 
sons, who maintained a museum adjacent to Independence Hall, seat of the federal 
government, and even held an exhibit in the building’s second story during the 
controversial hearings on the Jay Treaty.  At a time when both political parties were 
convinced of the other’s perfidy, such exercising of the critical faculties, the artists 
hoped, better enabled the conscientious citizen, a jealous and perspicacious guardian of 
government probity, to see through politicians’ representations and gain a knowledge of 
the true affairs of state.108  
It would not be unreasonable to expect that Brown’s narratives have a similar 
educative purpose.  He was a part of the same culture, indeed the same city as Peale and 
his sons.  And his works, and perhaps especially Ormond, partake of that general theme 
of the day’s literary offerings: the operations of sincerity and duplicity, authenticity and 
artifice.  Unlike the satirical works of the time, which ultimately function, even in their 
most outrageous expressions, as a didactic lesson, Brown’s novel, in a manner broadly 
similar to the era’s illusionistic paintings, works as a sort of exercise.  The difficulty, 
however, lies in attending to the different operations and aims of these illusionistic 
exercises.  Before examining just how Ormond, in fact, works against the epistemological 
assumptions and educative purpose behind trompe l’oeil art like Peale’s, it may be 
helpful to consider the critical readings that explore the similarities.  
Ormond was, of course, not posited as a genuine artefact in the way trompe l’oeil 
paintings are sometimes positioned in the viewing space so as to reinforce the illusion; 
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Brown’s readers, who can readily see that his name appears on the title page as the 
author, do not encounter this work unaware of its status as a fiction.109  And yet, as 
already suggested, there is another level of authenticity or integrity to be questioned.  
Like a trompe l’oeil painting, the narrator’s account, upon consideration, reveals a 
tension between its surface representations and unseen realities.  When eyed closely, S. 
C.’s avowedly faithful “history of Constantia Dudley” has no more credence than the 
“specious and complicated” history fabricated by Craig.  In fact, in light of her reluctance 
to reveal “all the means by which [she] gained knowledge of [Ormond’s] actions,” her 
evident antipathy to his views and aims, and the several apparent absurdities of her story, 
S. C. may have less claim to credibility than the scrupulously agreeable and craftily 
confiding con artist (3).  Some readings of the novel elaborate quite inventively upon this 
apparent hint.   
One long-standing line of critical response applies a familiar form of causal 
explanation to the perceived formal fragmentariness and thematic incoherence as critics 
attempt to peer through the surface to a hidden depth or through the effect to its cause.  
Reading between the lines to deduce its partly obscured true story, or alternately to posit 
an explanation for the lack of a coherent plot or meaning, some readers intend to expose 
the author’s intentional deceptions or his clumsy authorial machinations.  Critics James 
Russo and Carl Nelson Jr., rather ingenious in their construction of alternate parallel 
narratives, explain, separately and to rather different ends, the contradictions, digressions, 
inconclusiveness, and other narrative abnormalities as intentional (if almost too clever) 
misdirection.  Nelson, peering through the narrative inconsistencies, finds on the other 
side a biased and manipulative narrator increasingly shrill and irrational in the defense of 
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her conservative moral values.  Taking a similar approach, James Russo looks behind the 
façade of a false, exculpatory narrative, to discern an elaborate, hidden history of 
Constantia’s secret romantic involvement and criminal collusion with Craig.  For both 
these critics, the themes of duplicity and masks, theatricality and identity performance, 
serve to clue the reader in to an intentionally ironic narrative form.110  Some readings, 
however, focus not on demonstrating the duplicity of the teller or of the tale so much as 
on the unreliability of the author.  Recognizing that it does not explain much to say, as 
commentators earlier in the last century had, that the peculiarities of Brown’s novel are 
due to an eccentric mind, to carelessness, or to a rushed writing schedule, both Paul C. 
Rodgers and G. St. John Stott, in separate efforts, instead seek to ascribe some method to 
the madness, some rationale, if not a consistent controlling vision, behind the creative 
decisions.  By way of a sort of reverse engineering of the text, they re-trace Brown’s 
“improvisations” (Rodgers 1974) and “second thoughts” (Stott 1990) as he simply 
reacted without overarching design or plan to the exigencies of narrative construction.  
Each of these readings demonstrate impressive speculative ingenuity.  And yet, such 
clever reconstructions call to mind the conspiracy theory mode of causal explanation so 
prevalent in Brown’s era and, as I hope to show, so effectively challenged in Ormond and 
in other places in Brown’s writings. 
While some spy an intentional duality within the text, others a de facto duality 
between literary aims and real world limitations, still other readers discern a duality 
within the author himself.  The opposing impulses of the novel, in the view of Paul 
Witherington, emerge from Brown’s unseen but conjectured “personal conflict between 
aesthetic sensibility and moral sensibility.”111  Robert S. Levine argues that beneath the 
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overt expressions of skepticism regarding conspiracy theories by intellectuals like Brown 
lurks an anxiety stirred by the alarmist rhetoric of the day; and in the contradictory 
portrait of the radical Ormond, one can see that Brown’s “hidden fear had been tapped” 
(“Villainy” 129).  By examining the homo-social (if not homosexual) bond between 
Brown and Elihu Hubbard Smith, Caleb Crain uncovers a psychological dynamic that 
gives rise to Brown’s taking first one socio-political position and then its opposite from 
one novel to another or even from one moment to another in the same work.  With very 
little in the way of unambiguous extra-textual evidence to draw upon, however, 
arguments, like Witherington’s, Levine’s, and Crain’s, arguments positing that the 
problematic text exposes the author’s emotional or ideological confusion lay exposed to 
the charge of begging the question, i.e. the author’s work reflects the inner conflicts we 
know he must have had to have produced such conflicted work.  
Despite offering quite different interpretations, each of the above readings 
assumes that a baseline reality, an obscured but ultimately legible and reliable set of facts, 
can be glimpsed behind or through the misleading or obfuscating surface appearances.  
As such, they take the same approach to discernment and deception taken by the trompe 
l’oeil painters of the 1790s.  They, in effect, affect to draw aside the curtain and expose a 
portrait of a jealous and sentimental Sophia; or of a lying, licentious Constantia; or 
perhaps of the frantic author himself scribbling away at his desk, struggling earnestly to 
achieve conventional aesthetic and moral aims or to reconcile his deep-seated 
ambivalence.  And yet, as another line of criticism cogently argues, the search for a final 
explanation, a certain cause, or a true nature behind appearances in Ormond uncovers 
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only unwarrantable assumptions that collapse into irresolvable contradiction, incongruity, 
and inconclusiveness. 
“The Vanity of Systems” 
 In the conventional view, in an age of disguise, nothing is what it seems, at first; 
however, there is, comfortingly, a reality somewhere underneath waiting to be revealed.  
Therefore, the way to true understanding, happiness, and morality is through the 
cultivation of a penetrative insight into the nature of things.  In Ormond, however, 
characters (or the reader) often find that what lies beneath the deceptive appearance may 
be only another deceptive appearance.  Spectacular examples of the failure of vision, both 
literal and figurative, suggest, not unreasonably, that perhaps still greater penetrative 
power is needed; and yet, as the competing epistemologies of the principle characters fail 
them, no definitive means of verification remains.   
Several critical responses to the novel have recognized in it a concerted attack on 
the assumption of the stability of signs, the recoverability of origins, and the finality of 
conclusions.  William Hedges, Cynthia S. Jordan, and John Cleman, each in turn, see in 
Brown’s fiction a purposeful uncertainty, inconclusiveness, and resolute moral 
ambiguity.  Norman S. Grabo sees patterns of uncanny coincidence serving an open-
ended allegory.  William Scheick, Michael Kreyling, and Steve Hamelman each find 
Brown’s novels exhibiting what they argue can best be likened to a Derridean 
deconstruction of origins, language, and ultimate meaning.  Disagreement persists, 
however, on the issue of what purpose may be served by Brown’s skeptical analysis of 
ordering constructs. 
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Some, including Jordan, as well as Frank Shuffleton, Scott Ellis, and Thomas 
Koenig, argue that in refusing to reveal some unambiguous reality or ground of absolute 
truth, some stable and unified didactic lesson or meaning, Brown’s novels prompt readers 
to engage in an active and open reading process, for doing so would promote, 
respectively, calm and prudent deliberation, a more supple and responsive justice system, 
greater sympathetic bonds, or more effective learning.  This attention to the unreliability 
of ordering systems and to the need to continually check our perceptions against the 
unfolding of experience carries through the secondary literature up to the present 
moment.  Much of the Brown criticism of the past twenty years or so, ranging widely 
through the intellectual context of the author’s day, traces the novel’s parsing of some 
seemingly irreducible, monolithic construct posited as an ordering system or principle, 
exposing its inherent internal conflicts, contradictory implications, ideological uses, and 
sometimes perverse outcomes or manifestations.  Considered in the aggregate, these 
examinations of the novel’s critical analyses of  liberty (Cahill), republicanism (Drexler 
and White), the law (Shuffleton), the logic of the marketplace (Ellis), statism (von 
Morze), the reliance on rational autonomy underwriting Wollstonecraftian feminism 
(Layson), aesthetic education for virtuous citizenship (Morris), American identity 
(Bannet, Samuels), virtue (Christophersen), the private-public distinction (Chapman), and 
sympathy, including fraternal or sisterly models (Stern) and a lesbian model (Comment) 
all find Brown challenging totalizing systems, critiquing the use of these constructs as if 
they are fully adequate to human experience.112   
There are many points of contact between my reading of Ormond and those put 
forth by these scholars, but there are a few important divergences as well.  As the sheer 
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number of different critical foci might suggest, and several of the scholars acknowledge, 
Brown’s compelling interest may lie not in any one of these ordering systems, per se.  A 
more fundamental focus, I suggest, emerges in an essay published eight months after 
Ormond.  In “Walstein’s School of History, from the German of Krantz of Gotha,” which 
conveys some of the central tenets of his literary theory, Brown contrasts the efficacy of 
“abstract systems and theoretical reasonings” with “eloquent narration,” giving 
preference, not unsurprisingly, to the latter.  He argues that 
Systems, by being imperfectly attended to, are liable to beget error 
and depravity.  Truth flows from the union and relation of many 
parts.  These parts, fallaciously connected and viewed separately, 
constitute error.  Prejudice, stupidity, and indolence, will seldom 
afford us a candid audience, are prone to stop short in their 
researches, to remit, or transfer to other objects their attention, and 
hence to derive new motives to injustice, and new confirmations in 
folly from that which, if impartially and accurately examined, 
would convey nothing but benefit. [ . . . ]  
Mere reasoning is cold and unattractive.  Injury rather than benefit 
proceeds from convictions that are transient and faint; their 
tendency is not to reform and enlighten, but merely to produce 
disquiet and remorse.  They are not strong enough to resist 
temptation and to change the conduct, but merely to pester the 
offender with dissatisfaction and regret. (Literary Essays 35) 
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These comments underscore not the fallacy of any given system but the susceptibility of 
systems, even those expressly constructed to achieve general happiness and morality, to 
the weaknesses of human nature.  Brown’s concern in theory and practice is with this 
problematic interaction of abstractions with the embodied consciousness of human 
beings.  In contrast to argument and precept, the detailing of action in an “eloquent 
narration,” can “assail popular error and vice” through engaging the affections and 
winning over the reason by “incessant attacks,” by investing the benefits of a system with 
a “seeming existence” and giving the evils which error generates a “sensible and present 
existence” (35).113 
Though not impossible, this minimizing of error and vice, as incidents in Ormond 
repeatedly demonstrate, is easier said than done.  The ideal of “impartially and 
accurately” examining any ordering system generally falls prey to the distorted vision of 
chronically self-interested humans who, particularly in this era, invest an inordinate faith 
in the “panoptic faculties of sight” (Bellion 7).  Moreover, humans have a certain genius 
for constructing means of evading responsibility, particularly the responsibility for 
respectfully engaging alterity.  And, perhaps especially in Brown’s increasingly 
individualistic and commercialized society, this genius often operates in the form of self-
delusive fantasies of benevolence and justification operating through what can be called 
the contractual model of social relations. 
The contractual model of social relations provides cover for a multitude of sins.  
As aids in the determination of conduct, systems, pre-established conventions, and 
common expectations are useful, perhaps necessary for the relatively smooth operation of 
interpersonal relations on all scales.  But if taken to be the sole (or overriding) and 
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absolute authority, they reduce alterity to fixed terms and function to limit each party’s 
obligation to the other, even as one or another party may deem itself worthy of praise for 
a dutiful adherence to the contract.  Fixing terms, contracts define the parties involved 
and the considerations owed by each, thereby disregarding, indeed actively 
discountenancing, any alteration over time or alterity beyond the fixed terms, unless they 
can be assimilated into a revised contract.  When deferred to as a final truth, contracts 
(formal or informal, written, verbal, or unspoken) are instruments by which individuals 
absolve themselves of responsibility for regarding, respecting, and responding ethically to 
the uniqueness of a particular circumstance and the alterity of the other human being, that 
which exists or operates outside the logic of law, markets, language, and other ordering 
systems.   
Ormond depicts this limiting of liability and absolving from obligations as more 
than self-protective non-involvement or neglect or even crass exploitation.  Indeed, 
contracts of all sorts, through the vicissitudes of the plot, reveal themselves to be 
grounded on a sort of implied, provisionally deferred violence from which individuals are 
distanced, their direct and personal responsibility for the regarding of the other being 
replaced by the impersonal imperatives of an outside mechanism.  And as I will discuss 
further on, the sub-textual violence of contractual relations rears its head in many of the 
novel’s interpersonal engagements, whether a labor agreement, a business transaction, a 
marriage, or the social contract that binds a society.   
This contractual model of human interaction relies for its appearance of 
consistency and impartiality on the sure knowledge and moral certainty established 
through the heuristics of vision, the same exercising and refining of penetrative insight 
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promoted in the arts, education, science and medicine, and the paranoiac political outlook 
of the age.114  But, as with Wieland, the twists, turns, and breaks in Brown’s 
sensationalistic plot serve to depict in dramatic hues the consequences of assuming the 
existence of an absolute, universal truth and one’s capacity to access it.  In the face of 
intellectual and moral challenges, characters struggle to maintain faith in their respective 
means of clarifying their moral vision, whether the transcendent power of the imagination 
and its works, the exercise of observation and reason, the refinement of sensibility, or the 
operation of a moral sense. 
For the characters in Brown’s previous novel Wieland, the production, 
contemplation, and collection of art serve as a means of refining and displaying their 
enlightened subjectivity; for the characters in Ormond, however, art takes on a more 
material and more dynamic role.  In the busy milieu of Brown’s second novel, art and the 
operations of imagination more broadly are more manifestly inextricable from material, 
embodied existence: from economics and marketplace logic, from issues of class identity 
and social status, and from interpersonal relations and considerations of sentimental 
value.  From the opening paragraph, the characters are more actively involved in the 
world of art in a practical way; and art, in a practical way, actively shapes the world of 
the characters.  In the various uses of and responses to art and aesthetic pleasure, Ormond 
registers both the negative and positive, destructive and constructive potentialities of art. 
Stephen Dudley’s youthful ambitions are built upon the belief that art is an escape 
from drudgery, the purgatory of deadened feelings, and the intellectual and moral torpor 
of the laboring class.  Further, he evinces a quasi-aristocratic notion of the merit and 
privileges of enlightened intellect and refined sensibility.  As the narrator reports, “His 
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habits had disqualified him for mechanical employments.  He could not stoop to the 
imaginary indignity which attended them.”  In short, “The indulgence of his father had 
contributed to instill into him prejudices, in consequence of which a certain species of 
disgrace was annexed to every employment of which the only purpose was gain” (6-7).  
The death of the elder Dudley, however, forces the son to put his artist-intellectual skills 
into less ennobling but more remunerative use carrying on his father’s apothecary 
business (mixing substances not for paints but for palliatives and purgatives).115  He soon 
finds he cannot well-endure “the drudgery of a shop, where all the faculties were at a 
stand.”  It is a situation far from his liking, for it “not only precluded all those pursuits 
which exalt and harmonize the feelings but was detested by him as something humiliating 
and ignominious” (7).  In his radically altered circumstance, he soon despairs of ever 
returning to his beloved art and attaining that transcendence.  When Craig walks in off 
the street seeking a position, Dudley seizes the opportunity for the “immediate possession 
of ease,” offering a job to this competent youth with the seemingly “modest and 
ingenuous aspect,” “nothing but food, clothing, and lodging being stipulated as the 
reward of his services” (7, 8).   
Dudley’s aesthetic education, though it greatly expands his powers of observation 
and discernment, does not give him the clarity of vision to see through Craig’s 
impostures.  For critic Edward Cahill, Dudley’s desire to pursue his art serves as a 
liability in a commercial society, one example of many from the novel that illustrate the 
dangers of imagination.  It is possible, however, to see in this scenario an even more 
pernicious failure of vision and imagination.  Michael J. Drexler and Ed White read 
Dudley’s arrangement with the young Thomas Craig as an indulgence in the self-delusive 
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“fantasy” of republicanism, a proto-type of the American Dream, in which one transcends 
the need for further labor by convincing new comers to serve as labor machines devoid of 
or willing to defer their own desire for leisure and luxury.  Combining these critical 
insights, one might argue that the aesthetic education Dudley received seems to provide 
the desired object of a delusive and self-serving fantasy and the imaginative capacity 
needed to indulge in it.  But, of course, his own facility with the deception of the senses is 
matched and exceeded by that of his apprentice, the son of an illiterate washer woman.  
And unfortunately, “the arts of [this] subtle impostor” expose Dudley and his family to 
another, more systematized artifice, the law. 
After losing everything, Dudley must again relinquish “those pursuits which exalt 
and harmonize the feelings” and put his pen to use as a scrivener in a law office.  That is, 
he must become a copyist, a maker of mere imitations.  Indeed, he makes imitations for a 
system (the legal system) that functions, the narrative will attest more than once, as a 
mere imitation, that is, an imitation of objective justice.  In taking on this new position, 
“He was perpetually encumbered with the rubbish of the law, and waded with laborious 
steps through its endless tautologies, its impertinent circuities, its lying assertions, and 
hateful artifices” (20).  Rather than an impartial mechanism upon which judgments of 
right and goodness can be securely built, the law often serves merely as a tool for 
justifying the pursuit of self-interest.  Beyond the indignities and distaste he experiences 
in this line of work, Dudley’s fall into the role of a scrivener is all the more ironic and 
humiliating in light of his recent personal experience.  After Craig’s embezzlement, 
including the full exploitation of the business’s credit, “It was his [Dudley’s] lot to fall 
into the grasp of men, who squared their actions by no other standard than law, and who 
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esteemed every claim to be just, that could plead that sanction” (17).  In short, citing this 
self-enclosed abstraction with no absolute moral grounding, these men feel no 
compunction in stripping Dudley and his family of everything they own, including 
furniture and nearly all clothing.  Indeed, by this standard “they deemed themselves 
entitled to his gratitude for leaving his person unmolested” (17).  The critique of art (and 
artifice) extends here to a system of laws (“hateful artifices”) that the disgruntled 
scrivener describes as “a tissue made up of the shreds and remnants of barbarous 
antiquity, polluted with the rust of ages, and patched by the stupidity of modern 
workmen, into new deformity” (20).  
Thus, it is his misfortune to “fall a victim to the most atrocious arts” more than 
once (20).  Indeed, Dudley, as a result of his still clinging to his vision of aesthetic 
pleasures, social distinction, and the gratifications of wealth in the midst of ruin, gives 
himself up to “a listless melancholy” (25).  And despite his finely honed discernment, he 
is taken unawares, unable to see the “gradual and invisible” approaches of temptation as 
he degenerates into despair, drunkenness, and “low debauchery” (27).  He brings upon 
himself the very ignominy and humiliation connected to mere sensual indulgence that he 
had so passionately disdained.  Constantia’s long suffering in “scenes of uproar and 
violence and foul disgrace that accompanied his paroxysms of drunkenness” ends only 
when her father is, in a sense, cured by blindness (27).  The loss of sight, which 
“dissolved the spell, by which he was bound,” symbolizes the breaking of the delusive 
“spell” of the heuristics of vision (27).  His blindness, the result of his eyes being 
“invaded by a cataract,” leads to a new clarity of understanding that “showed him, with a 
distinctness which made him shudder, the gulf to which he was hastening” (20, 28).   
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In his new state he falls into a new relation to art, as it becomes a means not of 
self-interested transcendence but of interpersonal connection.  Dudley’s lute, sold at 
auction but “gratuitously restored to him by the purchaser, on condition of his retaining it 
in his possession,” resounds again during this period of impoverishment as it 
accompanies his daughter’s voice, functioning not for the last time as a medium and 
symbol of communion (28).  Edward Cahill and, more extensively, Scott Ellis examine 
the novel’s display of morally legitimate uses of imagination and art.  Both examine the 
manner in which tools or objects of artistic expression—the lute, a pair of miniature 
portraits, a song, as well as personal narratives—can function as media of exchange 
outside the dehumanizing logic of the market-place.116  
Those exchanges that foster fellow-feeling are put to the test when the incursion 
of yellow fever works to expose the gross self-interest operating just below the surface of 
civil society.  Whiston, a neighbor of the Dudleys, brazenly reneges on the social 
contract, abandoning his stricken sister.  When the epidemic enters his house, he lights 
out of town, “allow[ing] his terrors to overpower what was due to his sister and to 
humanity” (48).  Collapsed in a barn, infected and alone, he dies an agonizing and 
gruesome death, as do the farm family who out of fear of contagion refuse to approach 
him, deny him any aid, and even suffer him “to decay by piecemeal” (48).  They 
subsequently fall prey to the “malignant vapours, which the corpse thus neglected, could 
not fail to produce” (49).  One cannot escape the relation to others, this incident 
illustrates.  The abandonment of obligations does not eliminate those obligations.  
Ormond will later observe that we cannot avoid being in a contractual relation of sorts, a 
connection of almost mechanical necessity: “Man could not be otherwise than a cause of 
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perpetual operation and efficacy.  He was part of a machine, and as such had not power to 
withhold his agency.  Contiguousness to other parts, that is, to other men, was all that was 
necessary to render him a powerful concurrent” (112).  Further, Ormond holds that we 
cannot avoid producing evil when we act (or fail to act) in a corrupt society.  The novel, 
however, offers an alternative view.  In Constantia, we see one who chooses to take full, 
unqualified responsibility for the other, taking it upon herself, for example, to serve as 
nurse to Whiston’s fatally ill sister Mary. 
But others maintain their contractual duty so as to secure what they want.  
M’Crea, the nephew of the deceased landlord Mathews, in the midst of the epidemic 
comes to demand the rent.  “He was not unconscious of the inhumanity and sordidness of 
this proceeding,” the narrator explains, “and therefore, endeavoured to disguise it by the 
usual pretences” (50).  Pleading his own obligations to support his widowed aunt, he 
finds the contractual relation a useful mask for greed.  But the contract also sanctions a 
resort to force.  Later, when incensed by the counterfeit bank note Constantia unwittingly 
passed along to him (another of Craig’s deceptions), M’Crea demands from the 
impoverished and disabled Dudley all to which he is legally entitled upon threat of 
eviction and a certain wintery death. 
To appease the importunate landlord, Constantia must sacrifice the miniature 
portrait of her beloved childhood friend as collateral.  To M’Crea the trinket is an object 
having only a certain monetary value; to Constantia “It seemed as if she could have 
endured the loss of eyes with less reluctance than the loss of this inestimable relique” 
(75).  The critic Ellis notes the allusion to Dudley’s recent blindness here, but this and 
other remarks also register a critique of the reduction of everything to what can be seen, 
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that is, categorized, quantified, and, often, commodified.  When Dudley’s lute must be 
sold to secure fuel against the cold, his words suggest the instrument’s function as an 
alternative to the acquisitiveness of his days of sightedness: “It was, in some degree, a 
substitute for the eyes which I have lost, but now let it go, and perform for me perhaps 
the dearest of its services” (76).  Much later, we learn that the unscrupulous M’Crea sold 
the miniature for the worth of its gold.  The goldsmith who bought it, in turn, sees its 
market value as an object of beauty.  And finally the con artist Martynne prizes it for its 
use value as a prop in his illicit schemes.  What once served to enhance human 
connections are seen only as means toward mere monetary gain or social advantage. 
As Scott Ellis argues, this marketplace rationality that commodifies everything 
extends to personal relations in the novel, with the portrayal of the reduction of women to 
property.117  The street ruffians who argue over who will be the first to sexually assault 
Constantia exemplify this in its crudest form.  One “seemed to think his property 
invaded,” the other seemed “disposed to assert his claim by force” (80).  The critique of 
contractual relations extends, naturally, to the marriage contract, as well, particularly 
when marriage is seen as an extension of business, as it is by Balfour, the man who 
rescues Constantia from the thugs.  The precociously self-possessed Constantia had 
earlier deliberated upon the institution of marriage, “a contract to endure for life,” but 
Balfour’s attentions occasion Constantia’s ruminations on a woman’s subjectivity 
consequent to marriage: “So far from possessing property, she herself would become the 
property of another” (21, 84).  This Scottish adventurer, characterized by his “strict 
adherence to the maxims of trade,” his being “governed by the principles of mercantile 
integrity in all his dealings” seems the bloodless embodiment of the logic of the 
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marketplace, particularly in his peculiar interest in her management of household 
economy rather than her moral or aesthetic virtues.  Although a “stranger to violent 
emotions of any kind,” he nevertheless allows the maxims and principles to work 
violence in his interest (81).  When Constantia turns down the incredulous Balfour’s 
proposal, his sister, described as something like his double, exacts revenge on her.  The 
hidden threat of violence is actually born out in the punishment meted out to Constantia 
in the form of gossip and a concerted effort of the sister’s circle of female friends to shut 
her out of her occupation as a seamstress.  With her only means of procuring gainful 
employment cut off, she, her dependent father, and their former servant girl Lucy again 
face death by starvation. 
 Ormond abhors marriage as a “contract” “iniquitous and absurd” (127).  But he 
negotiates in bad faith the terms of his alternate, unconventional arrangement with 
Hellen, a young woman who “scarcely comprehends the principle that governs the world, 
and in consequence of which, nothing can be gained but by giving something in exchange 
for it” (141).  He thinks of women’s intellectual capacities and sensibilities as inherently 
inferior to men and sees a wife as a mere superintendent of a household.  As such, “He 
wanted instruments and not partakers of his authority.  One whose mind was equal and 
not superior to the cogent apprehension and punctual performance of his will.  One 
whose character was squared, with mathematical exactness to his situation” (128).  
Hellen, formed and educated to be an object charming to the senses, seems to him 
debarred by her sex from the heights of eloquence and wisdom.  Once installed into a 
Philadelphia mansion as his mistress, Hellen isolates herself from the judging eyes of the 
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world, finding friendship only in Constantia, who becomes her confidante and her 
advocate against the intractable Ormond.  
Cleaving to his idealized rationality, he is unable to understand let alone 
appreciate the aspects of Hellen’s mind and character that are not easily quantified in 
calculations of worth and instrumentality.  Her skill as an actor, he admits, is formidable: 
“When his pupil personated the victims of anger and grief, and poured forth the fiery 
indignation of Calista, or the maternal despair of Constance, or the self-contentions of 
Ipsipile, he could not deny the homage which her talents might claim” (130).  Ironically 
and sadly, Ormond seems unable or unwilling to recognize the source of her perfect 
impersonations—her own intense experience of these feelings in the face of Ormond’s 
shallow affection for her.  In music, too, “Hellen had long relinquished the drudgery of 
imitation,” though again it is her pent-up passions that power precisely those 
performances Ormond finds so pleasing.  Her ignorance of science, history, and 
philosophy is the result of a conventionally gendered education.  “Women are generally 
limited to what is sensual and ornamental,” the narrator had earlier explained.  “Music 
and painting, and the Italian and French languages, are bounds which they seldom pass” 
(33).  But this limitation cannot hide her capacity for sophisticated thinking.  Her ability 
to be “sedate, considerate, extensive in foresight, and fertile in expedients” shines forth in 
her skill at the “science” of chess, which Ormond held as “a sort of criterion of human 
capacity” (131, italics in the original).  Ormond admits to being confused by her 
“contradiction,” a measure of the role the females characters tend to play in this narrative, 
that of the grotesque.118 
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The appearance of contradiction and the wonder, surprise, or disgust evoked by 
female characters’ violation of the conventions of gendered education and virtue speak to 
Brown’s recurring theme: Conceptions of truth and value and the everyday experience of 
the world are processed through a perceptual mechanism that is never free from distorting 
influence, making impossible the task of distinguishing between objective truth and 
subjective experience.  As such what passes as our sure knowledge of things, persons, 
and meanings that seem self-evident and firmly rooted in the logical, natural, and 
unquestionably real is deeply unstable and contestable. 
Although it is Constantia’s physical and moral integrity that serves as the guiding 
interest of the narrator and her addressee, a concern with purity and corruption pervades 
the entire narrative.  Throughout, the language suppurates with the imagery of 
contamination and contagion.  Brown, of course, is not concerned merely with the 
Richardsonian theme of the seduction of a pure young lady, but with the complicated 
tangle of problems plaguing the nation and the world at that moment. 
Paradoxically, with the ever greater interconnectedness and interdependencies 
came ever more rigid divisions and divisiveness, ever more fear of corruption.  Perhaps 
this is best exemplified in one of the era’s lasting legacies: the establishment of the first 
American political party system, in which conflicting views of political reality in the 
early republic become increasingly institutionalized.  The informal, narrowly-focused, 
short-term skirmishes of factional politics that marked the revolutionary and pre-
ratification years gave way in the 1790s to the formation of a system of structured 
political parties each aligned with different regions, occupations, monetary policies, 
views on slavery, and favored foreign allies and each claiming to represent the truest, 
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most pure vision of American republican values.  Political parties arose even in the face 
of the still reigning ideals that decried political parties as gross violations of republican 
principles.  Both sides argued that it organized only as a defensive measure in response to 
the other party organizing first.  Self-defense becomes the specious rationalization for 
logically inconsistent and morally dubious offensive measures, as seen in the origins of 
Ormond’s deployment of theatrical skill, impersonation and costume in his attempt to 
head-off the fraudulent efforts of others: “The treachery of mankind compelled him to 
resort to it.  If they should deal in a manner as upright and explicit as himself, it would be 
superfluous.  But since they were in the perpetual use of stratagems and artifices, it was 
allowable, he thought, to wield the same arms” (115-6).  In the contest to define the new 
nation, the stakes were high and the rhetoric was often caustic, hyperbolic, libelous, and 
even paranoiac.   
Written in the aftermath of the Alien and Sedition Acts and the yellow fever 
epidemic that overtook and fused with anxieties about external and internal threats to 
political integrity and survival, Ormond plays upon on the paradox of a society based on 
the ideal of openness, benevolence, and mutual trust (in social, political, and economic 
exchanges) giving rise to a culture of paranoia, conspiracy, and secrecy.  The year 1798 
saw the paroxysm of paranoia—oriented inwardly as rabid partisanship and outwardly as 
reactionary and bellicose xenophobia—that jeopardized the republic’s continued 
existence as a unified and a sovereign nation.  As historian Gordon Wood explains, the 
same rationality that undergirds the movement toward democracy also functions to limit 
available conceptions of the causes of social processes and political events, making 
conspiracy theory both reasonable and necessary.  But in the last years of the century, the 
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enormity of events, particularly the vicissitudes of the French Revolution, strained this 
mode of causal explanation, producing conspiratorial explanations exquisitely twisted, 
absurd, and grotesque. 
Looking into some of his essayistic writings, one can see that for Brown, while 
there may be no infallible formula for discerning cause, there is a wrong way to ascribe 
causes to effects.  That way involves disregarding or forgetting the circumstances 
surrounding the effects, seeking causes in too narrow a fashion.  In comments regarding 
the ancient epics of Homer and Virgil, Brown refers to barbarous times when “truth was 
deformed by tradition and credulity [ . . . ] effects were disjointed from their causes, and 
unattended with their circumstances [and in poetry] invention supplied the defects of 
memory, and embellished events with causes and circumstances, grotesque, miraculous, 
and incredible.”119  There is no going back to a pre-Enlightenment mentality regarding 
causality, but Brown also suggests that the moderns are still susceptible to simplistic 
explanations for complex phenomena.  In a review published six months after Ormond, 
Brown rebuts the paranoiac picture put forth in a Fourth of July address that takes up 
Abbé Barruel’s account of the Illuminati’s role in instigating and controlling the 
revolution in France and its designs for spreading its corrosive doctrines to America and 
beyond. 
Some would reason thus: Men are liable to error, and though they may 
intend good, may commit enormous mistakes in the choice of means.  
While they imagine themselves labouring for the happiness of mankind, 
loosening the bonds of superstition, breaking the fetters of commerce, out-
rooting the prejudice of birth, by which father transmits to son absolute 
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power over the property, liberty, and lives of millions, they may, in reality, 
be merely pulling down the props which uphold human society, and 
annihilate not merely the chains of false religion, but the foundations of 
morality—not merely the fetters of commerce, and feudal usurpations 
upon property, but commerce and property themselves.  The apology 
which may be made for such is, that though their activity be pernicious, 
their purposes are pure.120 
Described by S. C. as “a contradictory and unintelligible” being, Ormond 
embodies that paradigm-disrupting otherness of the radical revolutionaries and of the 
yellow fever itself (3).  In Constantia’s interactions with him, fixed understanding and 
certainty fade into perplexity, self-evident facts into the mere appearance of 
conclusiveness.  Ormond, mixing sincerity with obfuscation, is both answering and not 
answering Constantia’s queries: 
His disclosures [ . . . ] were imperfect.  What knowledge was imparted, 
instead of appeasing, only tended to inflame her curiosity.  His answers to 
her enquires were prompt, and at first sight, sufficiently explicit, but upon 
reconsideration, an obscurity seemed to gather round them, to be dispelled 
by new interrogatories.  These, in like manner, effected a momentary 
purpose, but were sure speedily to lead into new conjectures, and re-
immerse her in doubts.  The task was always new, was always on the point 
of being finished, and always to be re-commenced. (177) 
At times the very form of the narrative refutes the assumption of a stable plane 
between representation and reality, between objective reporting and subjective 
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experience, between one individual identity and another.  In the account given of the 
fateful encounter of Baxter, the husband of Constantia’s friend Sarah, the narrating voice 
slips into free indirect discourse in recounting the doomed man’s thoughts regarding 
whether he should investigate the disquieting disappearance of his neighbor: “As to 
entering the house and offering his aid, if aid were needed, he had too much regard for 
his own safety, and too little for that of a frog-eating Frenchman, to think seriously of that 
expedient” (64).  In this slippage from diegesis (narrating, telling) to mimesis (imitation, 
showing, direct representation), S. C., the speaking voice of the narrative, fades from 
clear view as a character’s words or thoughts (“frog-eating Frenchman”) flow into and 
merge with her words and her identity flows into and merges with his.121  Actually, the 
events pass through multiple story-tellers, from Baxter to his wife, from her to 
Constantia, from Constantia to S. C.  This subtly disorienting phase transition between 
nominally separate persons or identities occurs again, in much stronger form, in the scene 
with the surly Indian Queen Tavern man, whom Constantia questions regarding the 
whereabouts of the man she has just followed there, Thomas Craig: 
A waiter informed her that Craig had lately been in, and was now gone out 
to spend the evening.  Whither had he gone? she asked.   
How was he to know where gentlemen eat their suppers?  Did she take him 
for a witch?  What, in God’s name, did she want with him at that hour?  
Could she not wait, at least, till he had done his supper?  He warranted her 
pretty face would bring him home time enough. (93-4) 
In breaking the plane between narrator and narration, S. C. mimics the movement of 
Ormond, who takes his dramaturgical skills out into the real world, onto the world stage, 
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“blend[ing] in his own person the functions of the poet and the actor” (116).  His dramas 
“were not fictitious but real” (116).  The form of the narrative reiterates the oft-repeated 
trope of characters as actors and authors and audience, as those who either appear on the 
stage and play a role or who witness events unfold in a “theater.”   
Other incidents enact a more forceful breaking of boundaries, not between the 
narrator and a character within her tale but between inside the narrative and outside, 
between the teller and the reader of the tale.  After Constantia finally learns that Craig 
can be found at the house of a Mr. Ormond (the first mention of the name in the 
narrative), we hear Craig’s inner monologue regarding the letter she has sent up to him 
calling upon his sense of justice and compassion in relieving her father’s distress.  
Indeed, the form these thoughts take in the telling present yet another and more forceful 
breaking of boundaries; starting from the point of view of an observer, the perspective 
shifts abruptly into the form of free indirect discourse then to free direct discourse:   
The letter was received, and perused.  His conscience was touched, but 
compunction was a guest, whose importunities he had acquired a peculiar 
facility of eluding.  Here was a liberal offer.  A price was set upon his 
impunity.  A small sum, perhaps, would secure him from all future 
molestation. –She spoke, to be sure, in a damned high tone.  [ . . . ] How 
the little witch talks!  Just the dreamer she ever was!  Justice!  
Compassion!  Stupid fool!  One would think she’d learned something of 
the world by this time. (96-7) 
Actually, the presentation is something even more direct than free direct discourse, in that 
the term discourse presupposes an interlocutor, and here we have only words unmediated 
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by a discursive persona.  These are the free flowing thoughts of another person’s mind as 
we could only experience them if we were eavesdropping on a private soliloquy.  From 
the start, where the prefatory note addresses someone other than ourselves, we have been 
secret witnesses to the affairs of Constantia, trespassers into her private world.  And in 
select places in the narrative, we even follow S. C. into the supposedly hidden and 
discreet realm of private thoughts. 
But this is a lie; although human events and personal identities are inextricability 
linked, they cannot blur into a totality.  Like Ormond, whose secret witnessing through 
disguise and impersonation “enabled him to gain access, as if by supernatural means, to 
the privacy of others, and baffle their profoundest contrivances to hide themselves from 
his view,” S. C. maintains some undisclosed means of obtaining knowledge that, we may 
believe, “flattered [her] with the possession of something like Omniscience” (116).  As 
we see in Ormond’s startling transformation into a black chimney sweep in order to spy 
on the intriguing Constantia, skills and intellect afford him no discernible connection to 
this racial and socio-economic other.  Indeed, his blackface escapade functions in the 
service of an invasion of privacy, not the cultivation of fellow-feeling.  
Much later, S. C. perpetrates a still more forceful transgression.  “I must be 
forgiven if I now introduce myself on the stage,” she announces (224).  And after relating 
twenty-two chapters from outside the story, the narrator suddenly steps into her book.122  
S. C., we finally learn, is Sophia Courtland (née Westwyn), the childhood friend long 
missed by Constantia. 
“The Folly of Prediction” 
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The deceptions of the senses in Ormond extend beyond false appearances and 
unstable identities to misleading modes of causal explanation.  Brown’s inventiveness 
tests the boundaries of probability and possibility as the plot unfolds in a series of striking 
coincidences.  The woman Constantia meets in the music store and to whom she sells the 
lute is the same woman Sarah Baxter described as the unfortunate Ursula Monrose in her 
story of her husband’s death.  After M’Crea presses charges against Dudley for passing a 
counterfeit bank note, the magistrate Constantia must see is Melbourne, the very 
acquaintance of her father that she had just been seeking to ask for help (105).  Ursula / 
Martinette’s new residence is next door to the Melbourne’s, where Constantia, while 
visiting, hears the distinctive sound of the lute she had sold, leading to their second 
meeting.  Rather improbably, the house in Perth Amboy that had been auctioned with 
Dudley’s other property happened have been bought by Ormond, who then gifted it to 
Hellen, who then bequeathed it to Constantia; and thus “by a singular contexture of 
events, it had reverted to those hands, in which the death of the original proprietor, if no 
other change had been made in his condition, would have left it” (266).  Also improbably, 
the miniature given to M’Crea for collateral and sold by him to a goldsmith is bought by 
Martynne, a man Sophia meets in Baltimore through Constantia’s cousin Mary Ridgeley 
to whom Martynne had conspicuously displayed the portrait she immediately recognized 
as Sophia’s.  After changing her plans to leave for New York so as to follow the 
exchange history of this trinket back to Constantia and her possibly still-extant 
“memorials” or diary entries, she happens to stay at the boarding house Constantia visits 
in her search for the miniature portrait’s buyer.  She then also happens to play the tune 
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she composed with Constantia at the very moment her long-lost friend is downstairs 
inquiring about Martynne.   
The sheer unexpectedness of coincidence and marvelous events, their apparent 
violation of probability, serves to demonstrate the limitations of characters’ modes of 
causal explanation, of their understanding of how the world works.123  When Constantia, 
awed by Martinette’s personal history, admits astonishment—“I am apt to think that your 
life is a tissue of surprising events, [ . . . ] events more wonderful than any which I have 
known” (192)—, Martinette replies that such a response is the result not of her story 
being objectively wondrous, but of Constantia’s limited idea of probabilities, making 
explicit Brown’s challenge to the era’s narrow, reductive explanatory schemes.  Her 
words may even serve as a retort to incredulous critics of Brown’s contrived 
coincidences: “Wonderful!  Pish!  Thy ignorance, they miscalculation of probabilities is 
far more so. [ . . . ] To such as you, my tale might abound with novelty, while to others 
more acquainted with vicissitudes, it would be tedious and flat” (193).   
Moreover, these features of the plot reiterate the theme of “the inextricability of 
human events,” the connectedness of lives and the ripple effect of individual’s actions in 
a community of mankind, which has important implications for moral judgment and 
action (264).  In a world of increasing complexity, even to the point of chaos, how does 
one understand events and judge appearances?  How can one increase one’s capacity for 
accurate prediction and discernment?  And, finally, where in the chain of causality does 
one locate where moral accountability lies?  
From the mechanical model of nature, which posits the necessary connection 
between causes and effects, comes the characteristic mode of eighteenth-century thinking 
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about what is behind developments in human affairs.  What has come to be called the 
paranoid style of the era’s rhetoric ultimately consists, again as Gordon Wood argues, not 
in some form of mass hysteria, but in the rational yet overly simplistic attribution of 
effects in the political realm to causes arising from human agency, and, moreover, 
directly from human intentions.  “Moral deeds implied moral doers,” Wood writes, 
“when things happen in society, individuals with particular intentions, often called 
‘designs,’ must be at the bottom of them.  All social processes could be reduced to 
specific individual passions and interests” (98).  A mechanistic and personalistic view of 
causality in the human sphere represents an intellectual step forward from explanations 
that fall back on the workings of chance or providence.  For many enlightened thinkers, 
however, the cogency of the mechanistic model of the physical universe does not 
override the deep concern for morality, the idea that individuals are morally accountable 
for their actions.  Even Newton, stepping back from the implications of his own work, 
posited various divine actuators in matter and physical forces, Wood notes.  Effect 
follows from some human action (the cause), it was reasoned, and it logically partakes of 
the moral quality of the originating motivation; that is, bad intentions produce bad 
effects.  Colonial Americans used this language of conspiracy and evil, hidden 
machinations to explain the adverse policies of the English government toward them.  
Similarly, political commentators in England spied the tell-tale signs of secret domestic 
cabals operating the levers of power.  And later, in revolutionary France, the failure of 
military campaigns brought heavy consequences upon the French generals whose 
incompetence or even secret treasonous schemes seemed the only plausible causal 
explanations for the defeat of such a righteous endeavor.  Through the last quarter of the 
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century, many interpreters of contemporary history assumed that human will must be 
behind any and all visible effects in human affairs. 
This humanistic mode of causal explanation was not the only one around, of 
course.  In attempts to reconcile the new mechanical conception of the physical world 
with the claims of religion, some adopted a providential naturalism, the view that the 
universe is divinely ordered in such a way that good naturally produces good, and evil, 
evil.  In this view, as expounded by the likes of Francis Hutcheson and Lord Kames, the 
material body is endowed with natural faculties capable of discerning, through the laws 
of nature, the laws of God.  Moral action thus consists in discerning these laws through a 
moral-aesthetic sense.  This seems to be Sophia’s outlook generally.  Her defense of her 
passionate attachment for her friend draws upon a theistic worldview:  
 I am not unaware of the divine superintendence, of the claims upon my  
  gratitude and service, which pertain to my God.  I know that all physical  
  and moral agents, are merely instrumental to the purpose that he wills, but  
  though the great author of being and felicity must not be forgotten, it is  
  neither possible nor just to overlook the claims upon our love, with which  
  our fellow-beings are invested.  The supreme love does not absorb, but  
  chasten and enforce all subordinate affections.  In proportion to the  
  rectitude of my perceptions and the ardour of my piety, must I clearly  
  discern and fervently love, the excellence discovered in my fellow-beings,  
  and industriously promote their improvement and felicity. (224)  
Here is a philosophy positing the existence of an absolute truth or reality; it is based in 
God, he who “superintends” the world.  The divine author is the ultimate cause of all 
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physical and moral effects.  He is “the great author of being and felicity” who imposes 
distinctions of “excellence” and “chasten[s] and enforce[s]” our love of “our fellow-
beings” (224).  And our duty is to rectify our perceptions so as to “clearly discern” these 
absolute and truly extant distinctions.   
Some, however, took the mechanistic view to the logical extreme, concluding that 
determinate beings are not wholly accountable for their actions.  What little free will one 
has consists in whether one acts in accordance with what is necessary, which can be 
discerned through the enlightened exercise of reason.  This is the Necessitarian model of 
morality, a version of which Ormond claims to hold.  “I cannot help it; I make not 
myself; I am moulded by circumstances: Whether I shall love thee or not, is no longer in 
my own choice,” he tells Hellen, explaining he loves and intends to marry Constantia and 
is therefore leaving her.  Such declarations follow from Ormond’s materialist picture of 
reality.  Ormond is an atomist, in the vein of Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius: “The 
universe was to him, a series of events, connected by an undesigning and inscrutable 
necessity, and an assemblage of forms, to which no beginning or end can be conceived” 
(180).  Conceiving of the cosmos as the mechanical integration and disintegration of 
forms, Ormond, like William Godwin, sees a mere mechanical necessity governing all 
physical and moral chains of causality.   
In this view, the operations of the individual mind and of human societies are 
similarly mechanical.  In Wieland, characters contemplate the possible breakdown in the 
physiological system that links the senses to the understanding and the will: “The will is 
the tool of the understanding which must fashion its conclusions on the notices of sense.  
If the senses be depraved, it is impossible to calculate the evils that may flow the 
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consequent deductions of the understanding” (35).  Ormond, likewise, takes a materialist 
view when he holds that a corrupt social system will produce only corrupt effects no 
matter the actions taken or the intents behind them: “A mortal poison pervaded the whole 
system by means of which every thing received was converted into bane and purulence.  
Efforts designed to ameliorate the condition of an individual, were sure of answering a 
contrary purpose.  The principles of the social machine must be rectified, before men can 
be beneficially active.  Our motives may be neutral or beneficent, but our actions tend 
merely to the production of evil” (112-13).   
His philosophy, not unlike Sophia’s, assumes the existence of an absolute truth, 
albeit one in opposition to the views of religionists.  “His meditations on religious 
points,” we are told, “had been intense.  Enthusiasm was added to disbelief, and he not 
only dissented but abhorred” (180).  It is based on a mechanical universe (not God), 
where physical laws are the ultimate cause of events and appearances (“forms”).  There is 
no meaning or motivation being expressed in these events and appearances, and the only 
duty or imperative is to seek one’s own happiness.  The exercise of reason (not gifted by 
or connected to God) is the means of discerning one’s true happiness and the means 
toward achieving it.  But we must consider Ormond’s philosophy in light of Hellen’s 
suicide: For all his confidence in his organs of sight and his penetrative intellect, he did 
not see that coming. 
Taught by her father, who believed religious inquiry was too important for 
“infantile and premature instruction,” Constantia is neither an advocate nor a critic, but 
merely indifferent to religion (179-80).  By conducting her education through Tacitus and 
Milton, her father sought to foster in her eloquence and wisdom.  Through Newton and 
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Hartley, he “unveiled to her the mathematical properties of light and sound, taught her as 
a metaphysician and anatomist, the structure and power of the senses, and discussed with 
her the principles and the progress of human society” (33).124  Sophia laments this lack of 
religious grounding.  However, she takes pains to say that Constantia’s “habits rather 
than her opinions, were undevout,” suggesting that her friend’s mind is not closed on the 
subject.  Regarding Constantia’s worldview, we learn, “She was unacquainted with 
religion.  She was unhabituated to conform herself to any standard, but that connected 
with the present life.  Matrimonial, as well as every other human duty, was disconnected 
in her mind, with any awful or divine sanction.  She formed her estimate of good and 
evil, on nothing but terrestrial and visible consequences” (179).  In contrast to Sophia and 
Ormond, in the matter of religion, she encountered nothing that “suggest[ed] to her the 
importance of investigation and certainty. [ . . . ] In her struggles with misfortune, she 
was supported and cheered by the sense of no approbation, but her own. [ . . . ] All 
opinions in her mind were mutable, inasmuch as the progress of her understanding was 
incessant” (179-80).  Thus, she holds no a priori beliefs, either religious or Necessitarian, 
no deference to an outside authority regarding right and wrong.  But also she is guided by 
no precepts or rules that might counterbalance the weight of experience, the heuristics of 
her own vision.  Visible consequences, as the narrator observes and events repeatedly 
demonstrate, are subject to fraud and misinterpretation and to the distortion of passions 
and interests.  Even Constantia suffers from unconscious biases: “In no case, perhaps, is 
the decision of an human being impartial, or totally uninfluenced by sinister and selfish 
motives.  If Constantia surpassed others, it was not, because, her motives were pure, but, 
because, they possessed more of purity than those of others.  Sinister considerations flow 
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in upon us through imperceptible channels, and modify our thoughts in numberless ways, 
without our being truly conscious of their presence” (157).  
“So Painful a State” 
Although many have zeroed in on Brown’s relentless skepticism toward all 
ordering schemes, there is little agreement as to the novel’s purpose or governing 
outlook.  Some see nihilism, others indecision.  Hamelman sees an exhibition of the 
instability of language, something like that of modern deconstructionist theory, but one 
only accidentally achieved in the work of a conflicted author who has lost control of his 
material.  One might look at Brown’s treatment of reigning epistemologies as the 
promotion a kind of intellectual humility; and as such, his approach may be mistaken for 
that of the earlier views of causality and morality, either fatalistic or pious, which 
recognized an inherent limit to the power of human comprehension.  Layson is among 
those who view Brown’s critique of reason in terms of a reactionary conservative recoil 
from the excesses of radical rationality.   
But Brown’s recognition of limitations, I argue, is perhaps better understood as 
the consequence of a relentless intellectual rigor.  In a brief article entitled “Yellow 
Fever,” Brown uses the division of opinion among physicians on the topic of the origin 
and treatments of this disease to illustrate the difficulty of keeping open-minded: 
Doubt is so painful a state, and a man’s pride and prejudice are so 
unavoidably engaged, on one side or the other, as he advances in his 
inquiry, and we so easily and suddenly pass from a state of neutrality, in 
which we only inquire after truth, into a state of conviction, when we 
merely search for arguments and facts in favour of one side; that nothing is 
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rarer than a physician who hesitates on this subject. Some men may vary 
from year to year, and change sides as often as the fever visits us, but they 
are ardent and dogmatic in maintaining what happens to be their present 
opinion, and stigmatize all their opponents as fools and villains.125 
Just such an operation of mind is evinced in Martinette’s benefactress Lady D’Arcy, who 
switches back and forth in both religious convictions and romantic devotions but remains 
ardently committed to her current views and passionately discriminatory against others.  
She even goes so far as to forbid the burgeoning romantic connection between her adored 
adopted daughter and her nephew, the irreligious Wentworth, threatening him with 
disinheritance if the relationship continues.  When Lady D’Arcy herself falls in love with 
the Spaniard Antonio de Leyva, breaking her commitment of eternal dedication to her 
dead husband, Martinette is free to marry her zealously idealistic Wentworth and follow 
him into combat.  After succumbing to the arts of a seducer who kills the jealous Leyva 
in a duel, Lady D’Arcy reverses course again, abjuring the Catholic religion and 
returning to England and her former faith.  She exemplifies the extreme of a common 
human quest for and delusive maintenance of certainty that produces grotesque effects. 
For a skeptic and freethinker in the Enlightenment, the explanatory conceptions 
and moral prescriptions of religionists seem unsatisfactory.  But the rationalism behind 
scientific advances in understanding the physical world, when transposed to the social 
world, could and often did lead to either simplistic, reductive notions of moral 
responsibility (conspiracy theory for example) or toward a nihilistic Necessitarianism in 
which the question of morality seemed a quaintly naive concern.  
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Is Constantia Dudley Brown’s “model of right conduct”?  A few critics, including 
Drexler and White and Bill Christophersen, see in the text a critique of her republican 
virtue, of her fantasy or delusion of selflessness, which is belied by the benefits she 
accrues over the course of the novel.  A number of others, however, consider Constantia 
the heroine of the piece.  English writer Thomas Love Peacock, for example, reports that 
she “held one of the highest places, if not the highest, in [Percy] Shelley’s ideality of 
female character” (qtd. in Clark 173).  But if we are to consider her an ideal, how are we 
to think of emulating this model?  Following the work of Thomas Koenig on Brown’s 
“instructional fictionality,” we might suggest that her utility as a moral model lies not in 
any precepts she may voice, not in the emulation of her actions, but in her “mode of 
reasoning and acting.”  Constantia’s most conspicuous displays of moral virtue include 
her care for the friendless Hellen, her brave and compassionate attentions to the infected 
Mary Whiston, and her refusing to prosecute Craig or entertain thoughts of vengeance 
toward the unknown murderer of her father.  “She recoiled with loathing,” we are told, 
“from considerations of abstract justice, or political utility, when they prompted to the 
prosecution of the murderer” (217).  All of these actions arise not from slavish adherence 
to precepts, not from mere mindless sentimentality, and certainly not from simple 
emulation of those around her.  Her value as a moral model is not in her actions 
themselves, not in her particular responses per se, but in her taking on the responsibility 
of regarding the other in all his or her alterity, in her not hiding behind a priori social or 
legal judgments or socially-acceptable self-interest, behind “abstract justice, or political 
utility” (217).  The merit is not in knowing one’s duty but in the struggle to know, the 
reaching out to the outside, to the other, taking responsibility for responding to the other 
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in his or her true otherness (both in the call to care even in the midst of contagion, stench 
and filth, and in the midst of violent passion, offering soothing counsel or even violent 
resistance).  Such a struggle to know requires a relentlessness, a care to not “stop short in 
[one’s] researches” (“Walstein’s” Literary Essays 35).  Contra Ormond’s Godwinian 
precepts, Brown posits a kind of freedom from not only church and state authority but 
also the authority of the self and its claims to unmediated truth and moral insight and 
discernment of distinct borders and stable identities.  
In the closing chapters, Ormond’s overtures and intrigues fail to secure 
Constantia’s intellectual and romantic acquiescence, leading to a final, fatal 
confrontation.  Constantia, who remains emotionally conflicted and almost willfully 
obtuse, seems unable to see the danger Ormond represents.  (At one point, after putting 
his hand to his forehead, he exclaims, “Catch you not a view of the monsters starting into 
birth here?” [254].)  When, however, at the story’s climax Constantia fends off the 
rapacious Ormond, killing him with a pen knife, the pleasure the reader might take in the 
depiction of virtue and reason conquering vice and error is counteracted by the reaction 
of the heroine herself.  
While Sophia makes preparations in New York for the voyage that will take the 
two of them to England and away from their homeland for good, Constantia chooses to 
spend the interim at the Perth Amboy country house.  The description of this edifice 
rather emphatically underscores its status as a metonym for Dudley’s aesthetic education 
and Constantia’s republican virtue, that which has been savaged by the likes of Craig and 
Ormond.  At dusk Ormond arrives on horseback at the isolated house, bringing with him 
the dead body of Thomas Craig, the con man who had swindled and, according to him, 
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murdered her father at his (Ormond’s) command.  He reveals to Constantia that his 
seemingly supernatural knowledge of her plans to leave with Sophia was not supernatural 
at all but came through the expedient of his eavesdropping on their conversations from an 
adjacent house, untenanted but owned by him and connected to Constantia’s apartment 
by a doorway.  Although it has received little or no critical attention, it is significant that 
this hidden portal, as he reveals, lies hidden behind a “sheet of canvass” (279).  In 
slipping through the canvas into Dudley’s chamber to see that Craig murders the old man, 
it is as if he is stepping right out of a painting.  Just as Wieland’s Carwin had made literal 
the fantasy notion of a disembodied intelligence, Ormond has made literal the fantasy 
notion that the real thing that lies behind the surface appearance will out.  He is not only 
the preeminent possessor of the era’s idealized penetrative insight, his stratagems giving 
him “something like Omniscience”; he becomes the embodiment of that ideal as well.  
His crimes thus symbolize the dangers of the heuristic of vision and the contractual 
model of relation that it sanctions.  
“Inured to the Shedding of Blood?” 
Is Constantia’s killing of Ormond in this final meeting an act of righteous 
violence, of absolute, necessary, or divine justice merely working through her?  This is 
the real question behind the critical obsession with whether Ormond is a monster.  If, as 
some critics see it, he is a monster, then his death is just.  As discussed in the chapter on 
Wieland, the liberal enlightenment view of human nature does not recognize the reality of 
true human evil: Evil-doers are moral monsters from whom normal people recoil.  They 
are aliens whose motives and actions are unfathomably perverse, mad, or savage.  
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Construed as a threat to all that is good and rational, these non-humans are effectively 
anti-humans, and as such, they provoke not sympathy but righteous violence.   
Brown sets up this question of righteous killing in the penultimate meeting 
between Constantia and Martinette de Beauvais.  In this exchange, Martinette’s 
admirable strengths—her Wollstonecraftian development of “masculine” attainments, 
particularly an intellect enriched by the sciences, travel, and engagement with and 
activity in the manly realm of politics; her disregard for feminine false modesty, for 
shallow sentimentality, and for the pretenses of social convention—shade into 
callousness as her eminently rational convictions justify deathly calculations.  She has 
become fixated on a vision of abstract justice and political utility.  Martinette glories in 
recounting the killing of others in the name of defending liberty, even those whom she 
once “knew and loved before the revolution” (206).  She declares, moreover, that she 
would have also gladly sacrificed her own life for the same cause.  “How can the heart of 
women be inured to the shedding of blood?” Constantia asks.  “The capacity to reason 
and infer, [ . . . ] the influence of habit,” Martinette explains: “My hand never faultered 
when liberty demanded the victim” (206).  She then boasts that she even plotted a 
suicidal attack on the Prussian enemy.  Her plan to impersonate a banished Royalist, gain 
access to the Prussian general, and assassinate him before “attest[ing] her magnanimity 
by slaughtering herself” draws from the real life affair of the Marat assassination.  “I 
regretted the retreat of the Prussians,” Martinette concludes, “because it precluded the 
necessity of such a sacrifice.”126  In response, “Constantia,” the narrator reports, 
“shuddered and drew back, to contemplate more deliberately the features of her guest. [ . 
. . ] She felt that antipathy was preparing to displace love” (207). 
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 And yet, when her female honor is threatened by Ormond, when she faces the 
prospect of rape, Constantia takes the same attitude toward the shedding of blood as 
Martinette.  In the first instant, she contemplates killing this man, whom before this night 
she considered a friend, just as Martinette killed her friends.  Indeed, Ormond is perhaps 
much more than a friend.  However, calculating that her attempt at direct, violent 
opposition may be easily counteracted, she turns to the idea of a righteous suicide: “To 
save a greater good by the sacrifice of life, is in my power, and that sacrifice shall be 
made,” she declares, echoing Martinette’s sentiments regarding her own willing sacrifice 
to a greater good, liberty (284).   
But Constantia does not kill herself.  Instead, she turns the knife toward Ormond 
and with a frenzied movement strikes a fatal blow.  In killing Ormond Constantia seems 
to follow Martinette’s example, committing an act of righteous killing that had earlier 
struck Constantia as repellant.  Was Martinette right, then?  Does Constantia’s apparent 
emulation of the woman warrior vindicate the views that had earlier repulsed her?  Paul 
Lewis believes the novel argues that armed resistance may be necessary for intelligent 
women to survive in a man’s world, even if Constantia’s remorse signals her and 
Brown’s uneasiness with it.  Other critics, including Kristen Comment, see a definitive 
rejection of Martinette’s homicidal zealotry.   
I suggest we consider the peculiar crisis Brown invents.  Ormond’s primary intent, 
as he explicitly states, is not to murder Constantia but to “extort” from her the womanly 
“gift” she has denied him (283).  In direct terms, he intends to rape her.  Contemplating 
her options, she determines that escape is impossible.  Entreaty is doomed to fail, “since, 
in the unexampled conformation of this man’s mind, [appeals to his compassion and 
155 
 
benevolence] were made subservient to his most flagitious designs” (283).  And direct 
threat—she wields a penknife—is liable only to incite not deter further outrages.  When 
she threatens to take the only option left, the sacrifice of her own life so as to preserve her 
honor, he confidently replies, “Living or dead, the prize I have in view shall be mine” 
(285). 
Brown’s gambit in having the ostensible villain go so far as to declare his 
intention to rape his victim even if she kills herself first, may stand as an example of what 
William Hazlitt identified as the author’s carrying his “imagination (full to disease) to 
outrage and disgust.”  But just as the incest in Wieland has a legitimate and quite central 
function beyond mere titillating sensationalism, the threatened necrophilia in Ormond is 
more than an expression of fantastically monstrous evil.  In Ormond’s outrageous 
declaration, Brown literalizes not only the physical but the moral threat of the invasive, 
penetrative heuristic of vision, the egoistical grasping for transcendental truth.  He also 
simultaneously exposes its monstrous absurdity.  Because the self and other mutually 
constitute one another, the breaking of this plane between them means the elimination of 
both.  Ormond, in his supreme arrogance, does not accept that the otherness of the other 
human being is inviolable.  The other can of course be murdered and can be raped, but no 
degree of corporeal invasion can extort from it its inviolable otherness.  Put another way, 
the “gift” (emblematized here by that that as a woman Constantia can bestow) ceases to 
be a gift if cynically bought or forcefully extorted.  
Moreover, the threat of rape works here to complicate the ethics of Constantia’s 
response to Ormond’s intentions.  That is, a more straightforward intent to kill on 
Ormond’s part would make her violent repulsion of him a more clear-cut case of 
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justifiable homicide:  “She remembered that to inflict death is no iniquitous exertion of 
self-defense. [ . . . ] The last extremes of opposition, the most violent expedients for 
defense, would be justified by being indispensable.  To find safety for her honor, even in 
the blood of an assailant, was the prescription of duty.  The equity of this species of 
defense, was not, in the present confusion of her mind, a subject of momentary doubt” 
(282, 283).  But, perhaps more importantly, because she can survive the attack, 
Constantia has the opportunity to be the “model of right conduct” that Brown claims as 
the ultimate aim of serious narrative art.  
 Brown discusses this model in the “Walstein’s School” essay, where he offers a 
negative example involving a heroine in a similar crisis.  In his critical remarks upon 
Richardson’s Clarissa Harlowe, a virtuous victim of rape who “died a victim of errors, 
scarcely less opprobrious and pernicious, than those of her tyrants and oppressors,” 
Brown puts the focus on the virtue of fortitude, on the determination to continue to work 
toward the benefit of others even in the face of privations.  He faults Clarissa for 
“depreciat[ing] the means of usefulness and pleasure of which fortune was unable to 
deprive her” (Literary Essays 38).  In another essay dedicated to these views, Brown 
argues more expansively:  
Clarissa’s chief calamity is of an extreme and delicate nature. I shall not 
pretend to investigate or settle the origin or value of a circumstance which 
we certainly find to be most prized by the most pure, and by those whose 
moral sentiments, in other respects, are the most correct.  I shall merely 
propose, to an enlightened woman, the question, whether the immediate 
phrenzy, and ultimate death, of Clarissa, be, in themselves, arguments of 
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virtue or vice, of fortitude or weakness?  Whether, after the calamity has 
actually and irretrievably occurred, either moral or religious duty enjoins 
us to live or to die; to be passionate in lamentation, or serene in fortitude?  
Ought the evils of human life, incurred without guilt in ourselves, to 
occasion a grief inconsistent with life, or only to produce a resignation to 
what, on the whole, while the whole is under the direction of one perfect in 
goodness and wisdom, is best? [ . . . ] 
Is there any essential difference in the merits of those who suffer an 
external evil to destroy them instantly by dagger or poison, or slowly by 
heart-breaking grief?  Does not our conduct, in either case, evince a 
disproportionate attachment to earthly and transient goods, and a 
disproportionate contempt or disregard for the testimony of a good 
conscience, and the approbation of a perfect Judge? 
Was it from submission to this will that she set the value which she did set 
upon the force of unjust and tyrannical relations, upon the esteem of the 
misjudging part of the world (for that part only would have withdrawn 
their reverence on account of her misfortunes), and on the possession of a 
corporeal integrity? (“Objections to Richardson’s Clarissa” Literary 
Essays 100)127 
In his “Walstein’s” essay, Brown contrasts this flawed model of virtue with the hero of a 
novel he briefly summarizes, a novel that is in fact his own thinly-disguised Arthur 
Mervyn.  The comparison is somewhat strained, for Arthur does not endure the 
complicated horrors of rape and its aftermath.  One would think that in crafting Ormond, 
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a narrative with a more similar crisis, that Brown would simply put his heroine in 
Clarissa’s position, that of a rape victim, but invest her with the virtues he claims for 
Arthur.  That is, one might expect that he would give us a picture of Constantia after the 
assault in which her “talents are exerted to reform the vices of others, to defeat their 
malice when exerted to [her] injury, to endure, without diminution of [her] usefulness or 
happiness, the injuries which [she] cannot shun” (Literary Essays 38).  But Brown does 
not have his heroine suffer rape and the loss of reputation; instead Constantia violently 
repulses and kills Ormond. 
 Some critics find this ending a sop to sentimental readers.  But, I argue, it is not 
the action that most matters but the response to the action once it is taken.  Constantia’s 
intense feelings of guilt would suggest that she does not see Ormond as a mere monster 
rightfully destroyed.  She does not share in the exculpatory narrative of the liberal 
enlightenment view and the legal exoneration it bestows.  In fact, the legal exoneration, 
so dutifully sought by Sophia is, as we have seen, already tainted by the critique of the 
law earlier in the narrative.  Indeed, the “formalities of justice,” redolent of the use of the 
law as cover for the heartless confiscation of all the Dudleys owned, again suggest a kind 
of sanctioned self-interested violence is at the base of the ostensibly rationally objective, 
non-violent contractual society (292).   
In fact, the reduction of the event to legal considerations is comparable to the 
extra-legal but still contractual model of relation by which Ormond understands both 
justice and love.  In an anecdote about Ormond’s past recounted immediately before the 
narrative turn to the climactic confrontation, Sophia tells of his violent quarrel with a 
fellow Russian soldier over who held claim to a captured Tartar girl.  After killing this 
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friend, Ormond rapes the girl before “stab[ing] her in the heart, as an offering to the 
manes of Sarsefield, the friend whom he had slain.”  He follows this with more 
bloodshed the next morning, carrying away the heads of five enemy combatants and 
“cast[ing] them upon the grave of Sarsefield” as a means of further “expiate[ing] his 
guilt” (264).  For this, the narrator reports, “the General gave him a commission in the 
Cossack troops” (264).  Thus, not only has he fulfilled a sort of savage contractual 
obligation, in the process, reducing seven lives to calculations of claims and debt, he has 
reaped a reward for doing so. 
In Ormond’s words before his attempted assault upon Constantia, we see the same 
economy of give and take, the same mere contractual model of relation operating in his 
efforts to win Constantia’s love.  “And what recompense,” he asks her, “is due to him 
whose vigilance pursued him hither, and made him [Craig] pay for his offences with his 
blood?  What benefit have I received at thy hand to authorize me, for thy sake, to take 
away his life?” (278).  He feels he is owed a debt for this gratuitous gift; and, soon after, 
he complains that his earlier stratagem of “summon[ing] gratitude to his aid” has failed to 
bring about the desired result.  “To snatch you from poverty, to restore his sight to your 
father, were expected to operate as incentives to love,” he explains.  Moreover, his killing 
of Constantia’s father, he claims, far from merely eliminating an opponent to his designs, 
“was a due and disinterested offering, at the altar of your felicity and mine” (281).  His 
idea of disinterestedness, however, is indistinguishable from the idea of (and his plan for) 
buying Constantia’s love (281). 
Given that the novel has already established that we cannot avoid self-interest in 
all our deliberations and actions, the reader, reflecting upon Constantia’s killing of her 
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attacker, may reasonably ask of it, is violence ever justified?  To get to what I believe is 
the novel’s answer to this, Ormond’s final question, I draw upon remarks by the 
contemporary philosopher Simon Critchley.  Following Walter Benjamin and Giorgio 
Agamben, Critchley asserts that the commandment ‘Thou shall not kill’ is not an a priori 
decree but an imposition of double responsibility, first, for following it and, second, for 
taking responsibility for not following it.  In exceptional cases, killing is allowable; but 
never are we released from the obligation of taking responsibility: 
The commandment is not a decree that is to be followed once and for all 
the moment it is made.  On the contrary, the commandment is something 
we struggle with, that we wrestle with.  The moral commandment is not 
an a priori moral law from which we derive the a posteriori consequences.  
In many ways, the situation is always the reverse: we always find 
ourselves in a concrete socio-political-legal situation of violence and we 
have with a plumb-line of non-violence, of life’s sanctity.  There are no 
transcendental guarantees and no clean hands.  We act, we invent. 
That is, in terms of what we have seen in Ormond, true responsibility entails not hiding 
behind constructs of mere legal responsibility.  It entails not redefining the act as a 
selfless tribute to an abstraction, like the cause of liberty.  It entails not surrendering 
one’s identity as a moral agent to some other supposed agent or mechanism, whether a 
divine author or a natural necessity.  The argument against submitting to a priori 
obligations may bear something of a resemblance to the Godwinian argument against 
promises, which, as in Ormond’s screed against the marriage contract, serves to hinder 
one’s freedom, to preclude choosing to act or select in a way that is rational considering 
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new circumstances.  But Brown’s novel suggests he views the problem of submission to a 
priori obligations in terms not of its hindrance of personal freedom and of a dedication to 
rational deliberation but in terms of its use in the evasion of responsibility.  Constantia, 
not constrained by an established moral system, actively engages Ormond’s sometimes 
repellant views, as she does Martinette’s.  She expresses neither merely reactive, 
dismissive judgment nor self-effacing submission; rather she practices an ethical 
attention.  This makes her vulnerable to Ormond’s specious views and violent actions but 
it also gives her the power to be responsive in a way not dictated by precept or principle 
or mere emulation.  
Faced with the choice of submission to Ormond’s will (like Hellen’s) or 
bloodshed to save a greater good (like Martinette’s), Constantia actually takes a third 
way.  Only superficially comparable to Martinette’s calculated carnage, her violent 
repulse (“desperate and at random,” “scarcely the fruit of intention,” “suggested by a 
momentary frenzy”) puts an end to her physical but not her moral crisis (291).  
Constantia does not share Martinette’s cavalier attitude toward what she deemed 
righteous killing.  In her reaction to the mayhem of that fateful night, the heroine, having 
escaped the threatened corruption of her virtue, gives ample proof that she feels far from 
relieved and righteous.  The scene is worth recalling at some length: 
O! my friend! she answered, what have I done, what have I suffered within 
the last dreadful hour?  The remembrance, though insupportable, will 
never leave me.  You can do nothing for my relief.  All I claim, is your 
compassion and your sympathy. 
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I hope, said I, that nothing has happened to load you with guilt or with 
shame. 
Alas! I know not.  My deed was scarcely the fruit of intention.  It was 
suggested by a momentary frenzy.  I saw no other means of escaping from 
vileness and pollution.  I was menaced with an evil worse than death.  I 
forbore till my strength was almost subdued: The lapse of another moment 
would have placed me beyond hope. 
My stroke was desperate and at random.  It answered my purpose too well.  
He cast at me a look of terrible upbraiding, but spoke not.  His heart was 
pierced, and he sunk, as if struck by lightning, at my feet.  O much-erring 
and unhappy Ormond!  That thou shouldst thus untimely perish!  That I 
should be thy executioner! 
[ . . . ] 
To restore health and equanimity to my friend; to repel the erroneous 
accusations of her conscience; to hinder her from musing, with eternal 
anguish, upon this catastrophe; to lay the spirit of secret upbraiding by 
which she was incessantly tormented; which bereft her of repose; 
empoisoned all her enjoyments, and menaced, not only, the subversion of 
her peace, but the speedy destruction of her life, became my next 
employment. (291) 
Clearly, Constantia is devastated by Ormond’s death and her role in bringing it about.   
Is this a tragic ending for our heroine?  Although she survives, her honor and life 
intact, she has in a sense lost, at least for a time, her independence, her ability to stand out 
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against the two-dimensional background that comprises the mindset in question here.  In 
the aftermath of the fatal encounter, we first see her as Sophia sees her while peering 
through the keyhole of the locked door: “A figure, with difficulty recognized to be that of 
my friend, now appeared in sight.  Her hands were clasped on her breast, her eyes wildly 
fixed upon the ceiling and streaming with tears, and her hair unbound and falling 
confusedly over her bosom and neck” (289).  A convergence of forces—Ormond’s 
actions, Sophia’s counsels, and arguably her own virtue—brought her to this moment and 
move her into the pose of a figure in a historical painting.  She seems forced into 
(imprisoned in?) the realm of two-dimensional art just as other characters seemed to step 
out from that realm and move freely between different “real and assumed characters” 
(117).128  
Tellingly, her voice disappears from the narrative as Sophia takes over and stage 
manages the official response to these events.  The men she called upon to help her 
rescue Constantia from her imprisonment, the sinewy sons and servants of the farmer, 
“powerless with terror,” as she tells the reader, turned to her for “direction” and 
“willingly performed whatever [she] thought proper to enjoin upon them” (291).  She 
dispatches the caretaker with a letter to the magistrate and overlooks the execution of the 
“formalities of justice,” which include a “hastily formed” tribunal that “exercis[ed] its 
functions on the spot” (292).  Although perfunctory, for as Sophia asserts, “her act was 
prompted by motives which every scheme of jurisprudence known in the world not only 
exculpates but applauds,” these procedures elicit in Constantia an almost unconquerable 
reluctance. 
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Sophia’s concluding remarks, directly addressing the still unidentified I. E. 
Rosenberg, remind the reader that this is a history, that it is an artful representation of 
reality intended for use in determining truth, value, and (implicitly) a future action: in this 
case, whether to enter into a marriage contract.  Note that the decision is now not 
considered from Constantia’s point of view as it was several times earlier in the narrative.  
Constantia becomes a fixed entity: “Since her arrival in England, the life of my friend has 
experienced little variation” (293).  She is fixed by Sophia’s narrative that defines and 
confines her, or at least it would appear so.   
But one could argue that in her reluctance to cooperate with Sophia’s efforts to 
secure her exemption from “legal animadversion” and her resistance to her friend’s 
strenuous consolations, she thinks, feels, and acts from a place outside the narrow 
constructs of abstract systems and mere reasoning and, finally, even her own approbation.  
In the end, although she maintains her “corporeal integrity” by defeating Ormond, 
Constantia’s enlightened education, her republican virtue, and, yes, her constancy prove 
to be not enough to preserve her clear conscience.  But it is exactly in not trying to 
preserve a clear conscience that she preserves her innocence.  
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Chapter 4: “The Most Efficacious of Moral Instruments”: Brown’s Literary Theory 
Self-intensifying reverberations echo through the halls and the heads of Wieland’s 
Mettingen, shattering the planes between the figurative and the literal, between passion 
and reason, and between body and mind.  The same play with dichotomies and focus on 
their moral implications feature in the drama that unfolds on a larger stage in Ormond, 
where no proscenium separates theatrical and social fictions, artistic and factual 
representations.  Both of these novels put into question prevalent modes of understanding 
the world and of situating oneself within it.  And both demonstrate that the nominal truths 
upon which we base our judgments and justify our actions are subject to the distortions 
created when in our jealous defense of a sense of reality and of a certain conception of 
our self we reject what cannot be accommodated into our worldview.  Even characters’ 
self-conscious efforts to mitigate the effects of these distortions can become in turn a 
means of merely seeking selfish ends, perhaps satisfying personal desires or obtaining a 
clear conscience or both, rather than a truer understanding and more truly ethical 
responsiveness.  
In contrast to the rationalism and conventional didacticism underlying the popular 
Gothic and seduction narratives from which he borrowed, Brown’s disturbing novels 
center on atrocities committed by intelligent, principled people laboring for what they 
conceive of as an ultimate good.  Human error and vice as presented in Wieland and 
Ormond emerge not simplistically as the chance introduction of random flaw or the 
active intervention of a principle of evil.  They are born, these works suggest, of the 
habitual and arduous attempt—implicitly common to all human beings but perhaps 
particularly acute and conspicuous in Brown’s revolutionary Atlantic world—to reduce 
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all phenomena to comprehension, to make experience adequate to our categories.  
Theodore Wieland, perhaps, best exemplifies this drive to assimilate into a 
comprehensive whole even extraordinary violations of the assumed cosmic order; upon 
hearing that Carwin had been counterfeiting the seemingly otherworldly voices, he falters 
only a moment in his conviction before folding this too back into his ego-centric narrative 
of a contest between angels and demons to claim his soul.  But Brown does not narrowly 
target revealed religion; contrary to what might be expected from a reader of radical 
Enlightenment philosophies, rationality, too, plays a large part in the devastations of 
Wieland.  And, of course, his follow-up novel portrays the monstrous schemes of the 
supremely rational Ormond as he lays claim to penetrative insight into hidden realities.   
Foundational truth, the object of both religious teachings and philosophical 
inquiry, however conceived, is understood as the principle that constitutes and governs 
the universe.  Given the premise that one’s knowledge, being, and moral duty consists in 
one’s relation and responsiveness to a foundational truth, a logos, the bizarre and often 
destructive behavior of  Brown’s characters makes a kind of sense within the logic of 
their worldviews.  And yet the novels’ sensational plots dramatically demonstrate that the 
search for this foundational truth, this ultimate reality, whether cosmic reason or the mind 
or will of God, can never yield certainty.  And in as much as dedication to seeking out 
and adhering to this ultimate reality takes priority over humane considerations in our 
engagements with other human beings, this search is liable to give birth to, at the very 
least, ethically questionable judgments and actions and at worst moral abominations.  
 Although grounded by an Enlightenment aversion to the miraculous, by a 
dedication to probabilities and to the known principles of nature and human conduct (as 
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Brown asserts in the preface to Wieland), Brown nevertheless underscores the intellectual 
and ethical imperative of suspending certitude.  Whether his characters are right about the 
truth or cause of some appearance or event and whether they espouse reason or faith or 
sensibility or some other source or means of knowing is less important than the attitude 
of certainty they bring to their judgments and responses.  Certitude is what makes one 
vulnerable to deception; a deceiver need only create those appearances that serve as the 
bases for one’s certain belief, as Craig does when he forges the letter from Dudley’s 
English friend, placing himself beyond all doubt in his employer’s eyes—or more 
disastrously, as Carwin does when he creates the illusion of a disembodied intelligence 
mediating between the world of man and the realm of the supernatural.  And, as exhibited 
most spectacularly in Theodore Wieland’s and Ormond’s merciless rationalizations, it is 
certitude that allows for an unethical disregarding of the otherness of others, a preclusion 
of the inherent mystery of experience, a shutting out of the possibility of new significance 
as experience unfolds and our perceptions, if allowed, evolve.  Certitude, or at least an 
unreflective habit of mind, is also the precondition for the disruptions of the grotesque.  
Such disruptions, shocking, confusing, ridiculous, and even painful as they may be, may 
offer the possibility, at least, of changing one’s approach to truth and of gaining an 
understanding from outside the limitations of one’s conceptual horizon.  This holds true 
for the characters’ experiencing grotesque persons and events (although most seem to fail 
to take up the opportunity); and it holds true for the readers of these grotesque works as 
well. 
As already noted, critics of the past few decades have observed that Brown’s 
radical skepticism, his outlook regarding the discoverability of a foundational truth, 
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shares a strong family resemblance to prominent intellectual currents of the past half 
century or so that challenge the very idea of apodictic truths and of a language adequate 
to conveying them.  A number of readings of Brown’s works draw parallels to 
poststructuralism; and several more, without reference to poststructuralist thinkers and 
terminology, similarly explore the manner in which Brown’s novels illustrate the 
instability, indeterminacy, and internal contradictions of seemingly monolithic terms and 
concepts, thus undermining any claim to ultimate reality.129  In some cases, critical 
explorations of the texts’ relentless indeterminacy find that Brown fails to discover and 
offer any alternative ground for morality or social justice and just government.130  Several 
other readings, however, see the novels’ epistemological critique serving as a means of 
opening up a space for new ideas and pointing out the possibility of other constructions 
of what is true, logical, and natural, thereby implicitly advocating for a more inclusive 
and equitable approach to political and juridical decision-making. 
My aim in this chapter, is to follow up on my sense that Brown’s writings evince 
a focus on the ethical groundwork, on that which although it may serve as a starting point 
for reforming social and political structures, or systems, is not primarily political in the 
narrow sense.  Brown’s novels do not conform to or advance a political theory or system.  
Nor for that matter are Brown’s novels reducible to moral propositions or formal 
philosophical discourse more generally.  I want to argue that the novels’ resistance to a 
totalizing explanatory construct serves to prompt a mode of continuous critical 
engagement, a living practice of attentive reading that is, when transposed into the realm 
of interpersonal relations, the active awareness and ethical regarding of the other in its 
true otherness.  As such, the novels’ very weirdness—their inconclusiveness, incongruity, 
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and contradictions, in content and form; that which, I have suggested is best understood 
as their grotesqueness; that which commands attention and resists assimilation—serves 
an ethical end. 
In this chapter I hope to show how Brown’s weird novels build upon but move 
beyond ideas he inherited and those he encountered in the intellectually volatile era of the 
late Enlightenment.  Drawing upon a number of Brown’s other writings and considering 
them within their historical and biographical context, I trace the sources and development 
of his thoughts on the relation of morality, truth, and narrative art.  In particular, I 
consider how his letters and his magazine pieces, reviews and essays written during and 
after his novel-writing period, express elements of what I take to be the novels’ nuanced 
and cohesive attitude toward the self’s relation to and responsibility for the other.   
“An Outcast of That Unwarlike Sect” 
 A biography of the aesthetic, intellectual, and ethical values or ethos animating 
Brown’s literary project may well begin with his birth into the Philadelphia community 
of the Society of Friends.  His membership in the Quaker community shaped Brown’s 
socio-economic circumstances, his friendships, and his education.  It shaped to some 
extent his language.  (All those “not un-” constructions [the indirect or non-committal 
assertions through negation] and other circumlocutions [“wide of beauty” instead of ugly] 
might be creditable to a particular Quaker care to avoid disputation.)  It shaped, as well, 
his moral and intellectual bent of mind.  The early-to-mid 1790s for Brown is generally 
depicted as a youthful turn toward the radical ideas then sweeping through the Atlantic 
world—and indeed their impact on him and many other thoughtful people was profound.  
“Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive, / But to be young was very heaven!” wrote 
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Wordsworth, reflecting upon these early years of the French Revolution (Prelude book 
XI).  But Quaker historian Richard P. Moses rejects the binary opposition envisioned by 
some literary scholars between Brown’s religious upbringing and his later immersion in 
liberal intellectual currents, asserting instead that his intellectual curiosity and liberality 
are outgrowths of his Quakerism.131  And upon closer inspection, it does seem that 
despite the obvious divide separating the Christian sect from the often irreligious 
reformers with whom Brown is most often and rather justly compared, their tenets are not 
very far apart.  Indeed, a curious fact attests to the affinity of Quaker thought and some 
radical philosophies of the decade: Even before the Friendly Club’s enthusiastic 
canvassing of English Jacobin writings, Elijah Brown, the author’s Quaker father, copied 
into his commonplace book passages from William Godwin’s Political Justice, Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution, and Robert 
Bage’s Man as He Is.132  Of course, the strong connection between our author’s works 
and that of these and other such writers is and was easily discernible.  John Neal, a 
novelist of the succeeding generation, called Brown “the Godwin of America” (qtd. in 
Verhoeven 17).  And almost twenty years before, an 1805 German edition of Ormond 
(perhaps the first American novel translated into another language) is wrongly, if perhaps 
intentionally, ascribed to the famous William Godwin.  But the shift from religious 
communitarian to secular cosmopolitan does not essentially alter some core beliefs; a 
through-line remains.  Some years after Brown’s novelistic phase and after his 
disownment for marrying outside the Society, in what would be the last year before his 
untimely death, Brown referenced his Quaker background and its life-long influence on 
him: 
171 
 
  There are others who will pass me by as a visionary: And some, observing 
  the city where I thus make my appearance, may think my pacific doctrine,  
  my system of rational forbearance and forgiveness carried to a pitch of  
  Quaker extravagance.  The truth is, I am no better than an outcast of that  
  unwarlike sect, but cannot rid myself of reverence for most of its practical  
  and political maxims.  I feel a strong inclination to admit to an equality of  
  rights and merits, men of all nations and religions; to pass the same  
  sentence on the same conduct, even though the men who practice it bear,  
  at one time, the name of French, at another of English, and at another of  
  American: Sometimes that of federalists, and sometimes that of   
  republicans.133 
Here can be seen Brown’s peculiar and compelling blend of brotherly love and justice: 
impartiality steeped not in disinterested deliberation or religious revelation but in an 
extravagant concern for the well-being and respect for the alterity of the other, of all 
others.  
 Nor are these merely the effusions of shallow sentiment.  Brown’s egalitarianism 
and non-partisan principles take their original force from the Quaker ideas—redoubled 
and extended by his reading of Godwin and others—regarding authority and conscience.  
As part of a larger sphere of English Dissenters, Quakers were objectors to what was seen 
as the incomplete reformation of the Anglican church and its retention of elements of 
Roman Catholicism deemed un-Biblical and contrary to the true Christianity of the early 
church.  Although varying widely in their particular beliefs, the many sects of English 
Dissenters (or Non-conformists) commonly opposed the enforcement of church doctrine 
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and organization through state power and were barred in the mid-seventeenth century 
from holding public office by the Test Act and other laws targeting both Roman 
Catholics and Non-conformists.134  A principle tenet of the Society of Friends, which 
traces its origins to mid-seventeenth century northern England, is the rejection of 
adherence to any external authority on religious matters in favor of being open to being 
moved by God through an “inner light,” a spark of God’s divinity that resides in 
everyone.  The lack of a creed and of a church hierarchy (meetings were not led by 
priests or ministers) foster a personal relation to the divine not beholden to any 
intermediating power.  During the eighteenth century, Quaker meetings consisted of 
members sitting in contemplative silence until one among them felt the “inner light” 
leading him or her to speak (sex as well as race and class were not recognized as 
religiously significant distinctions).  Conscious of the problem of knowing whether the 
leading is done by the divine, by the ego, or some other source, members engaged in 
conscientiously non-confrontational questioning, healthily skeptical but always mindful 
of their core belief in the priesthood of all believers, the belief that divine truth may speak 
through anyone and may not always accord with majority opinion.135  Further, such 
expressions of divine truth are understood as part of the on-going, continuous revelation 
of God’s will.  And the principle that no one individual or group is in possession of a 
final truth is the source of the famous Quaker traits of humility, kindness, and 
attentiveness to others; it is also the rationale for their characteristic rejection of all the 
trappings (gestures, clothing, or language) of social inequality.  Thus, while the Society 
of Friends bequeathed to Brown a tradition of challenging the claims of any authority to 
mediate between the individual and the great unknown, it also gave him a progressive 
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ideal of a community moving forward together, a “fellowship of the Spirit,” as an 
eminent modern Quaker historian puts it, “a movement that can and does grow, develop, 
and change because it has within it the inward power of expansion.”136  For Quakers, the 
ethical importance of authority and conscience lies not only in the imperative to honor 
one’s own authentic moral convictions but also, and importantly, in the idea of 
maintaining an openness to a continuous revelation that may come through anyone.137  
Quakerism thus more than adequately prepared Brown’s mind for the moral and political 
theories of the radical democrats and rational reformers, particularly of their champion 
William Godwin.  In an 1805 article entitled “Origins of Quakerism,” written in part by 
Brown and published in his Literary Magazine, the narrator marks the striking parallels: 
  Those who deem the simple or popular form of government the best, fancy 
  that they see in the policy of the quakers the purest and most perfect model 
  of this government.  It is very remarkable, indeed, that in the internal order 
  of this society, in its legislative and judicial system, we see the most  
  extravagant political reveries of Godwin and his followers realized.  The  
  division of the whole society into bodies sufficiently small to allow all  
  legislative functions to be performed by the whole community assembled,  
  without distinctions of rank, property, or even of sex; the deliberations of  
  their public bodies, without any of those forms deemed indispensable by  
  all other senates; decision in these assemblies accomplished without vote,  
  or appeal to a majority; judicial powers united with the legislative,   
  exercised without precise statutes, and executed without corporal   
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  punishment of any kind, are all characteristic of quaker as well as of  
  Godwinian policy.138 
 Godwin (1756-1836), a one-time Nonconformist minister who embraced atheism 
and philosophical materialism under the influence of the writings of French philosophes, 
argued for remaining always open to the dictates not of the divine spark, but of the light 
of reason.  In his movement away from the theism of the Dissenters, one could argue, 
Godwin took their freethinking principles to heart by taking them further.  Just as 
Dissenter principles might be thought to be the logical extension of the Protestant 
Reformation regarding the primacy of individual conscience in religious matters, 
Godwin’s ideas, as Mark Philp argues, might be thought to be the logical extension of 
this primacy of conscience “to encompass all aspects of moral and political life.”139  
Indeed, Godwin, armed with the conviction of the capacity of humankind to apprehend 
universal truth, envisioned the eventual obsolescence of government itself as individuals 
would work out conflicts through the exercise of reason in private judgment and public 
discussion.    
 And, like the Quakers, Godwin conceived of a continuous progression in 
understanding and moral being, not a final state of perfection.  He conceived of this 
capacity for ever-further development, however, in narrowly intellectual terms, not only 
rejecting the need for religious doctrines or divine revelations, but also taking a Stoical 
approach to emotions, treating them as corrupters of reason and of the impartial 
calculations of utility, that is, of the greatest good for mankind.  To his mind the 
continuous approach to truth by way of dispassionate reasoning would also necessarily 
entail the continuous approach to true morality.  As Paul McLaughlin explains, in 
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Godwin’s view, “not only is intellectual (or theoretical) progress necessary for moral (or 
practical) progress; it even guarantees it (889): ‘That which we can be persuaded clearly 
and distinctly to approve, will inevitably modify our conduct’” (135).  And Philp notes 
that “far from separating the spheres of ideas and motives, the understanding and the 
passions, Godwin treated sensations merely as raw forms of idea, and thereby made 
possible a view in which the understanding could come to master and direct the passions 
and the organs of sensation,” a view that, as I have already argued, Brown critiques in his 
narrative of the Wieland-Pleyel group.140  This dispassionate ideal, however, is central to 
Godwin’s focus on true justice, on a first-order impartiality. 
 In a defining move, Godwin, in fact, explicitly rejects the doctrine of the natural 
rights of man as treated by Thomas Paine and others, arguing instead for the same 
freedom from external interference only not from an appeal to an abstract absolute but 
from the necessary conclusions of disinterested reason and enlightened self-interest.  He 
conceived of the freedom from interfering elements as allowing and indeed imposing the 
duty of each individual to recognize his or her own responsibilities.  Freedom is not the 
end goal but the space from which one can discern and exercise one’s moral duty to the 
greater good.141 
 Just what that greater good may be would be discerned through the exercise of 
private judgment as chastened and made more correct through public discussion.  
Godwin acknowledged the frailty of human character, its susceptibility to false logic and 
the corrupting influence of personal interest, and endorsed the corrective of earnest public 
discussion whether in speech or writing.  We might easily assume Godwin is borrowing 
directly from the Quakers, merely substituting the common faculty reason for the inner 
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light, when he argues: “All men are partakers of the common faculty reason, and may be 
supposed to have some communication with the common preceptor truth.  It would be 
wrong in an affair of such momentous concern, that any chance for additional wisdom 
should be rejected; nor can we tell in many cases till after the experiment how eminent 
any individual may one day be found in the business of guiding and deliberating for his 
fellows” (III. iv. 91).  And this benevolent business, Godwin argues, is carried on through 
“discussion,” “the only substantial method for the propagation of truth,” for through 
discussion “the errors of one man may be detected by the acuteness and severe 
disquisition of his neighbours” (III. vii. 105).  In this, the Quaker emphasis on plain 
expression and candor mirrors the radical democrats’ beliefs concerning the virtue and, 
importantly, the transformative power of sincerity.  Caleb Crain observes, “Godwin may 
not have been as mystical as the Quakers, but he shared their belief that heartfelt speech 
would spread love. [ . . . ] Almost religiously, Godwin believed that the release of the 
truth would lead inevitably to what the Quakers would have called a Society of Friends” 
(87-88).  Godwin conceived of a political and juridical structure based on consensus, the 
convergence of ideas by means of the universal operation of reason toward a “single and 
uniform” truth.142  And this faith in the power of peaceful exchange to resolve conflict is 
another commonality of eighteenth-century Quaker and Godwinian principles.  Although 
considered the father of anarchist thought, Godwin expressly rejected violent revolution 
and advocated for a continuous dialogue among truth seekers that would in effect be an 
on-going and bloodless revolution.143  Looking far into the future of this ideal 
progression, he projected that an enlightened mankind will overcome not only social ills, 
“the vices and moral weakness of man,” but even the physical limitations and 
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vulnerabilities of the mortal body, achieving a kind of secular immortality.144  Godwin’s 
supreme confidence in the power of reason to disclose eternal truth, including the eternal 
truth of moral duty, proved highly infectious, for a time.  
“Infidel Philosopher” 
 Selections of Godwin’s philosophical magnum opus An Enquiry Concerning 
Political Justice and Its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness may have reached 
Brown by way of lengthy extracts published in New York newspapers as early as 1793, 
soon after its London publication, just as he was breaking from the expectations of his 
family and friends in quitting the law, in questioning religious doctrine, and in taking on 
the quixotic pursuit of a career as a professional writer.145  In this period from the middle 
to the latter part of the decade, Brown espoused the “infidel philosophy” of his New 
York-based friends Elihu Smith, William Johnson, and William Dunlap.  The phrase, 
referring to their critical stance toward religion and their progressive reform interests in 
line with the radicals of Europe, is one Johnson playfully co-opted from the title of a 
counter-subversive, anti-Illuminati work The Nature and Danger of Infidel Philosophy by 
prominent Congregationalist divine (and friendly acquaintance of Smith) Timothy 
Dwight.146  These energetic, educated, and hopeful young men were among many 
inspired by a materialist and individualist conception of an inner light, not the flashes of 
divine revelation, but the light of reason illuminating the path toward eternal truth.  In his 
biography of his late friend, Dunlap, writing from a period of conservative backlash 
against revolutionary zeal, against the undermining of ordering systems, treats as a matter 
meriting some apology Brown’s embrace of the thought and spirit of Revolutionary-era 
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reformers, of the “plunging tenets and dangerous doctrines which he advanced in his first 
entry into public life” (Life 71).  
  Ever fond of analysis, Charles, even in very early life, would take no  
  opinion upon trust.  He found in his own mind abundant reason to reject  
  many of the received opinions of mankind, and to doubt the reality of  
  many facts upon which those opinions are founded.  Much of his reading  
  at this time tended to bewilder rather than enlighten and to confirm his  
  predisposition to skepticism.  In common with many others, he imputed to 
  wrong causes the defects which are but too apparent in existing systems.   
  He saw the wrong and injustice and evil which exist, and instead of  
  attributing them to the ignorance and selfishness of individuals, he   
  assigned as the cause the errors or inefficiency of those codes which are  
  intended to enlighten or to restrain. (70) 
It seems that the inveterately skeptical Brown found something relatable in the cogent 
critiques of old systems founded on arbitrary distinctions and perpetuated through 
obfuscation and superstition, and something compelling in the possibility of 
systematizing or scaling up his skepticism so as to remake the world, to turn doubt and 
refutation into something constructive.  
 Perhaps the most explicit record of Brown’s conversion to Godwinian thought is 
his October 1795 letter to Joseph Bringhurst, Jr., his long-time Philadelphia friend, 
former classmate, and fellow Quaker.  In this letter Brown continues an on-going 
controversy between them on the topic of theism and morality, exemplifying along the 
way his characteristic skepticism toward the uniformity and stability of terms and the 
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decidability of meaning: “How ambiguous is the meaning of that word? [Christianity] 
How difficult to ascertain its true meaning?  You talk of it as if you thoroughly 
understood it; You are aware that there are a thousand sects in the world, who call 
themselves Christians, who differ essentially from each other in their practical and 
speculative creed. [ . . . ] Have you determined which of these is the true?” “The question 
between us,” Brown declares, “is not whether I condemn Christianity, but whether I 
condemn your system of Christianity” (Letters 297-98).  He finds the belief in the divinity 
of Christ (more particularly the concomitant unquestioning submission to the moral law 
conceived in his name) and the prospect of future reward or punishment in an afterlife to 
be pernicious, historically responsible for far more harm than good.  And he notes that 
these doctrines are not uniformly adopted by all those who profess to be Christians.  
Deference to scripture, he argues, cannot avoid the problem of interpretation.  The errors 
committed under sanction of religion, his friend must argue, are a matter of annexing “the 
sanctions of the Christian religion to modes of conduct and opinion to which you think it 
is inapplicable.”  But such susceptibility to misinterpretation when coupled with 
“imagined rewards and punishments hereafter,” Brown offers in pointed understatement, 
can make for “an error of no little importance” (300).  As to whether Brown’s moral 
principles, despite his positions on doctrine, do or do not accord with what Bringhurst 
“will esteem a just and natural construction of the language of the New testament,” 
Brown asserts that he must still insist that “religious sanctions are unfriendly to morality” 
(301).147  The problem of interpretation, he continues, must discredit reliance upon 
religious law: “The Construction of one of us only can be true: One of us must commit 
actions positively wrong; with the additional incitement that they are sanctioned by 
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Heaven: And what shall I think of the Utility of motives which may operate with equal 
force with respect to opposite actions and which are infinitely more in danger of being 
applied erroneously than rightly, of inciting to evil than to good.”  And as to admitting 
“with Archdeacon Paley the necessity of Revelation to point out to men their duty, and 
enforce their performance of it,” Brown finds it a “strange concession” (301).  (He would 
later also find it a generative topic for a novel.)  In rejecting deference to any authority, 
including sacred scripture and revelation, he takes the decisive step from Dissent to 
deism.148  
 Following the lead of the era’s rational humanism, and particularly of Godwin’s 
brand, he seeks a system of morality that accords with the best human understanding; he 
looks with some optimism not to the grace of God but to the mind of man to disclose the 
true morality.  The “chief business” of man, Brown tells Bringhurst, “is to ascertain the 
dictates of moral duty, by consulting his Understanding; and measuring the opinions of 
others, whatever may be their pretensions, by the standard of his own judgment.”  In 
Godwinian fashion, he insists upon the free exercise of the individual’s reason and argues 
that the path toward knowledge of one’s duty lay in reflection, which he is careful to 
point out necessitates “the belief of the possible erroneousness of our present 
conclusions” (302).149  He then ends his remarks by earnestly referring Bringhurst to 
Godwin, the “author, to whom, in my present mode of thinking, I appeal, as an oracle” 
(302).150  Tellingly, although to his Quaker friend Brown presents a vigorous defense of 
this oracle’s pronouncements, including the appeal to “Utility” and one’s own private 
judgment, in practice at least, as we shall see, he is not Godwinian enough for his deist 
friend Elihu Hubbard Smith.  In the repeated allusions to the variability of definitions and 
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the problem of interpretation is the intimation of a difference whose significance will 
become evident over time as his predisposition to skepticism outgrows the idealistic 
hopes he placed in a Godwinian system. 
 However, despite some early signs of an eventual philosophical divergence, the 
importance of William Godwin’s works from the mid-1790s on Brown’s development as 
an aspiring author, of a “story-telling moralist,” cannot be denied.  It was around this time 
that Brown declared his intention to write a novel after reading Godwin’s Things as They 
Are; or, The Adventures of Caleb Williams (1794), a thriller meant to render in dramatic 
narrative form the proto-anarchist’s critique of outmoded and unjust structures of 
authority.  “I had planned so that I could finish a work equal in extent to Caleb Williams 
in less than six weeks,” Brown writes in a letter to Dunlap in September, 1795.  But upon 
experiment he decides that “great expedition does not seem desirable.  Tenets so 
momentous require a leisurely and deep examination; and much meditation, reading, and 
writing, I presume, are necessary to render my system of morality perfect in all its parts, 
and to acquire a full and luminous conviction; but I have not stopped—I go on, though 
less precipitately than at first, and hope finally to produce something valuable for its 
utility” (Letters 293).  After a few arduous weeks, however, he decided he could not 
finish the task—neither completing the novel nor, presumably, perfecting his system of 
morality.  Some months later, describing the intellectual inconstancy of his friend, Elihu 
Smith exclaims, “Godwin came, and all was light!” (Letters 343) before lamenting what 
he sees as Brown’s frequent backsliding into (to borrow Wil Verhoeven’s apt phrase) 
“Rousseauesque sensibility and self-absorption” (“This Blissful Period” 18).    
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 The meticulous and disciplined Smith conducted his own prodigious industry by 
the light of Godwin’s Political Justice; and through Smith, Godwin’s influence seems to 
have been both reinforced and also perhaps overextended, strengthening some elements 
in Brown’s views and simultaneously putting others into question.  It seemed to Smith 
that what needed to be reinforced in Brown was the commitment to more active 
involvement with what lay beyond his direct personal concerns, a turn outward that 
would benefit himself as much as others by compelling a greater rigor in his writing and 
thinking.  Implicit in Smith’s many activities in publishing, in scientific and social-reform 
societies, and in the establishment and running of the Friendly Club are the Godwinian 
convictions regarding man’s capacity for continuous improvement (in Godwin’s terms 
“perfectibility”) and his moral duty to spread enlightenment (the gospel of reason) 
throughout his sphere of influence.  During the long period of Brown’s literary 
wanderings, Smith, putting these convictions into action, coaxed, corrected, even 
castigated Brown for what he saw as an indulgence in Wertherian posing and self-
mythologizing and an inability to see a project all the way through to completion.  In a 
lengthy letter from 1796, he criticizes his friend for imprecision and possibly even 
deliberate obscurity in his writing, in particular concerning a letter just received in which 
Brown intimates some great emotional crisis in only the most abstract terms and alludes 
so elliptically to the fact of a mutual friend’s imprisonment for debts that an exasperated 
Smith feels compelled to demand plain speech.  He then proceeds to admonish him more 
generally: 
  Why do you so much delight in Mystery?  Is it the disease of the Will?  Or 
  of Habit?  Do you, of choice, give to the simplest circumstance the air of  
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  fiction?  Or have you been so long accustomed to deal in visionary scenes, 
  to intertwine the real with the imaginary, & to enwrap yourself in the  
  mantle of ambiguous seeming, that your pen, involuntarily borrows the  
  phraseology of fancy, & by the spell of magic words, still diffuses round  
  you the mist of obscuring uncertainty?  The man of Truth, Charles! The  
  pupil of Reason, has no mysteries.  He knows that former errors, do not  
  constitute him guilty now—& he has nothing to conceal.  He seeks only to 
  know his duty, & perform it, & he has no occasion for disguise.  He  
  places, with his own hand, the window in his breast; & he bids the world  
  look in, & comment.  Lurks there any deformity within—he blesses the  
  eye that descries it, commends the tongue that proclaims, & kisses the  
  hand that drags it to the light.  He acknowledges his error; he owns his  
  weakness; he purifies his heart; & he invigorates his hands. (Letters  
  333) 
Brown responded conscientiously, thanking his friend for the frank assessment and well-
meant advice.151  In an insightful examination of this crucial relationship in the author’s 
life, scholar Caleb Crain observes that here Smith’s aim is to call out Brown for evading 
uncomfortable disclosures and confrontations through emotional posturing and flights of 
romantic fancy and to inculcate in him the virtue of sincere expression.  Crain credits 
Smith’s candor, compelled by intellectual principle and delivered in the spirit of true 
friendship, with helping his friend channel his errant fictionality into actual fictions.   
And yet, as influential as Smith was on his friend’s development, Brown did not, 
as Crain also notes, simply become a copy of this sober-minded, methodical man of 
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Truth, pupil of Reason.  Brown’s Wieland and Ormond, as we have seen, evince the view 
that the good doctor’s prescription is rather too high-minded and dismissive of inveterate 
human frailties, limitations, dependencies, and perversions.  And while both Brown’s 
novels and his magazine pieces suggest an agreement with Smith’s assessment of the 
relative values of obfuscation and openness, they question the idea of truly separating the 
real and the imaginary; and they question Smith’s (and Godwin’s) blind faith in the 
human capacity for rationality and in reason’s power to cure the “disease” of delusion 
and deception.152  Although he would, throughout his career, evince his belief in the 
moral duty to grow in understanding and to promote general virtue and happiness, a 
belief that was strengthened and set into motion by his friends in New York, and 
particularly by Smith, Brown would take a different view of the ease even the possibility 
of waving away the “mist of obscuring uncertainty.”   
 Smith’s faith in the discoverability, communicability and progressive nature of 
truth operated well beyond his interventions in Brown’s personal development, powering 
his many ambitious benevolent endeavors.  His establishment of the conversation circle 
he called the Friendly Club was, like the Gothic fiction Brown would draw upon, another 
example of the young republic’s appropriation for its own purposes of cultural forms 
from across the Atlantic.  Scholar Catherine O’Donnell Kaplan explains that in the 
absence of the raison d’etre of similar associations in monarchial England—a site of 
criticism and civic resistance to absolute authority and rigid social stratification—, the 
American associations of wit, learning, taste, and polite discourse in the first two decades 
of the new United States transformed into something else.  When subjects became 
citizens and political disagreement became institutionalized into an electoral and party 
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system, the associations became a sort of antidote to partisan gridlock, a ground for the 
“exchange of ideas and the creation of bonds of affection and trust that the American 
polity demanded but failed to create” (4).  Of the rationale behind the activities of the 
Friendly Club, she writes, “In Smith’s view, individuals created harmony and pursued 
justice through acquiring and circulating information.  The information they gathered 
would reveal the truth of any problem and its best solution.  Thus, in Smith’s view, the 
world—and the American nation within it—would be improved, not through electoral 
politics and partisan debate, but through a kind of open-ended intellectual exertion that 
rendered political parties unnecessary” (7).  Smith hoped, in other words, to promote the 
large-scale remodeling of American society as a cosmopolitan republic of intellect.153 
To this end Smith and other members made plans for two magazines to 
disseminate useful information and ideas and to serve as forums for intellectual 
exchange.  The first, which Smith co-edited along with two other physician members, 
Edward Miller and Samuel Latham Mitchell, was the Medical Repository, the country’s 
first enduring medical journal; and the second, the Monthly Magazine, and American 
Review.  As Alfred Weber writes, this second endeavor, which Smith did not live to see, 
“was to cover—incredible as it may sound—all the other interests of the Friendly 
Club.”154  Thus, after a year as a steady supplier of material to James Watter’s Weekly 
Magazine, Brown found a new outlet for expressing and developing his thoughts.  He 
served as editor and often the biggest contributor to the eighteen issues, which were 
published between April 1799 and December 1800.  And he would later edit two more 
periodicals, the Literary Magazine and American Register (1803-1807) and American 
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Register, or General Repository of History, Politics, and Science (1807-1809), which 
would feature scores more of Brown’s original writings. 
There seems a certain irony in the outcome of Smith’s efforts to keep his friend 
on the intellectual straight and narrow.  In goading Brown’s industry, in including Brown 
in the weekly meetings of his conversation circle where ideas were discussed and where 
his writings were critiqued, and finally in bequeathing to him an outlet for projecting his 
ideas and putting them into action, he did indeed promote the more considered 
development of the author’s thinking.  But just as the tenets of the Society of Friends 
gave a certain direction to Brown’s thought that under the impetus of his restless mind 
and the influence of his readings carried him beyond their boundaries, Smith’s efforts, it 
seems, occasioned Brown’s progression through and beyond the Godwin-inflected 
philosophy of his Friendly Club companion.  
 Close as the two were, there remains a contrast between them regarding the 
methods and aims of narrative, regarding the nature and relation of truth and the ethical.  
In his major fiction, as previous chapters have attempted to demonstrate, Brown will 
challenge the discoverability of an eternal truth, as well as the necessary causal 
connection between and the progressive nature of reason and morality.  He will challenge 
as well the need to overcome emotions and considerations of pleasure and pain for the 
sake of impartial judgment and, indeed, will challenge the rational mind’s capacity to do 
so.  And he will also challenge the belief that the true origin of human actions is the 
individual’s judgment, that “the will is the tool of the understanding,” as Clara Wieland 
puts it.  Turning to his works of criticism and literary theory to follow the ideas that 
inform his novels, one finds the semblance of Quaker and Godwinian principles, a Hume-
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like skepticism, some French philosophe thought, as well as bits of German aesthetics.  
As different and even incompatible as these thought systems are in some particulars, 
Brown makes of them a cohesive approach to the pursuit of truth, the role of imagination, 
and the function of fiction in a new republic and in the life of the individual moral being.   
“The Highest Province of Benevolence” 
Although never combined into a fully developed, complete, or systematic 
statement, fragments of Brown’s theory of literature and of its ethical force emerge in a 
number of essays, literary reviews, and other writings.  Throughout his career as arguably 
the first literary critic of note in America he repeatedly emphasizes the “moral utility” of 
narrative art and provides details of his own methodology for achieving the aesthetic and 
ethical goals of his literary project.155  At first glance, we might find his periodical 
writings, like his novels, contradictory; that is, they seem to be offering strands of both 
conservative and progressive, neo-classicist and Romantic notions of literary merit and 
social value.  Ernest Marchand, writing in the 1930s, characterizes Brown’s works of 
literary criticism as neo-classicist in matters of style and reflective of middle-class 
morality in matters of content.156  And this view seems in line with some readings of 
Brown’s literary practice.  As already noted, a number of critics find in his major novels a 
pattern of punishing artists, aesthetes, and those who give themselves over to conceptions 
beyond sober, rationally-grounded constructions of reality.  Leslie Fiedler, Michael 
Davitt Bell, William Manly, and others discern a conservative cultural and psychological 
critique regarding the potentially dangerous effects of novel-reading and the indulgence 
of the imagination more broadly.  Other critics, including Paul Witherington, Maurice J. 
Bennett, and Bill Christophersen, explore what they see as a profound ambivalence 
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toward the author’s own profession.  Doubtless, evidence for Brown’s negative view of 
popular novels or romances (he seems to have used the terms interchangeably) can be 
found in select magazine pieces.  His brief “A Receipt for a Modern Romance,” for 
example, offers mocking instructions for composing a gothic thriller: “Take an old castle; 
pull down part of it, and allow the grass to grow on the battlements, and provide the owls 
and bats with uninterrupted habitations among the ruins.  Pour a sufficient quantity of 
heavy rain upon the hinges and bolts of the gates so that when they are attempted to be 
opened, they may creak most fearfully” (Literary Essays 8-9).  Written later and in a 
more serious tone, the article “Terrific Novels” continues his disdain for “the folly of this 
mode of composition,” which exploits “exploded fables and childish fears,” by 
disparaging its often feeble attempts at evoking suspense and its relentless barrage of 
frightful incidents, which does not permit “the unhappy reader to draw his breath, or to 
repose for a moment on subjects of character or sentiment” (Literary Essays 143-44).   
And yet even in his negative critical remarks, Brown does not join in the critique 
of popular literature that ridiculed its appeal to the imagination and to emotions 
generally.157  Indeed, in the pieces just noted he mocks and chides not the Gothic writers’ 
sensational scenarios, only their unimaginative reliance on formula and their crude 
handling of the genre’s affective aims.  In another piece, “Novel-Reading,” an essay in 
the form of a brief fictional dialogue, a well-read Miss D— presents a retort to the era’s 
anti-novel screeds, arguing: 
 They who prate about the influence of novels to unfit us for solid and  
  useful  reading, are guilty of a double error: for in the first place, a just and 
  powerful picture of human life in which the connection between vice and  
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  misery, and between felicity and virtue is vividly portrayed, is the most  
  solid and useful reading that a moral and social being (exclusive of  
  particular cases and professional engagements) can read; and in the second 
  place, the most trivial and trite of these performances are, to readers of  
  certain ages and intellects, the only books which they will read.  If they  
  were not thus employed, they would be employed in a way still more  
  trivial or pernicious. (Literary Essays 136) 
Crito, as the woman calls her interlocutor (a stand-in for Brown’s readers whose Platonic 
cognomen implicitly positions Miss D— as the convincing, right-thinking Socrates), 
grants his general assent to her views, qualifying only her assertion regarding the rarity of 
“profligate” novels.  He then adds his pronouncement that “my fancy has received more 
delight, my heart more humanity, and my understanding more instruction from a few 
novels I could name, than from any other works; and that the merit of a score or two of 
these is, in my apprehension, so great, that they are the first and principal objects to 
which I would direct the curiosity of a child or pupil of mine” (136).  Perhaps there is an 
element of an early American novelist’s self-promotion or self-defense in this argument, 
but Miss D—’s views are also recognizably part of a line of thought regarding the 
usefulness of fiction’s moral demonstrations that goes back at least as far as Aristotle’s 
comments on the nature of fable and can be seen in the defense of imaginative writings 
offered by Lord Kames and Hugh Blair as well.158  This declaration of fiction’s primacy 
as a potential means of imparting and of obtaining not only pleasure and instruction but 
also greater humanity is a central theme of Brown’s expressions of his literary theory, 
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method, and aims, all of which are inextricable from his rather particular conceptions of 
the true and of the ethical. 
Defying the common understanding, Brown argues against the easy distinction 
between works of fact and those of fiction.  Although he maintains, as in the preface to 
Wieland, a separation of the useful from the “frivolous” productions, he does not equate 
this distinction with that between works that appeal to the reason and to observable or 
recorded fact and works that use fictional elements to stimulate the emotions and the 
imagination (3).  He rejects the conventional binary and substitutes a sliding scale with 
sober chronicles of observed action on one end and purely fantastical inventions on the 
other.  And along with it, he rejects the opinion, common in that era, that fictionality was 
antithetical to the values of a rational republic.  His ideal, as implicitly invoked in his 
historically-grounded novels and explicitly argued in his literary essays and reviews, is 
the middle ground.  In a key essay, one that I have found useful in previous discussions 
yet is worthy of fuller analysis, he expressed the belief that “a narration of public events, 
with a certain license of invention, was the most efficacious of moral instruments” (35). 
Appearing in the August and September 1799 issues of the Monthly Magazine, in 
the midst of Brown’s brief but prodigiously prolific novel-writing phase, the two-part 
article entitled “Walstein’s School of History, from the German of Krantz” is often cited 
as the most direct and comprehensive statement of Brown’s own narrative aims and 
methods.159  The essay is a strange blend of genres, at once a work of fiction (in the form 
of an overview of a fictional group of historiographers) and of literary and 
historiographical theory, and it brings together a number of ideas reiterated and 
sometimes expanded upon in other pieces.  Perhaps stranger still, at least at first blush, is 
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the contention that objective truth is not only overrated, but also that it is rarely true, and 
that its possession (or the belief that one has possession of it) can anaesthetize the holder 
to what is truly important. 
Krantz, Brown’s fictional historian (of a group of fictional historians), begins with 
a description of an intellectual fellowship that approximates the relation of Brown and his 
Friendly Club mates to their own models, particularly to Godwin, or perhaps of Brown to 
his mentor Elihu Smith.  A certain number of Walstein’s admiring students began 
meeting as a group and exchanging and comparing ideas with each other and with their 
professor who “laying aside his professional dignity, conversed with them on the footing 
of a friend and equal.”  These students enthusiastically espoused the ideals of the master, 
although, again not unlike Brown’s adaptation of Godwinian thought, “it could not but 
happen, [ . . . ] that the criterion of excellence would be somewhat modified in passing 
through the mind of each; that each should have his peculiar modes of writing and 
thinking” (31).    
   Historical narrative, Walstein believed, is a tool for increasing the general 
happiness of mankind through imparting moral understanding.  His intention is to depict 
enlightened personages striving for the general happiness in ways best suited to their 
stations and the particular circumstances.  Krantz offers a description of his two books, 
one on Cicero, the other on the Marquis of Pombal, both presented in the form of 
autobiography, a fictive conceit.  Walstein’s felt duty to historical truth does not arise 
from a devotion to objectivity per se but from a conviction that a compellingly realistic 
portrait of “human excellence” would facilitate the “happiness of mankind” by instilling 
in readers a zeal to imitate such “models of right conduct.”  The realism thus striven for 
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serves not the cause of truth but is a function of a desire to “illuminate the understanding, 
to charm curiosity, and sway the passions” toward a “love and zeal of virtue” (33).  
Engel, Walstein’s eldest student, followed his instructor’s lead, believing that “to exhibit 
in eloquent narration a model of right conduct is the highest province of benevolence” 
(35).  He, however, recognized that most readers would not find themselves in the exalted 
positions of prominent men.  A closer parallel between the common reader’s state and 
that of the persons exhibited in the narrative seemed preferable.  For this reason he turned 
from conventional history to novels, “fictitious history.”  In this Engel could portray the 
common man in his sphere of influence, particularly in the common but complex 
relations with others that fall under the categories of property (or economic and class 
considerations) and sex (or considerations of gender and sexuality).  “The usefulness [of 
such fictitious history],” Engle believed, “undoubtedly, consists in suggesting a mode of 
reasoning and acting somewhat similar to that which is ascribed to a feigned person” 
(37).  Brown’s self-identification with this portrait of Engel is manifested in the summary 
of Engel’s novel “Olivo Ronsica,” which is actually a summary of Brown’s Arthur 
Mervyn with character and place names changed. 
Because of his interest in the richness of experience, Brown finds too much 
fictionalization, too much indulgence of imaginative license (or, to use Coleridge’s 
distinction, “fancy”) to be counterproductive to what he considers the proper aims of 
narrative.  It is for this reason that Brown, a defender of novel-reading in general, took to 
task the run-of-the-mill sentimental and Gothic works for their potential to distort 
readers’ sense of reality.  He decries what he saw as the popular narratives’ abuses, their 
infidelity to the realities of lived experience—not only the improbabilities of the events, 
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rationally considered, but also the unrealistic perceptions and emotional and imaginative 
responses of the characters.  Most Gothic narratives, he argues, trading on the pleasure of 
passions evoked and imagination indulged, nevertheless implicitly devalue the feelings 
and imagination of both the characters and the readers: 
 The multitude of Mrs. Radcliffe’s imitators seem to have thought that  
  description and sentiment were impertinent intruders, and by lowering the  
  mind somewhat to its ordinary state, marred and counteracted those awful  
  feelings, which true genius was properly employed in raising.  They  
  endeavor to keep the reader in a constant state of tumult and horror, by the  
  powerful engines of trap-doors, back stairs, black robes, and pale faces:  
  but the solution to the enigma is ever too close at hand, to permit the  
  indulgence of supernatural appearances.  A well-written scene of a party at 
  snap-dragon would exceed all the fearful images of these books. (“Terrific  
  Novels” Literary Essays 143-4).  
The objective of the story-telling moralist, then, is to move the mind out of its “ordinary 
state.”  He appreciated the beauties of a well-written narrative and argued that reading 
merely on the principle of pleasure, although it makes the reader no wiser, is no bad 
thing.  However, he deplores the popular novel when it instills “estimates of human life 
and happiness that are calculated upon false foundations” (“On the Causes of the 
Popularity of Novels” Literary Essays 181).  An early short story published in May 1798 
entitled “A Lesson on Sensibility” centers on the hapless, insane Archibald who “has 
remained for some years, an example of the fatal effects of addicting the undisciplined 
mind to books, in which Nature is so fantastically and egregiously belied” 
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(Somnambulism 105).  Fully aware of the revolutionary power of story-telling, Brown 
uses story-telling to warn of the failures and abuses of story-telling, as well.    
 He finds ostensibly true narratives, that is, biographies and histories, equally 
capable of distorting our picture of reality and equally culpable for desensitizing readers 
to what he might have called, after the title of one of his short stories, the romance of real 
life.  “No writers more than the historian, and the professed romancer,” he argues, “so 
sedulously practice the artifice of awakening curiosity, and feasting that appetency of the 
mind, which turns from simple truth to spirited fiction” (“Historical Characters” 162).  
Novels and histories alike are pernicious, he insists, when they make readers less 
attentive to the subtleties and the varieties of experience, when they lull readers into 
merely indulging the pleasure that comes from the satisfaction of their increasingly 
unrealistic expectations, when they make readers averse to or insensible of the elements 
of common life that make a call upon our attention and responsiveness.  He stresses the 
need to have empathy for “the obscure living” and to not devalue and ignore the merits of 
real people in favor of false representations of nature presented in exaggerated historical 
portraits of “the illustrious dead” (164).  In the article “Anecdotes,” Brown endorses the 
idea that historical narrative should be valued for its insights into the human condition, 
life as it experienced, those extra-schematic particularities of real life experience.  The 
useful history will portray “common life” which the historian must “regard [ . . . ] with 
minute attention, and reflect long on a thousand little strokes, which are to give the 
faithful resemblance” (160).  It is there we find “the causes of the misery and prosperity 
of our country,” and there where we must turn for a picture of the “progress of the human 
mind.”  Using a figure of familial interest, he insists, “We should consult the annals of 
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history as a son and a brother would turn over his domestic memoirs” (159).  Brown’s 
message is that we ought to take the curiosity that we exercise in our reading about kings 
and empires into our encounters with real life persons. 
We see this concern expressed in his literary reviews.  Regarding content, he 
advocated attention to specifics of character and circumstance rather than reliance on 
types.  In the review article “Sketches of Some Recent Novels,” he credits the author of 
What You Please for an ability to display the characters’ “peculiar turns of temper” and 
for showing himself, “in many instances, a good observer of the springs and motives 
which influence the conduct of individuals in the commerce of life.”  Later in the same 
article, Brown faults another author for having “no felicity in developing and unfolding 
the peculiar distinctions and shades of character” and giving the reader no opportunity 
“of forming what is equivalent to a personal acquaintance with the character recorded.”  
“This defect,” he insists, “must necessarily render all biography, whether real or 
fictitious, less interesting in proportion to its extent; and in avoiding this fault, consist the 
great art and secret of fascinating and riveting the mind of the reader; as Fielding and 
Smollet, and other eminent writers in this walk, have so happily illustrated in their 
writings” (Literary Essays 157).  The emphasis in Brown’s writings on the truth of 
human nature is the recognition of the ethical need to make present the other human 
being in his or her “genuine and peculiar” state, not as covered over by preconceptions or 
idealizations or “decorations of [the historian’s] fancy,” but as presented in the “nudity of 
truth” (“Historical Characters” 163).  If too enthralled by the historian’s or romancer’s 
inventive arts, “we form false estimates of the human character, and, while we exhaust 
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our sensations in artificial sympathies, amidst calamities of life, we suppress those 
warmer emotions we otherwise should indulge” (161).   
But in Brown’s usage this truth is a qualified truth, the truth as it appears to us 
from our historical-cultural point of view, and not as it may be in some absolute and 
objective state.  Truth and nature, as Brown goes out of his way to note, are indeed only 
“our own conceptions of truth and nature.”  And he offers no end point of inquiry, no 
eschatology of human understanding, only the notion of truths being inextricable with 
particular times and places: “We naturally conceive our own habits and opinions the 
standard of rectitude; but their rectitude, admitting our claim to be just, will not hinder 
them from giving way to others, and being exploded in their turn” (“Romances” Literary 
Essays 142).  The explanatory and mimetic functionality of fictitious histories, Brown 
takes pains to point out, is not to be judged by timeless, objective standards but is relative 
to the subjective, context-bound nature of changing conceptions of taste, truth, and 
nature.  Elsewhere he argues, “In matters of taste and criticism, as well as of morality and 
history, we have not yet discovered any mode by which the truth of our opinions could be 
demonstrated.”160   
Similarly, Brown’s fictional historian Walstein “was conscious of the uncertainty 
of history”:   
 Actions and motives cannot be truly described.  We can only make  
  approaches to  the truth.  The more attentively we observe mankind, and  
  study ourselves, the greater will this uncertainty appear, and the farther  
  shall we find ourselves from truth. 
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  This uncertainty, however, has some bounds.  Some circumstances of  
  events, and some events, are more capable of evidence than others.  The  
  same may be said of motives.  Our guesses as to the motives of some  
  actions are more probable than the guesses that relate to other actions.   
  Though no one can state the motives from which any action has flowed, he 
  may enumerate motives from which it is quite certain, that the action did  
  not flow. (Literary Essays 33)   
The historian’s (and moral story-teller’s) duty is to the continuous approach to the 
greatest probability.  Thus, “the impossibility of absolute certainty,” the principle Brown 
would find in his reading of Condorcet’s philosophy, is the stimulus to more not less 
attention; a need to always reassess the balance of probabilities.161  He expands upon this 
idea of the probabilistic not apodictic nature of all knowledge in yet another important 
essay.  
In “The Difference between History and Romance” (April 1800), more explicitly 
than in “Walstein’s School,” Brown argues that the common distinction fails to hold up 
to scrutiny.  James Dillon sees Brown using rhetorical sleight of hand to claim for fiction 
what is conventionally identified with history.162  But Brown’s distinctions are perhaps 
best understood as faculties or operations of the mind: thus, one is a historian when 
reacting merely to sensory perception, observing actions directly or through the medium 
of another’s account; and one is a romancer when speculating about causes and 
tendencies, when drawing connections and comparisons.  Brown conceptually links even 
the writings of scientists to those of historians and romancers (his term for fiction writers) 
and all of them to considerations of certainty and probability:  
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Narratives, whether fictitious or true, may relate to the processes of nature, 
or the actions of men. [. . .] The observer or experimentalist, therefore, 
who carefully watches, and faithfully enumerates the appearances which 
occur, may claim the appellation of historian.  He who adorns these 
appearances with cause and effect, and traces resemblances between the 
past, distant, and future, with the present, performs a different part.  He is 
a dealer, not in certainties, but probabilities, and is therefore a romancer. 
(Literary Essays 83)  
He names Buffon, Linnaeus, and Herschel as examples of scientists who are both 
“diligent” recorders (historians) and “adventurous” theorists (romancers).  “Among the 
historians of nature, Haller was, perhaps, the most diligent: among romancers, he that 
came nearest to the truth was Newton” (84).  In his focus on the imaginative speculation 
involved in attributions of cause and of resemblance (as opposed to logical 
demonstration), one is reminded of Hume’s skepticism, which challenges even the 
certainty that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow.  To Brown such an assertion is one of 
probability and not certainty.  And like Hume he argues that causal relations between 
actions even if observed are merely conjectural: “Two contemporary and (so to speak) 
adjacent actions may both be faithfully described, because both may be witnessed; but the 
connection between them, that quality which constitutes one the effect of the other, is 
mere matter of conjecture, and comes within the province, not of history, but romance” 
(84).  He cautions against the habit of the mind to accept as true and self-evident, as 
unquestionably natural and a matter of common sense, those appearances that are 
historically contingent and subject to the perceptions and testimonies of others:  
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  The facts to which we are immediate witnesses, are, indeed, numerous; but 
  time and place merely connect them.  Useful narratives must comprise  
  facts linked together by some other circumstance.  They must, commonly,  
  consist of events, for a knowledge of which the narrator is indebted to the  
  evidence of others.  This evidence, though accompanied with different  
  degrees of probability, can never give birth to certainty.  How wide, then,  
  if romance be the narrative of mere probabilities, is the empire of   
  romance?  This empire is absolute and undivided over the motives and  
  tendencies of human actions.  Over actions themselves, its dominion,  
  though not unlimited, is yet very extensive. (85) 
His remarks on the on-going controversies regarding yellow fever further exhibit his 
skeptical views on the inevitable progress of reason toward absolute certainty: “How is 
the pride of human reason humbled, by observing that in this enlightened age, with so 
vigilant a police, with such comprehensive and exact methods of investigating facts, and 
such diffusing vehicles of information and comparison as newspapers afford, there should 
still be in the community opposite opinions as to the nature and origin of a pestilence 
which has visited our principal cities five times in ten years?” (“Yellow Fever” 7-8). 
“The Proper End of Reading” 
 Elihu Smith, like the British radical democrats, conceived of popular narratives—
of novels (like Godwin’s Caleb Williams), plays (Smith and Brown’s planned but 
unfinished adaptation of Bage’s Hermsprong), opera libretti (Smith’s Edwin and 
Angelina), and narrative or expository poems (like Darwin’s The Botanic Garden for 
which Smith composed a poetic preface describing the rise of print and its use to spread 
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knowledge)—as effective means of communicating to the non-cognoscenti the truth of 
the world as disclosed by the disinterested exercise of observation and reason.163  And 
more than merely passing along information and exhibiting ideas, such works were 
intended to convert hearts and minds to what Smith refers to in a letter to Brown as “our 
philosophy.”  The foundation of this Godwinian philosophy, as Philp observes, is the 
discoverability, communicability, and progressive character of an eternal truth.  Brown 
challenges this foundation on all counts.  In his literary practice, Brown moves beyond 
this model and develops an idea of the importance for moral being of uncertainty.  The 
principle of the impossibility of absolute certainty is not for Brown merely a negative 
critique.  His inconclusive, incongruent, and contradictory narratives suggest the ethical 
lies not in the truth sought, but in the interaction of persons in the immediacy of the 
moment.  The office of the story-telling moralist is less about communicating the truth 
and more about engaging the unknown.  It is an insight likely fostered in the intimacy as 
much if not more than in the intellectualism of the Friendly Club circle.  
 The philosophical outlook culminating for Brown in Godwin’s works and in 
Smith’s counsels locates the source of true knowledge and moral authority within the 
individual’s capacity to reason toward an eternal truth.  It is dependent upon the idea of 
the communicability of truth and of its necessary progress.  The philosophy is succinctly 
summed up in Godwin’s short, sharp propositions: “Sound reasoning and truth, when 
adequately communicated, must always be victorious over error: Sound reasoning and 
truth are capable of being so communicated: Truth is omnipotent: The vices and moral 
weakness of man are not invincible: Man is perfectible, or in other words susceptible of 
perpetual improvement” (Political Justice, second edition, I: 86-87).  In this view, the 
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laws of the material universe, of its constitution and operations, consist in the principle of 
the self-sufficient operation of mechanical necessity.  The mind too is material and 
mechanical.  As Philp explains, in Godwin’s thought, as informed by the writings of 
Joseph Priestly and David Hartley as well as of d’Holbach and Helvetius, “the association 
of ideas is also a matter of necessity, and that, as we gain clear and distinct ideas and 
combine these in propositions, we are moved by those ideas to act” (Philp xvi).  Thus, in 
contrast to Plato, Godwin saw the operation of conflicting points of view as working 
toward greater truth and consensus. 
 Understood as a machine, the world of man, like the world of all nature, proceeds 
in a logical and discoverable manner to a single and uniform truth.  From the principle of 
necessity comes the happy consequence that close observation and judicious reasoning 
render future events predictable and past events deducible from present evidence.  The 
doctrine of material Necessitarianism also opens the possibility of enlightened social 
engineering.  Helvetius saw no constraints on it, since pleasure and pain guide judgment 
and action and our ideas of right and wrong are culturally and historically contingent.  
Godwin held a goal-oriented conception of reason and dialogue and acknowledged that 
popular consensus is not the same as objectivity: “Private judgment and public 
deliberation are not themselves the standard of moral right and wrong; they are only the 
means of discovering right and wrong, and of comparing particular propositions with the 
standard of eternal truth” (Political Justice 94).  In this view, the other rational human 
being, in a way not unlike the Quaker friend, serves as a vehicle of mutual progress 
toward a common goal, the rational truth.  And thus in moving away from the 
religionists’ centering concept of God, the divine Logos, the Godwinian philosophy 
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nevertheless retains a conception of a secularized impersonal logos.  Brown’s Ormond 
and Martinette reflect different manifestations of this view.  Martinette sacrifices friends 
and would willingly sacrifice her own life on the altar of the rights of man about which 
Paine writes so forcefully.  Ormond, with his Godwinian conception of necessity and his 
network of secret coadjutors, schemes to bring about a more perfect society, to socially 
engineer a utopian civilization somewhere in uncharted wilds.  
 What seems to have remained with Brown as he worked through these ideas is 
that Quakers and Godwin, building on his own dissenting background, did move toward a 
greater personal responsibility and ethical responsiveness.  Quakerism conceives of a 
stronger moral bond with the other human being.  More than as merely another soul on a 
journey to the afterlife, the other human being in the Quaker view of things is as a crucial 
aid and a responsibility, as a Friend; because everyone is a receptacle of the divine light 
and potential channel of the eternal truth, the self and the other are mutual aids to one 
another’s spiritual journey.  The intersubjective relation is still, however, part of a 
religious framework and, therefore, is a relation mediated by the mutual prior relation 
with the divine. 
Godwin, Philp argues, sought to “encourage people to think for themselves and to 
take responsibility for their lives, their actions, and their relations with their fellows; that 
is, to think for themselves and ask themselves: What ought I to do?  And, in weighing my 
own claims in comparison to others at such and such a value, am I assessing them justly” 
(xxxiii-xxxiv).  Indeed, Godwin’s claims for first-order impartiality, a strict rational 
disinterestedness that impels one to do everything one can for the greater good, to 
sacrifice one’s personal desires to the needs of the general happiness, places a rather 
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extreme burden on the individual.  Consider Godwin’s famous thought experiment: You 
can only save one of the two people trapped in a house fire, either a lowly maid or 
Fénelon, the celebrated early eighteenth-century French philosopher, before he has 
written his influential Telemachus.  Reason dictates that in order to serve the greater good 
for the greater number, a rational view of morality, you must save Fénelon.  What if the 
maid were your own mother?  Godwin insists that you must still choose Fénelon.  
Sentimentality corrupts moral vision.164 
 Brown sought this ideal of extreme personal responsibility but challenged 
Godwin’s means, that is, his investment in the efficacy of reason, his deference to a 
rational calculation of utility; but moreover Brown challenged the foundation of 
Godwin’s program and did so along the same lines of his critique of Christianity, of the 
evangelical strand of Quakerism adopted by his friend Bringhurst: he challenged the idea 
of the discoverability of an eternal truth.  In the portraits of Theodore Wieland and 
Ormond, he explodes the idea of accessing this space outside the ego, a space from which 
the ego can receive or make assessments of the justice of one’s claims and those of 
others.  Brown’s conception of impartiality is even more radical, suggesting as it does 
that deference to a logos is in fact merely a means of assimilating alterity rather than 
taking direct responsive action.  The logos all too easily becomes merely a projection of 
the ego.   
When his novelistic phase burst from him, Brown, unlike Godwin, did not start 
from a moral system or a preconceived ending.  At least with his early works, Brown’s 
composition “did not proceed in [a] systematic manner,” Dunlap explains.  “He began to 
write a novel after having only determined upon one leading circumstance, character or 
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idea, and trusted to the growth of one incident to another, and the appropriate sentiments 
from the incidents.  One volume would be finished and printed before he had formed any 
plan for the beginning of the second, or any plan for the continuation, development or 
denouement of the story” (Life I.258).  But the critic Warner Berthoff offers some 
compelling insights into this process, pointing to “a potential element of order in this 
episodic method, not that of the well-made plot or of meticulously developed 
characterization, but of thematic repetition, of successive and cumulative analogy.” 
“Brown’s novels,” he argues, “proceed through a chain of incidents which, though 
disconnected, restate and sometimes deepen, each one, the common theme” (47).  And 
perhaps it is this approach of following not literary formula or the outlines of a 
philosophical demonstration but his own associative imaginings for as long as he could 
plausibly affirm their verisimilitude that accounts for the appearance of fragmentariness.  
But we might also consider how this method, the exploration of embodied humans’ 
interactions with circumstances as well as ideas, may function to make a nearer approach 
not to an eternal truth but to the psychological and moral truth of his characters and 
situations.  Whatever they may suggest about the very existence of eternal truth, the 
novels, from their first-person narration to their contested and inconclusive issues of fact 
and of meaning, focus not on the metaphysical but on the realm of human psychology 
and human interactions.  The ethical, then, appears not in referring to this realm outside 
the individual, but in responsiveness to the unknown; it appears not in understanding or 
even in striving to understand or confirm an eternal and universal truth but in an 
unflagging attention to the otherness of the other human being, a recognition of his or her 
always being in a state of becoming.  
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Brown objects to Godwin’s first-order impartiality not on the grounds of it 
imposing too great a demand on the individual.  Instead, in Brown’s novels the disasters 
that arise from the claims of transcendent moral knowledge, claims of an impartial point-
of-view, illustrate the impossibility of attaining this state of omniscience necessary for a 
truly moral impartiality or, at the very least, of ever knowing one has achieved it.  If, as I 
have argued, Brown critiques the evasion of responsibility by means of hiding behind 
contracts, behind “abstract justice and political utility,” then especially in Constantia’s 
response to her killing of Ormond, Brown seems to suggest that the truly ethical lies in 
taking an extreme responsibility beyond the letter of the law, beyond clear conscience 
and beyond any other cessation in one’s benevolent attentions.   
A good story-teller can, in Brown’s view, coax just such ethical vigilance from 
his readers.  By virtue of its detail of actions, an artful narrative captures the attention of 
the reader; through its description of character and motives, narrative inspires 
identification with the characters and “the spirit of salutary emulation.”  As he observed 
in “Walstein’s” and in several literary reviews, the intended promotion of good morals, 
however admirable in itself, cannot hope to be realized if the reader cannot recognize in 
characters a truth of common experience, at least at the broad level of human nature.  
Thus, in his fictional biographies, Brown provides a great deal of psychological detail— 
family background, early formative experiences, education, and worldviews, as expressed 
and acted upon in various contexts,  as well as, occasionally, something like an early 
form of stream-of-consciousness narration—, affording the reader a view of the 
characters at close quarters and extended over time.  From this perspective, the horrific or 
confounding actions the characters take evince less a species of innate perversity than a 
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complicated and twisted drive toward some misguided, misbegotten understanding of the 
good.  On the level of conscious intent, at least, the major characters’ unethical actions 
are driven by sincerely-held ethical convictions.  Regarding her brother and his “lofty 
crimes,” Clara, as a proxy for the reader, cannot help but admire the strength of 
conviction, the dedication to moral duty no matter the personal cost.  Similarly, 
Ormond’s interaction with Constantia, as Krause observes, makes him a strangely 
compelling and attractive figure before (and to some degree despite) his most extreme 
behavior.165  We feel at least a degree of compassion for these men, “men unknown to 
themselves,” to borrow Brown’s subtitle for his lost novel, as they leave the state of 
becoming for a false, fixed transcendent being.  And in Constantia’s compassion for such 
a being even in the face of trauma we see a model of right conduct. 
 But as argued in “Walstein’s School,” this model’s particular actions are of less 
import than her “modes of reasoning and action.”  Of what do these modes of right 
reason and conduct consist?  They seem to consist of the same attributes enacted by the 
benevolent author.  A priority is attention to the details of the character and the 
circumstance.  The knowledge of the emotions and the imagination as well as cognition 
should inform a judgment and action that is not just mechanical imitation of what others 
have thought or done, for Cicero and Pombal would have acted in a way opposite to their 
famous interventions, adopting the strategy of the other had they switched circumstances, 
doing what was best in that particular situation; nor is it the Clarissa-like slavish devotion 
to antecedent rules such as the general rules of filial duty.  Thus informed by our 
imaginations as well as our thoughts, we may form the best notions of the most 
beneficent action toward those within our sphere of influence.  As such the model offered 
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may not always be any one character in the novel, but a way of engaging the other as 
other and not simply as an iteration of an established concept.  Moral understanding and 
being, in a manner analogous to the art of the story-telling moralist as Brown seems to 
conceive of it, emerges from continuous attention to and thoughtful, imaginative 
engagement with others; not through intuition (moral sense), nor the careful preservation 
of innate goodness; not through disciplined study of precepts, the disinterested 
calculation of the greatest good for the greatest number, nor through direct revelation.  
And reading, too, like writing, is an art, Brown asserts.  In “Remarks on Reading”  
he contrasts two kinds of reader, arguing that one will “rise from the perusal of the same 
book [having] only delighted himself with the brilliant colouring, and the mingled 
shadows of a variety of objects, while the other receives the impression not only of their 
colours and shades, but their distinct graces and real forms” (166).  Brown explains, “The 
one will not only have the ideas of the author at command, and strongly imbibe his 
manner, but will have enriched his own mind by a new accession of matter, and find a 
new train of thought awakened and in action” (166, my italics).  The wakefulness and 
activity is here privileged over mere mastery of ideas and imbibing of a writer’s manner.  
In distinguishing the “the proper end of reading,” Brown is not inculcating tenets but 
calling for a thoughtful response, a committed engagement, an acknowledgement of 
objects in their “distinct graces and real forms,” language suggestive of unmediated 
response to the unique not the type. 
And Brown’s concern for ethical reading or conscientious reading as an ethical 
praxis is not the product of mere abstract philosophizing but emerges in the context of 
pressing practical issues.  In the absence of other grounds of common identity, like 
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religion, ethnicity, or common history, the newly independent colonies and young 
republic clung to a shared set of principles codified in constitutive documents—the 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights—and expressed in 
and shaped by commonly shared narratives, historical and fictional.  The relation of the 
individual or small community to the larger, less-tangible union of the several, far-
ranging states necessitated the exchange of symbols, whether rhetorical tropes, stories, or 
images, as a means of creating and sustaining that sense of common identity.  Americans 
identified themselves as such not through symbols alone but also through reading 
practices.  That is, we can think of conscientious American citizenship being enacted in 
the refinement of symbol decoding, in the action of a rational, self-possessed, and 
sensitive mind capable of discerning and embracing public virtue, or put another way, a 
mind susceptible to a contagious republicanism.  Whether that kind of mind is one that 
the individual best discovers and cultivates on his own free from the distortions of 
government, church, or social authorities or is one that must be induced by a judicious 
manipulation of the social environment by enlightened and benevolent minds, a political 
elite of disinterested men, seems to be a major distinguishing line between Jeffersonian 
republicans (agrarians, individualists, democrats) and Federalists (landed gentry, 
business, or professional men, civic humanists, quasi-aristocrats).    
The ethics as conceived here—the response of thoughtful attention, inclusive of 
reason, of feelings, and imagination; beyond preconceived categories—demands, that is, 
it can only be expressed in, a narrative form that complements the ethical relation (one 
between the self and the truly other, that is, the other human being not divested of his or 
her otherness) and enacts the rational self’s relation to the imperfect embodied self.  In 
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other words, the narrative’s form must be such that it prompts readers to become active in 
interpreting and judging, of fully engaging the characters and circumstances as if they 
were really present.  Thus, we might take it that embodied in the Brown novel’s uncouth 
narrative form, a form at once familiar and alienating, is a philosophical and, most 
fundamentally, a moral argument.  That argument is that good being is a function of good 
reading.   
 Consider that Brown’s neo-classical use of the term grotesque—as in “Goldsmith 
and Johnson”: “Johnson’s attempts at pourtraying life and manners, as they existed 
around him, were remarkably unfortunate.  His eastern tales have all the merit compatible 
with plans so wild, grotesque, and unnatural” (Literary Essays 147)—conveys something 
like the opposite of the more modern idea that associates the term with the Real or the IT 
(as discussed in Wolfgang Kayser’s work on the grotesque), an inescapable if ineffable 
ground of reality.  In Brown’s usage of the term, the grotesque is the product of mental 
operations not fully engaging with the reality of lived experience; grotesques are only in 
the mind, as in his phrase “chimeras of the brain” (Wieland 65).  But, as expressed in his 
novels and literary essays, Brown aims for an authentic experience, one that presents the 
mystery of the other mind.  As such, Brown’s pejorative use of the term reveals his desire 
to get to the truth of experience stripped of the efforts to cover over its natural state of 
uncertainty.  We might compare this with Derrida’s use of the term purity to indicate an 
originary state of paradoxical blendedness prior to the imposition of discriminating 
terminology.  That is, the purest state, as Derrida argues, is the original state of 
impurity—or what through our taxonomically-inclined perceptual apparatus appears as 
impurity.  Similarly, Brown’s apparent disgust with “grotesque” conceptions or 
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deceptions (as in Ormond’s “grotesque” metamorphosis) is his response to the 
disregarding or defacing of that experience that should make a claim on our attention and 
our capacity for ethical response. 
The value of narratives, whether fictional or historical, Brown insists, lies in its 
effects in the realm of practical reasoning, in the realm of the ethical; it “lies without 
doubt in their moral tendency,” as he puts it in his self-introductory advertisement for his 
now lost first novel (“Notice” 202).  But Brown’s narratives go beyond inculcating a 
moral system; indeed, they function to challenge the ethics of ethics, to subject ideas to 
reality-grounded counterfactual scenarios, to expose the humanity and justice or lack 
thereof of moral systems.  The interpretative and moral failings of the characters arise not 
as a result of a failure to privilege benevolence, self-control, and reason over the urgings 
of passion and the delusions of imagination, but as a result of the dogged attempt to do 
so.  The approach to life that relies predominantly upon antecedent rules and 
classificatory schemes aims to make one impervious to surprise.  Consider Wieland’s 
inability to accept evidence that the voice he heard was a delusion and Ormond’s 
assertion that his prediction of Clara’s future “knows not the empire of contingency” 
(258).  New circumstances and phenomena are assimilated into the preconceived system 
of thought with a disregard for and even at times hostility toward any particularities that 
resist assimilation.  If the recalcitrant particularities are strong enough, they will appear to 
the consciousness already interpreted and evaluated as prodigies, anomalies, and 
monsters.  Surprise, as C. M. Wieland attests is one element of the effect of the 
grotesque, an often painful emotion that we too readily counteract with reductive 
rationality or rejection.  In contrast to this approach, however, is an openness to the 
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newness of experience in its particularities that defies antecedent judgments.  It is the 
approach that is “susceptible to adventure” and “susceptible of influence” (Nussbaum 
180).  It sees and responds to the grotesque entity as it is in its concreteness, not as, 
abstractly considered, a clash of categories.  It is the approach, informed and curious, 
open and active, that Brown posits as the proper aim of reading, of both literature and 
life, an approach richly and ethically responsive and responsible.   
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Notes 
 
1 Throughout this dissertation all citations to Brown’s novels will refer to The Kent State Bicentennial 
Edition of The Novels and Related Works of Charles Brockden Brown published in six volumes between 
1977 and 1987 under the general editorship of Sydney J. Krause and S. W. Reid.  All citations to Brown’s 
correspondence will refer to The Collected Writings of Charles Brockden Brown: Letters and Early 
Epistolary Writings (2013), the first volume in a projected seven-volume collection under the general 
editorship of Mark L. Kamrath.  My citations of Brown’s magazine pieces will reference, where applicable, 
the only scholarly print collection currently available: Charles Brockden Brown: Literary Essays and 
Reviews (1992) edited by Alfred Weber and Wolfgang Shafer with John Holmes.  Magazine pieces I cite 
that are not included in this collection will reference original publication information; but these pieces, 
along with his letters, can also be found in the scholarly, searchable on-line archive The Charles Brockden 
Brown Electronic Archive and Scholarly Edition, part of the same project that is also producing The 
Collected Writings in print.   
 
2For my discussion of Caritat, his circulating library, his bookselling, and his publishing ventures I have 
drawn from George Gates Raddin’s Hocquet Caritat and the Early New York Literary Scene (1953) and 
The New York of Hocquet Caritat and his Associates 1797-1817 (1953); Dorothy Blakey’s Minerva Press, 
1790-1820 (1939 ); John Davis’ Travels of Four Years and a Half in the United States of America; During 
1798, 1799, 1800, 1801, and 1802 (1803); and Caritat’s own  “explanatory catalogue” The Feast of Reason 
and the Flow of the Soul (1799).    
 
3In an essay arguing for the important influence of the French philosophes on Brown’s work, Wil 
Verhoeven emphasizes Caritat’s role as “a Maecenas of the arts and ambassador for the French 
Enlightenment,” “a sponsor of serious and radical literature, in defiance of the spirit of conservatism that 
had begun to dominate the public sphere in America at the time” (“This Blissful Period” 21, 37 n.55).  But, 
drawing on Raddin’s studies of the bookman, Verhoeven also notes Caritat’s great commercial success and 
his “remarkable” ability to maintain “a prominent position and good relations with the Americans in the 
period 1797 to 1804, when French American relations were very tense, and the French living in America 
were subject to suspicion and discrimination.” “What is even more remarkable,” he adds, “is that all 
through this period, Caritat was on a good footing with prominent figures on both sides of the deepening 
rift in the American political scene, from Thomas Paine and John Fellows on the democratic side, to 
Alexander Hamilton and Rufus King on the Federalist side” (21).  These facts, along with the decidedly 
populist, commercial bent portrayed in John Davis’s account, suggest that Caritat was pragmatic about 
accomplishing his idealistic goals.  But trafficking in trifling amusements and even works of 
counterrevolutionary sentiment were not only a matter of good business and good politics; it was also 
consistent with his dedication to the free exchange of ideas.  As such, Verhoeven’s point still stands: if not 
before then certainly after Caritat opened his doors, Brown had access to and became familiar with the 
work of the French philosophes.  But it may well be added that in Caritat’s enterprise we see can see a 
common cause with Brown’s literary project: the advocacy of dialogue itself. 
 
4 The delightfully “horrid” novels Isabella Thorpe lists for Catherine Morland are Eliza Parson’s Castle of 
Wolfenbach (1793) and Mysterious Warnings (1796), Regina Maria Roche’s Clermont (1798), Lawrence 
Flammenberg’s [pseudonym of Karl Friedrich Kahlert] The Necromancer; or, The Tale of the Black Forest 
(1794), Francis Lathom’s Midnight Bell (1798), Eleanor Sleath’s Orphan of the Rhine (1798), and Carl 
Grosse’s Horrid Mysteries (1796).  It was long thought that Austen simply made up these titles.  Montague 
Summers, however, in 1938 confirmed their independent existence outside Austen’s imagination; see The 
Gothic Quest: A History of the Gothic Novel.  The Minerva Press published all but the Lathom novel.  See 
the lengthy list of the press’s (mostly Gothic) publications in Dorothy Blakey’s Minerva Press, 1790-1820 
(1939).   
 
5 See the footnote to this passage in A. J. Morrison’s 1909 edition of Davis’s Travels for full titles and some 
publication information.  Morrison lists the anonymous Female Frailty; or, The History of Miss Wroughtan 
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(1772) and The Posthumous Daughter (1797).  He notes that a Cavern of Death was published in London 
in 1794 and in Baltimore in 1795; but Davis may in fact be referring to a volume entitled Sight, A Cavern 
of Woe, and Solitude, a collection of poems by Mary Robinson published in London in 1793.  The other 
titles Davis lists refer to Elizabeth Helme’s sentimental novel Louisa; or, The Cottage-on-the-Moor (1787), 
George Walker’s The House of Tynian (1795), Ann Radcliffe’s The Castles of Athlin and Dunbayne 
(1789), Jacques Cazotte’s The Devil in Love (1772), the anonymous More Ghosts (1798), and the early 
penny dreadful by Christian Augustus Volpius Rinaldo Rinaldini, The Robber Captain (1797). 
 
6 In late 1797, he began the manuscript of a novel he called Sky-Walk; or, The Man Unknown to Himself, 
which would later be lost with the death of its would-be publisher.  An advertisement for the forth-coming 
work appeared in the Weekly Magazine (March 1798) and an excerpt soon after.  Elements of Sky-Walk, 
particularly the device of sleep-walking, were repurposed for Edgar Huntly (1799).   
 
7 Paul Allen began what would become the first biography of Brown soon after the author’s death.  Dunlap 
completed the project and published it as The Life of Charles Brockden Brown: together with a selection of 
the rarest of his printed works, from his original letters, and from his manuscripts before unpublished 
(1815).   Other biographical works include William H. Prescott’s entry on Brown in Library of American 
Biography, vol. 1 (1834) and the anonymous introduction to the 1827 edition of the complete novels.  His 
twentieth century biographers include Harry Warfel, David Lee Clark, Steven Watts, and Peter Kafer.  The 
diaries of Brown’s close friends Elihu Smith, William Dunlap, and Thomas Pym Cope are also useful 
sources of information on Brown’s life and opinions.  In addition, vivid descriptions and telling anecdotes 
about Brown appear in the previously mentioned travelogue of John Davis and in the memoir of actor John 
Bernard entitled Retrospections of America, 1797-1811 (1887).  Finally, the definitive, scholarly edition of 
Brown’s letters, the first volume in a series that will comprise all extant non-novelistic works, appeared in 
print in 2013.  The Charles Brockden Brown Electronic Archive is the searchable, on-line collection of 
these works. 
 
8 Of the approximately twenty or so American novels published before September 1798, most are novels of 
sentiment, like William Hill Brown’s The Power of Sympathy (1789), Susannah Rowson’s Charlotte 
Temple (1794), and Hannah Webster Foster’s The Coquette (1797), which are concerned with the trials and 
tribulations of romantic and domestic relations.  (See Lyle Wright’s American Fiction, 1774-1850: A 
Contribution toward a Bibliography, 2nd edition [1969], page 363, for a chronology of American fiction.  
Henri Petter’s The Early American Novel [1971] offers synopses of these works.)  Such concerns are not 
without parallels in the romantic subplots of Brown’s novels, but English novelist Samuel Richardson is the 
likely model for Brown in this area.  Bryan Waterman notes that there is no indication that Brown or his 
circle read Rowson or Foster or any other popular American women writers (“Introduction: Reading Early 
America with Charles Brockden Brown” 238).  Several other American productions before Brown’s are 
picaresque novels, including Modern Chivalry (1792-7) by Hugh Henry Brackenridge, the anonymously 
written The History of Constantius and Pulchera (1796), and The Algerine Captive (1797) by Royall Tyler.  
Like Wieland, these works are self-consciously topical, but unlike Brown’s novel they aim in large measure 
for satire. 
 
9 See Barnard and Shapiro’s extensively annotated edition of Wieland for details on the sources Brown 
references, pages 3, 19, and 198. 
 
10 In the “Preface to the Second Edition,” Walpole explains the work as “an attempt to blend the two kinds 
of romance, the ancient and the modern” (7).  By creating characters that “think, speak and act, as it might 
be supposed mere men and women would do in extraordinary positions,” Walpole allowed readers to 
identify with and live vicariously through the heroes and heroines as they experienced feelings of terror and 
pity (8). 
 
11 Influential works on the Gothic by David Punter, Edith Birkhead, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick have 
informed my discussion here. 
 
12 The term Gothic itself served to conflate the barbarous Goths, a Germanic tribe of the early Middle Ages 
that wreaked havoc on the declining Roman empire, with the scholarly monks of the Late Middle Ages to 
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designate a cruel, superstitious culture mortally and morally opposed to the increasingly revered 
civilizations of classical Greece and Rome and to the biblical Christianity idealized by Protestants.  
Otranto, Udolpho, The Monk, and many other early Gothic narratives are set during the centuries before the 
Renaissance; located for the most part in the Catholic regions of southern Europe, particularly Italy and 
Spain; and peopled with lascivious monks, sadistic abbesses, superstitious Roman Catholic devotees, 
cutthroat banditti, plotting usurpers, and perverse and oppressive parents.  Gothic literature, Baldick argues, 
“usually shows no [ . . . ] respect for the wisdom of the past, and indeed tends to portray former ages as 
prisons of delusion” (xv). 
 
13 Gary Kelly coined the term Jacobin novel.  As he explains in his book The English Jacobin Novel, 1780-
1805 (1976), he derives the term from The Anti-Jacobin; or Weekly Examiner, the periodical of the radical 
democrats’ political opponents.  The major English Jacobin novels include Robert Bage’s Man As He Is 
(1792) and Hermsprong; or, Man As He Is Not (1796), Thomas Holcroft’s Anna St. Ives (1792), Elizabeth 
Inchbald’s A Simple Story (1791) and Nature and Art (1796), and Charlotte Turner Smith’s Emmeline, The 
Orphan of the Castle (1788), Desmond (1792), and The Old Manor House (1793).  At one time Brown and 
his friend Elihu Hubbard Smith planned to write a stage version of Bage’s Hermsprong. See Smith’s diary 
page 244. 
 
14 This group of writers set themselves against what they saw as the tyranny of feudalistic aristocracy with 
its outdated codes held over from the Middle Ages.  Wollstonecraft presented arguments for the essentially 
equality of the sexes and the need for female education.  Godwin advocated the belief in man’s 
perfectibility through the exercise of private judgment informed by rational discourse.  In his view, the free, 
sincere, and intimate exchange of ideas and feelings would lead to the eventual dismantling of government 
institutions like the state, the social hierarchy (peerage), and the church, which he argued claimed an 
illegitimate authority and maintained power through priestly obfuscations, rhetorical manipulations, and the 
inculcation of irrational and barbaric value systems, such as the code of honor most dramatically enacted 
through the still-extant practice of duelling. 
 
15 See M. O. Grenby’s The Anti-Jacobin Novel: British Conservatism and the French Revolution (2001) 
and Bryan Waterman’s Republic of Intellect.  Anti-Jacobin novelists include George Walker, Elizabeth 
Hamilton, Robert Bisset, Henry James Pye, Charles Lloyd, Jane West, and Edward Dubois.  
 
16 See the Barnard and Shapiro edition of Wieland, 321. 
 
17 Between her first meeting with the fascinating stranger Carwin and her first encounter with the 
mysterious voices, Clara spends a stormy day and contemplative evening in reveries about death, which she 
attempts to dispel with music.  Barnard and Shapiro offer detailed information on the ballad that likely 
served as Brown’s model for the ballad Clara lights upon, a work which she attributes to her father (49 and 
309-16). 
 
18 See Elihu Hubbard Smith’s diary for mentions of Schiller’s The Ghost-Seer (serialized from 1786-89) 
and Tschink’s The Victim of Magical Delusion (serialized 1790-93).  Barnard and Shapiro offer excerpts 
from these novels, Wieland 319-25.  Dunlap’s diary, in which he notes Brown’s work on different projects, 
evinces the near-simultaneous composition of the first four novels.  Scholar Ed White argues that aspects of 
Carwin’s character and background may have another source.  He links Carwin to the politically unstable 
backcountry farm communities of Western Pennsylvania (site of the Paxton Riots) in arguing that Brown’s 
novel exposes the tensions among socio-economic strata in a supposedly classless America.  See his article 
“Carwin the Peasant Rebel” in Revising Charles Brockden Brown. 
 
19 Anthony Galluzzo cites the works of Edmund Burke (as well as another major aesthetic theorist of the 
time, Immanuel Kant) as he investigates the “interpenetration” of eighteenth century aesthetics and politics. 
 
20 The paranoiac tracts of Augustin Barruel (Memoirs; Illustrating the History of Jacobism [1797]) and 
John Robison (Proofs of a Conspiracy [1798]) exacerbated fears of French hostilities and inspired 
Americans, like Jedidiah Morse and Timothy Dwight, to take up the call against foreign and home-grown 
subversives, which they linked to Jefferson and his party.  See Barnard and Shapiro’s appendix on the 
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Illuminati debates, which includes historical background and a detailed head-note to their excerpts of 
Dwight’s reactionary pamphlet and of John Ogden’s rebuttal.  In Conspiracy and Romance: Studies in 
Brockden Brown, Cooper, Hawthorne, and Melville (1989), Robert S. Levine provides an informative 
account of the conditions that gave rise to the fear-mongering narratives of subversive conspiracies 
targeting a vulnerable Europe and America, 17-24.  See also Charles C. Bradshaw “The New England 
Illuminati: Conspiracy and Causality in Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland”. 
 
21 Smith and Dunlap were reading Morse and Robison during the same period they were helping Brown by 
reading proofs of Wieland.  See Smith’s and Dunlap’s diaries (454 and 322 respectively).  Carwin’s link to 
Ireland may serve to associate him with recent uprisings there, which alarmists had attributed to Illuminati 
machinations.  Additionally, hints of his being “engaged in schemes, reasonably suspected to be, in the 
highest degree criminal, but such as no human intelligence is able to unravel” may suggest to some his 
participation in an Illuminati-like secret society (Wieland 130).  Brown explicitly develops just such a 
connection in the unfinished prequel to Wieland “Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist.”  Indeed, critics have 
read Wieland as a Federalist nightmare (Tompkins) and as a conservative warning against “aliens and 
infidels” (Samuels).   
 
22 Edwin Fussell (“Wieland: A Literary and Historical Reading”), offering a New Historicist perspective, 
writes, “Fortunate as we are to have so revealing a document as Wieland, it seems the rankest folly to read 
it mainly as a Gothic novel or other divertissement in the annals of literary types” (185).  While Fussell 
expresses contempt for Gothic “divertissement[s],” Goddu, who also reads the novel for its revelations 
about the formation of early American identity, sees the Gothic element as central to Brown’s diagnosis of 
the conflicted contemporary culture.  Beverly Voloshin argues that Brown desired not to “reject the gothic 
form [so much] as to naturalize it” (“Edgar Huntly and the Coherence of the Self” [262]). 
 
23 Shuffleton and Ferguson focus on law; Koenig on education; Cahill and Galluzzo on aesthetics and 
imagination; Hinds and Shapiro (Culture and Commerce) on economics; Kamrath (“Art”) on 
historiography; Faherty on architecture; and Downes, Looby, and Wolfe on democratic processes. 
 
24 A recent overview finds that current Brown criticism generally breaks down into two camps: Brown as 
partisan and Brown as diagnostician.  See Bryan Waterman’s “Reading Early America with Charles 
Brockden Brown,” an introduction to a Brown-centric issue of Early American Literature. 
 
25 The passage is from William Hazlitt’s “William Ellery Channing's Sermons and Tracts,” originally 
published in Edinburgh Review, October 1829, and reprinted in Rosenthal (60). 
 
26 Pattee (xli), Fiedler 155.   
 
27 Several other critical commentaries on Brown’s works use the term grotesque.  Without using the word, 
however, Brown critics commonly express the idea of the grotesque as captured in Ludmila Foster’s 
definition: “We call a literary work ‘grotesque’ when it produces upon us an effect of something distorted, 
absurd, incongruous, or estranged; when something is presented to us not only as different from what it is, 
or from what it might be, but is also presented in a way which does not fit our familiar logical or 
imaginative pattern.” 
 
28 Umberto Eco makes this observation in On Ugliness. 
 
29 Hirst’s piece is called The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living. 
 
30 See the discussion of Russo’s ideas regarding the female grotesque in Edwards and Graulund (14-15). 
 
31 Harpham, Barasch, and Eco each underscore the importance of understanding the grotesque within its 
cultural and historical context. 
 
32 Brown predicts an expansion of the economic and political connections among the different parts of the 
world toward a global community.  He notes the reigning Western ignorance of China, “Corea” [sic], and 
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Japan and the future importance of Western relations with Asia as the world moves toward what we would 
call globalization. 
 
33 In his article “The 1790s: The Effulgence of the Gothic,” Robert Miles writes, “After 1794 a new sense 
of modernity emerged as the inrushing of an unrecoverable chaos.  Hester Piozzi’s contemporary sense of 
this moment is worth attending to: ‘science herself suffered from revolutions; and taste, no longer classical, 
cried out for German plays and novels of a new sort, filled with what the Parisians call . . . 
phantasmagoria’” (54).  Miles also notes, “In Paris [in 1795], the spectral technologist Etienne-Gaspard 
Robertson played the role of the Armenian [in Schiller’s The Ghost-Seer] by staging a show (for which he 
coined the buzz-phrase phantasmagoria) in which the apparitional tricks of the Illuminati were exposed” 
(51). 
 
34 For the following discussion of eighteenth-century science I am drawing from the works of William E. 
Burns Science in the Enlightenment, An Encyclopedia; The Science of Liberty by Timothy Ferris; and The 
Invention of Air by Steven Johnson.  My phrasing in this passage alludes to Cotton Mathers’s Wonders of 
the Invisible World (1693), in which he recounted the court testimony of the torments of innocents imposed 
by the invisible hand of Satan or of his followers.  Mather, although a defender of the admittance of 
spectral evidence in the Salem witchcraft trials, actually championed the idea that philosophy and science 
could coexist with religion.  He was, for example, an early proponent of inoculation as a measure against 
the smallpox. 
 
35 See his essay “Yellow Fever” (Literary Magazine I. 1 [Oct. 1803]: 8-9).  Brown’s discussion of men of 
science rushing to conclusion suggests that science had not fully evolved into the rigorous, intensely self-
scrutinizing method it would later become. 
 
36 In “Empiricism and King’s Evil” Brown addresses the Mesmer controversy, arguing that the “grand 
point” to be considered is that in a number of cases the treatment effected a good outcome, even if it came 
via what we now call the placebo effect.  Here (and implicitly in his fiction), imagination has its benefits, 
he argues; and, in some instances, it would be perverse to insist upon the rule of reason.  See “A Student’s 
Diary [VII]” Literary Magazine 2.8 May (1804): 85. 
 
37 See Bellion 5. 
 
38 James Blondel’s The Strength of the Imagination in Pregnant Women (1727), quoted in Burns’ Science 
in the Enlightenment.  Cahill’s discussion of the force of the imagination genre appears in his monograph 
Liberty of the Imagination. 
 
39 Dashwood was painted by Hogarth, a probable member.  Ben Franklin may have attended a few 
meetings while in London.  See Daniel Mannix’s sensationalist account published in the 1960s. 
 
40 Cagliostro was recommended as a physician to Ben Franklin during his time in Paris.  Casanova recorded 
meeting him.  The Ghost-seer’s Sicilian is based on him. 
 
41 Henry Home, Lord Kames Elements of Criticism originally published in 1762 (excerpted in Robert E. 
Spiller’s The American Literary Revolution, 1783-1837 [1967]). 
 
42 Although we would not put Montaigne in the same category with religionists, his response to monsters, 
as Harpham observes, is one of wonder and humility in the face of “infinite wisdom” (Harpham 104). 
 
43 Although the materialist French philosophes, including Helvetius, d’Holbach, and Condorcet exemplify 
this faith in reason, the British proto-anarchist William Godwin may be the era’s most optimistic of 
reason’s devotees. 
 
44 The term ideology is credited to Antoine DeStutt de Tracy who coined it in a 1796 work Elements 
d’ideology.  
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45 The most salient manifestation of this conflict in the English press was Edmund Burke’s Reflections on 
the Revolution in France and the many responses it provoked, including Thomas Paine’s The Rights of 
Man, Mary Wollstonecraft’s The Rights of Woman, and William Godwin’s Political Justice. 
 
46 See, for example David Lee Clark’s biography of Brown and Ernest Marchand’s article “The Literary 
Opinions of Charles Brockden Brown.” 
 
47 Critics Christopher Looby, Shirley Samuels, and Robert S. Levine are among those who see Brown’s 
novels reflecting conservative views, while Philip Barnard, Stephen Shapiro, and Mark L. Kamrath, for 
example, see them as socially-progressive and even subversive. 
 
48 In his essay “Charles Brockden Brown and the Culture of Contradictions,” Hedges refers to Brown as 
being made “somewhat schizophrenic by pressures on him to conform” to “conventional pieties” and 
argues that Brown’s novels reflect his only intermittently successful attempts to come to terms with his 
confusing times (116). 
 
49 Warner Berthoff, Cathy N. Davidson, and Chad Luck are among those who hold this view.  
 
50 Krzychylkiewicz writes that in the first half of the eighteenth century, with the emergence of neo-
classicism, “The grotesque acquired negative connotations and signified everything that was considered 
deformed, macabre, ugly, unnatural, ridiculous and absurd, unless used strictly as a technical term in 
criticism” (7). 
 
51 Goya’s famous nightmare scene The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters could be the epitome of the 
civic humanist artist’s worldview.   
 
52 In one literary review, Brown writes of “the adaptation of images and allusions of a remote and 
uncultivated age, to the events and characters of the most enlightened and improved.” “The scrupulous,” he 
observes, “might deem such combinations uncouth, grotesque, and, perhaps, debasing.” (“[Review of] The 
Death of George Washington, a Poem. By John Blair Linn” rpt. In Literary Essays and Reviews 85). 
 
53 Some recent scholarly interest has turned to the usefulness of the concept of the grotesque in examining 
American literature of the nineteenth century.  Mary M. Balkun offers a useful overview of this trend that 
includes works by Leonard Cassuto and Gary D. Engle and often centers on constructions of the racial 
other. 
 
54 Smith’s diary contains detailed records of the topics discussed in each meeting.  Extensive portraits of the 
Friendly Club members and accounts of its activities can be found in Waterman’s Republic of Intellect and 
Kaplan’s Men of the Republic of Letters. 
 
55 In “On Rereading Wieland: ‘The Folly of Precipitate Conclusions,’” Cynthia Jordan argues that a 
purposeful lack of a sense of an ending, dramatized, for example, through characters’ failure to locate and 
consult some written document, suggests that Brown counsels a more deliberate, less precipitate approach 
to the unfamiliar. 
 
56 James Dawes, exploring the question of why we read scary stories, argues that Brown’s major fiction 
reveals that the seeming disconnect between emotion (fear) and belief (this is only a fiction, not real) arises 
from a bifurcation in psychical being.  Dawes draws from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience to 
offer a theory of just how the semi-autonomous aspects of consciousness interact in such a way as to allow 
for the pleasurable manipulation of strong non-rational reactions, especially fear.  Brown’s novels, he 
argues, are “among the most brilliant examinations [ . . . ] of what happens when readers read,” revealing 
that without a special exertion of skepticism “we will believe almost anything we tell ourselves” (437, 
462).  Brown, it seems, intuitively grasps the self-defensive and self-gratifying operations at work in 
popular literary forms. 
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57 Michael G. Ditmore suggests that certain aspects of Brown’s writing long considered stylistically flawed, 
including the use of passive voice constructions, may be thought of as a part of the narrator’s rhetorical 
strategy of deflecting her own culpability, whether consciously or not.  See his unpublished paper “The 
Grammar of Gothic Victimhood: Clara’s Passive Vocality in Wieland” presented at the Charles Brockden 
Brown Society’s Seventh Biennial Conference, October 21-23, 2010.   I suggest that the grammatical shift 
in agency may just as likely convey in a disinterested and accurate way the narrator’s experience of a 
dissociation of her actions from her conscious intentions. 
 
Notes for Chapter 2 
 
58 The account appeared in the New-York Weekly Magazine; or Miscellaneous Repository, July 20 and 27, 
1796 and was reprinted in the Philadelphia Minerva, August 20 and 27, 1796.  Alan Axelrod, in his Charles 
Brockden Brown: An American Tale (1983), offers an extensive comparison of the original with Brown’s 
version. 
 
59 Carl van Doren made the case for its correct deduction in his article “Early American Realism” in the 
journal Nation, November 12, 1914.  However, Annie Russell Marble was, according to Ernest Marchand, 
“the first to call attention” to the Yates account and its probable use as a source for Wieland (Introduction 
to Ormond xlix).  The anonymous review, Barnard and Shapiro claim, was likely written by Brown’s close 
friend William Dunlap, who would have known that the account was making the rounds through Brown’s 
circle at the time of the novel’s composition.  Elihu Smith records in his diary that he was reading the 
account in July of 1798, the same period during which he was also correcting proofs of Wieland 
(Introduction to Wieland 455). 
 
60 See David Lee Clark’s biography and Warner Berthoff’s “‘Lessons on Concealment’” for examinations 
of Brown’s critique of superstition.  William M. Manly argues that Brown’s deist influences underlie his 
dramatization of the narrator’s rationalism and scientific objectivity faltering and almost expiring under 
waves of emotionalism and superstition before being restored to a healthy “cause-and-effect sanity” (321).  
In “The Voices of Wieland,” Bernard Rosenthal argues that Brown targets not merely religious excess but 
more particularly revealed religion.  Leigh Eric Schmidt argues that although Brown debunks superstition 
he also portrayed the danger of the rationalists’ elitist dehumanization of religionists. 
 
61 See Jane Tompkins’ seminal Sensational Designs, which offers a reading of Wieland as a sort of 
Federalist political tract.  Christopher Looby argues that Wieland is a conservative, counterrevolutionary 
text, a critique of the inherent instability of reason-based republican subjectivity (Voicing America).  Paul 
Downes’s article “Constitutional Secrets: ‘Memoirs of Carwin’ and the Politics of Concealment” (1997) 
examines Brown’s unfinished sequel to Wieland, a story of the biloquist’s relationship with a member of a 
clandestine political sect, “as a source of insight into the transformation of the political subject in the late-
eighteenth century United States” (91).  
 
62 Cathy N. Davidson argues that “Brown, soon after the inception of the novel in America, wrote 
metafiction, fiction about the making of fictions—the writer’s, the character’s, the reader’s, and the 
nation’s” (Revolution and the Word 355).  Jay Fliegelman argues that “Brown is ultimately offering one of 
the earliest analyses of the workings of ‘ideology’” (xxxvi).  Steve Hamelman calls the author a “self-
reflexive ‘metafictionist’” (“Rhapsodist in the Wilderness” 175).  See also Frank Shuffleton, Emory Elliot, 
Nancy Ruttenburg, and Edward Cahill.   
 
63 In The Culture and Commerce of the Early American Novel: Reading the Atlantic World-System (2008), 
Steven Shapiro links the rise of the early American novel to the emergence of the socio-economically 
distinct mid-Atlantic cities of New York, Baltimore, and particularly Philadelphia where merchants and 
bankers enriched by the re-export trade spurred development of the region’s cultural and ideological 
identity, one not beholden to patrician New England or the aristocratic South.  Using the lens of cultural 
materialism, he finds in Brown’s novels a critical analysis of the world-systems (trans-Atlantic economies) 
that produce local effects (a distinct economy and culture).  Offering “an alternative political framework for 
the emergence of the American novel,” Ed White’s article “Carwin the Peasant Rebel” (2004) presents 
Brown not as the “bourgeois nationalist” but as a “burgeoning historical materialist” interested in the 
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“nexus of class formation, geography, material conditioning, and social structure” (44).  Wieland, White 
argues, explores the development of national identity against the counter-narratives embodied in 
backcountry rebellions and the rural subaltern. 
 
64 Kamrath uses these terms in his helpful review of Brown criticism from the late 1970s through 2000, 
which is included in the essay collection Profils Amércain: Charles Brockden Brown (1999). 
 
65 Robert S. Levine, for example, sees in Wieland a Bakhtinian exploration of multi-voice discourse that 
expresses the author’s counter-subversion anxieties (Conspiracy and Romance [1989]: 27-31).  Nicholas 
Rombes, however, sees the thematic of narrative breakdown as a critique specifically of Federalist authority 
and thus reads Wieland as suggesting the possibility of radical democracy, a new political relation based 
upon “assimilation and plurality” (“All Was Lonely, Darksome and Waste” [1994] 45).  In more recent 
articles, Galluzzo, Gale, and Leeuwen, each examining different particularities of Carwin’s representations, 
take a similar view of Wieland as challenging the underlying patriarchal attitudes of Federalist narratives 
and gesturing toward a space for alternative (more liberal) political systems.  Eric A. Wolfe contrasts his 
reading of Wieland with that of Jane Tompkins and of Christopher Looby, each of whom see the text as a 
Federalist critique of the dangers of populist oratory, of the ventriloquial power of demagogues who can 
speak through the mouths of others.  Wolfe argues, “While the novel reveals the power of the voice in 
fostering illusions of identity, it also suggests the dangers of insisting too stridently on the need for a 
unified identity” (437).   To Wolfe, the novel is a political statement challenging the drive toward unity that 
produced the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts. 
 
66 Halttunen does not directly address Brown’s novel but cites Carwin as an early example of the misshapen 
Gothic villain whose physical deformity betokens moral monstrosity (47).  I am arguing that Carwin and 
Wieland resist the conventional moral structure Halttunen so usefully delineates. 
 
67 Hagenbüchle argues that Brown, challenging the optimistic Lockean epistemology, originated the 
limited-point-of-view technique in American literature and in Clara produced its first unreliable narrator.  
 
68 Clara’s history begins with her family’s noble lineage; her grandfather, disowned by his parents after he 
married a merchant’s daughter, turned to musical and dramatic compositions to make a living, becoming, 
she tells us, “the founder of  the German Theatre” (7).  Another relative was the real-life “modern poet of 
the same name,” whom readers would have understood to be Christoph Martin Wieland, who was thought 
of in the 1790s as the preeminent figure in the German enlightenment.  C. M. Wieland’s Der geprufte 
Abraham (1753) was a verse treatment of the biblical story of the devoted patriarch, a story with obvious 
parallels to the Yates and Wieland affairs.  Multiple British editions in English (many available on this side 
of the Atlantic) were produced through the end of the century.  John Trumbull’s translation The Trial of 
Abraham was published in Connecticut in 1778. 
 
69 Clara is a practitioner of physiognomy, the reading of facial features as signs of personal qualities.  She 
adheres also to eighteenth-century notions of associative sentiment, described by Barnard and Shapiro as 
“the folk-theoretical construct” in which non-verbal cues are read to ascertain the character, thoughts, and 
feelings of others.  After she had confronted him with accusations of his alleged crimes, Clara reflectively 
notes, “Carwin’s eyes glared, and his limbs were petrified at this intelligence.  No words were requisite to 
prove him guiltless of these enormities: at the time, however, I was nearly insensible to these exculpatory 
tokens” (197). 
 
70 See Norman S. Grabo’s examination of the resolute moral uncertainty in The Coincidental Art of Charles 
Brockden Brown (1981), especially 9-10 and 25.  John Cleman, in “Ambiguous Evil: A Study of Villains 
and Heroes in Charles Brockden Brown’s Major Novels” (1975), argues cogently that a pervasive 
ambiguity characterizes (almost) all of Brown’s supposed bad guys—and good guys.   
 
71 In his influential article “‘Saying Makes It So’: Language and Event in Brown’s Wieland” (1978), Mark 
Seltzer examines the novel’s breakdown of causal relations and Clara’s own doubts about whether her 
narrative is serving to disclose causality or instead merely imposing a “chain of connection” upon the series 
of events.  See also Cynthia S. Jordan’s “On Rereading Wieland: ‘The Folly of Precipitate Conclusions’” 
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(1981) for an examination of the ways in which Brown’s novels repeatedly deprive characters and readers 
of a sense of an ending. On the assumption that the novel is intended as a classical tragedy, Nina Baym 
offers an exhaustive analysis of the ways in which Wieland utterly fails as an example of the genre, 
concluding that it is the work of a hack who sacrifices artistry and coherence for mere sensationalism. 
 
72 As such it is quite understandable that not a little of the critical response to Wieland finds the work 
structurally flawed and thematically incoherent.  Especially before the more recent reconsideration and 
reevaluation of Brown’s writings, critics, even those otherwise favorably disposed, felt the need to explain 
or apologize for what was commonly accepted as obvious artistic failings.  Flaws were attributed to the 
extrinsic circumstances of the work’s rushed composition—the printer was calling for more as Brown was 
hurriedly finishing the final chapters—or to the author’s intrinsic factors: carelessness (Fiedler), lack of 
artistic expertise (Pattee), lack of intellectual seriousness (Baym), or intellectual and emotional 
ambivalence (Hedges, Seltzer, Crain). 
 
73 In his Liberty and the Imagination, Edward Cahill explains that the “twin poles of understanding that 
informed the theory of the imagination in the eighteenth century” were 1) “a supreme spiritual faculty” and 
2) a “complex psychological organ” (173). “He [Brown] could see it as a supreme spiritual faculty or a 
complex physiological organ; but most often he saw it as something in between,” Cahill argues (173).  
Brown’s earlier, Rousseauistic writings (“The Rhapsodist”) reflect the former before his readings of French 
materialists like Condorcet and d’Holbach in the early 1790s and his introduction to Strutt, Hartley 
(through Priestley’s abridgement), and Boerhaave (through physician friends Davidson and Smith) (175).  
He adds, “Where Hartley’s association merely links the mind with the body, Boerhaave understands it as 
capable of acting on other bodies as well. Thus, emotions like joy, sadness, and fear are not merely felt or 
expressed but take on an agency of their own, potentially circulating between individuals and across whole 
communities” (176).  Cahill is speaking here of emotions like joy, sadness and fear, not language or ideas.  
I, however, trace the ripple effect of the transformation of ideas and words into material reality across 
social groups not just individuals; thus, one person’s words echo and amplify throughout the group taking 
on monstrous materiality. 
 
74 Indeed, Bernard Rosenthal points out that despite his earlier presentiments of a heavenly punishment, the 
elder Wieland describes the incident solely in terms of an attack from a person (a faint gleam as if from a 
lamp, a pain as if struck from behind by someone wielding a club) and specifically notes that the igniting 
spark fell upon his clothes, which is inconsistent with the more wondrous internal cause considered by 
Clara and perhaps most often assumed by readers.  See “The Voices of Wieland” in Critical Essays on 
Charles Brockden Brown. 
 
75 Compare the inconclusiveness of Brown’s novel to the revelations of the “true” story, the discovery of a 
supernatural or natural explanation, behind the initial misinterpretations and false conjectures in other 
Gothic narratives.  Wieland, generically considered, is neither fantastical Gothic, like Walpole’s story of 
ghosts, nor is it (satisfactorily) explained supernaturalism, like Radcliffe’s works.  In his biography on 
Brown, William Dunlap, the writer’s friend, addresses the relative strangeness (and for some the 
unsatisfying nature) of Wieland’s explanations for appearances:  
A doubt has been suggested of the propriety or policy of resorting to such tremendous agents in 
the conduct of the novel.  It is true that they are in nature, but to the generality of mankind, they 
appear more strange, if not more unnatural, than ghosts or specters.  The instances of self-
combustion or ventriloquism, are so rare, that a work whose events are founded on such materials, 
accords less with popular feelings and credulity, than if supernatural agency had been employed. 
(The Life of Charles Brockden Brown 12-15) 
Moreover, as critics have noted, the strangeness arises not only from the use of these devices, these 
“tremendous agents,” but from the fact that they fail to definitively explain appearances.  Contra Godwin’s 
faith in the mind’s power to ascertain truth, as dramatized in his Gothic Caleb Williams, Wieland provides 
no access to objective truth, only narratives of more or less probability.  Scholar Michael T. Gilmore 
responds to this lack of certainty by asserting, “Many of the ‘facts’ in Brown’s tale are improbable to the 
point of arousing disbelief, and his appeals to evidence often have the air of privates jokes” (“Calvinism 
and Gothicism” 645). 
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76 See Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) 
and Kant’s Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (1764).  Selections from Burke’s 
writings, as well as those by other influential thinkers, including Mark Akenside, Shaftesbury, and Lord 
Kames are collected in The Sublime: A Reader in British Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory (1996) 
edited by Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla. 
 
77 In the influential Elements of Criticism (1762), Henry Home, Lord Kames argues, “A taste in the fine arts 
goes hand in hand with the moral sense, to which indeed it is nearly allied. [ . . . ] Nor ought it to be 
overlooked that the reasonings employed on the fine arts are of the same kind with those which regulate our 
conduct” (Elements of Criticism I:7, 10 and quoted in Shuffleton 92) 
 
78 See Edward Cahill’s Liberty of the Imagination: Aesthetic Theory, Literary Form, and Politics in the 
Early United States (2012) (especially chapter 4) on the Federalists’ use of the aesthetic ideal of the 
sublime to argue for a universal equality of human potential while still maintaining a quasi-aristocratic 
hierarchy based on the meritorious individual refinement of this universal sensibility.  Anthony Galluzzo 
points out that, of course, the safe spot from which one may contemplate awe-inducing phenomena can be 
won and maintained through decidedly interested violence.  Galluzzo reads Carwin’s deceptions as 
exploding the Wieland group’s self-satisfaction, exposing the material advantages underwriting the 
supposedly disinterested enjoyment of the Kantian sublime. 
 
79 Eighteenth-century thinkers, greatly influenced by John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1690), sought to reconcile the mind-body split through investigations of the relation of 
physical sensation and mental processes.  David Hartley, father of the associative psychology alluded to in 
several places in the narrative, held that the body still had a place in the constitution of one’s self.  He 
argues, however, that it is merely the intermediary between the mind and the material world.  Through a 
process of association, sensory transmissions combine to form complex ideas and eventually 
consciousness.  This consciousness then is capable of increasingly complex and subtle refinement and thus 
of being further and further abstracted from simple bodily mechanics.  Through this process, all individuals 
may move toward becoming “partakers of the divine nature” (qtd. in Richard Allen’s entry for Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy).  See Hartley’s influential Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and 
His Expectations (1749). 
 
80 The exchange that occurs with Carwin’s first entrance upon the stage is appropriately open to multiple 
interpretations.  As we later learn, Carwin had already established a meretricious relationship with Judith; 
his request for buttermilk to relieve his thirst, therefore, can plausibly be read as a euphemistic reference to 
breast milk and by extension a request for access to her bosom.  When the girl tells him there is no 
buttermilk in the house, he persists, saying, “Ay, but there is some in the dairy yonder” and adds, “Thou 
knowest as well as I, though Hermes never taught thee, that though every dairy be an house, every house is 
not a dairy,” implying perhaps that the two should go to the barn for a roll in the hay.  When Clara notes 
that the girl seemed to have only a partial understanding of these words, we might infer that she, more 
educated than her young servant girl, understands the salacious insinuation.   
 But Carwin’s rhetorical flourish supports meanings beyond those likely to be intended or inferred 
by any at the scene.  The phrasing, particularly the reference to Hermes, directs the auditor to a body of 
knowledge (classical mythology) to divine the true underlying meaning; however, intentionally or not, it 
also points to and exemplifies the complexity and uncertainty of interpretation.  The Greek god Hermes, he 
of the winged sandals, is the patron of travelers; he is also associated in some myths with both cattle and 
breast milk (noted by Barnard and Shapiro, 46-7, n. 4 and 5).  Carwin’s comment may, therefore, refer to 
the knowledge of travelers (like himself) about where to look for needful things, including sex.  If so, 
Carwin’s reference is doubly apt and evinces a learned mastery of language and a confident, uninhibited 
sexuality.  Or does it?  Carwin’s words, if indeed calculated to seduce, fail him miserably.  Not only does 
he not acquire what he sought from Judith, he also may be unwittingly giving himself away.  Hermes is the 
messenger of the Gods, both between the gods and between the gods and humans; and as such he is an apt 
type for Carwin in his role as supernatural informant.  Hermes is the patron of interpreters, as well.  (He is 
the eponym of the systematic practice or study of interpretation, hermeneutics.)  But Hermes is also a figure 
of the trickster, enjoying as he does the discomfort of the confused receiver of ambiguous messages.  At 
some point, Carwin is associated with all these roles—traveler, thief, interpreter, trickster—although it is 
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unlikely he is intentionally alluding to his secret biloquial adventures.  Thus, unable to control language or 
desire, the initially impressive Carwin subsequently appears as a mere mortal who suffers from his 
hubristic assumption of god-like attributes.   
 However, in his article “‘Though Hermes Never Taught Thee’: The Anti-Patriarchal Tendency of 
Charles Brockden Brown’s Mercurial Outcast Carwin, the Biloquist,” Evert Jan van Leeuwen interprets the 
reference quite differently, claiming Carwin’s remark associates him with Hermes Trismegistus, a 
legendary figure possibly based on an ancient Egyptian prophet, to whom is attributed the writings that are 
the basis of a philosophic-religious tradition associated with alchemy, astrology, and theurgy, that is, 
magic.  Leeuwen argues Carwin should be seen as a “marginalized utopian idealist” whose “oxymoronic 
identity” undermines the vestigial patriarchal ideology of the early republic.  Interestingly, in the Hermetic 
tradition black magic is accomplished by means of controlling a dæmon, a notion alluded to in Wieland in 
the conjectures about the phantom voices (180).  Also, the Hermetic writings tell of Hermes Trismegistus’s 
direct dialogue with God in which the sage is given the secrets of the workings of the physical universe.  
Thus, this reference, too, echoes the divine revelation plot.  (In this discussion of Brown’s novel as 
debunking Enlightenment-era binary thinking, it is interesting to note that Isaac Newton, whose work 
helped sparked the Age of Reason, drew inspiration for his search for the laws of nature from his study of 
the occult Hermetic corpus, a fact that would seem to blur the distinction between ostensible opposites, 
magic and science.) 
 
81 See Rosemarie Garland Thomson on the effect of the extraordinary body on conceptions of selfhood.  
Nancy Ruttenburg references the conservative religionists’ view of virtue as the “integrity of visible 
character and invisible identity” (rpt. in Waterman’s edition of Wieland, 439). 
 
82 For a similar reading see Galluzzo. 
 
83 In her monograph Private Property: Charles Brockden Brown’s Gendered Economics of Virtue, 
Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds argues that the incestuous dynamic in Wieland serves as a socio-economic 
symbol representing the economics and associated virtues of the isolated landed class (101-16).  
 
84 In “The Importance of Point of View in Brockden Brown’s Wieland” (1963), William M. Manly, reading 
the novel as a staunch defense of normalcy, objectivity, and rationality, maintains that the pit in Clara’s 
dream represents the gulf of insanity and argues that certain critics (he references Leslie Fiedler and Larzer 
Ziff) have insisted on reading incestuous desire into the dream “despite a complete lack of objective 
evidence for it within the novel” (318).  Although Manly can be credited with an early recognition of the 
text’s thematic focus on the characters’ perceptions of events, his conviction that incestuous desire has no 
part in the novel is not reflected in subsequent criticism.  Perhaps most baldy, James D. Wilson argues “the 
dream becomes a vehicle for expressing the subconscious, for crystallizing her latent incestuous love for 
Theodore” (“Incest and American Romantic Fiction” 38).  Additional explicit references to the incestuous 
dynamic at Mettingen appear in the critical works of Cowie, Weldon, Lloyd-Smith, Elliot, Fliegelman, 
Christophersen, Hinds, Chapman, and others too numerous to specify. 
 
85 In The Coincidental Art of Charles Brockden Brown (1981), Norman S. Grabo traces the psychodrama of 
Clara’s dilemma, arguing that she is caught between an irrational desire for union with her brother in their 
shared legacy of “obedience, duty, and guilt,” and her undeniable desire for independence, which is 
embodied in the lawlessness of Carwin.  “The choice of either is impossible, and the impossibility is put in 
essentially sexual terms,” he argues (27).  But whereas Grabo suggests that the incestuous impulse to 
identify with her kinsmen is symptomatic of an inherited psychological pathology, I see Brown’s novel 
portraying that inheritance as an ideological pathology shared much more broadly among all the children of 
the Enlightenment. 
 
86 Alan Lloyd-Smith too infers a link between the murder spree and an illicit sexuality: “Wieland’s brutal 
destruction of his wife and children, and projected murder of Clara, suggest clearly enough a pattern of 
repressed incestuous desire, emerging explosively at the point when Clara moves toward independence and 
sexual initiation” (American Gothic Fiction: An Introduction 42).  
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87 Hagenbüchle argues that after the incident at the recess “Pleyel began to assume the possibility that there 
were two Claras: the pure woman on the one side and the profligate creature on the other (a variant of the 
‘light and dark lady’ formula).  His loss of faith in Clara, therefore, is nothing less than the loss of faith in 
the continuity of identity as such” (133). 
 
88 Associative psychology, as propounded and popularized in David Hartley’s Observations on Man, His 
Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749), is founded on the Lockean idea that behaviors arise from 
empirically discoverable sources, stimuli which trigger a chain reaction of vibrations traveling through the 
nervous system to the brain. 
 
89 Note that Brown does not use the spelling Catherine for Wieland’s wife, but the less common Catharine, 
possibly so as to associate her more clearly with the Cathars, another name for the Albigenses referenced in 
the novel’s first chapter.  This dualistic Christian sect was labeled heretical by the Roman Catholic Church 
and made the target of an exterminating campaign in the early thirteenth century.  The conflict was marked 
by atrocities attributed to both sides, thus placing the Wieland story in the context of other bloody and cruel 
deeds committed in the name of God.  Moreover, the Cathars’s belief in the absolute corruption of all 
matter parallels Wieland’s apparent desire to transcend the corrupt material world and achieve a spiritual 
perfection through his sacrifice of all earthly treasures, including that “last and best gift” from God, his 
wife (172).  Both Cathar and Catharine derive from the Greek word meaning perfection; as such the wife’s 
name could serve to underscore Wieland’s rape and murder of her as an ironic destruction of the spiritual 
perfection he sought.   
 
90 In “‘The Awe-creating Presence of the Deity’: Some Religious Sources for Charles Brockden Brown’s 
Wieland” (1997), Marshall N. Surratt examines the Zinzendorf reference, arguing that it serves “four 
purposes—besides being a convenient stand-in for Pennsylvania Quakers, who tended to remove 
themselves from social and political matters.”  In sum, the Moravian wife would underscore by contrast the 
excesses and failures of the even more isolated husband, although she too would pass along a separatist 
disposition.  Also, the source of the father’s religious views, the French Protestants, would tap into fears of 
“the emotional excesses of the French Revolution” (312).  Editors Barnard and Shapiro, reflecting their 
critical interest in the dynamics of socio-economic stratification and subaltern uprisings, point to the 
Zinzendorf reference as the “final link in the chapter’s lengthy set of allusions to insurrectionary Christian 
schisms” (13, n. 20).  My reading of the secondary literature on Brown has uncovered no reference to the 
Moravian’s striking treatment of the sexual and the sacred. 
 
91 Brown includes another Zinzendorf allusion, in addition to the Lusatia ties.  The immediate series of 
events that culminate in Wieland’s massacre begins when Pleyel fails to appear for a planned rehearsal of a 
newly arrived play.  That play, featured at a crucial moment in the narrative, deals with “the exploits of the 
Zisca, the Bohemian hero,” who was a follower of Jan Hus, the founder of the Moravian sect lead over 
three hundred years later by Zinzendorf (78). 
 
92 See Paul Peucker’s “Inspired by Flames of Love”: Homosexuality, Mysticism and Moravian Brothers 
around 1750” (2006). 
 
93 Michael T. Gilmore, in “Calvinism and Gothicism: The Example of Brown’s Wieland” (1977), argues, 
“So extensive, in fact, are the parallels between Wieland and Paradise Lost that it is hard to imagine how 
they have been overlooked” (112).  But his argument is for the novel’s rather direct reiteration of the story 
of the Fall, with Carwin in the role of Satan and Clara as “the novelist’s American Eve” (112).  Gilmore 
finds that the novel’s core concern is with “the mutual failure of Clara and Pleyel to assume responsibility 
for their transgressions” (114), which he examines in terms of a lack of sincerity, “a reluctance of sinful 
man to lay bare his heart” (115).  My argument parallels Gilmore’s in reading the novel as critiquing any 
narrowly legalistic view of responsibility.   
 
94 Alexander Cowie finds echoes of Milton in certain phrases in Wieland and argues Brown aspired to the 
“grandeur and magnitude and the ‘moral sublimity’ which he so admired” in the great English poet (Cowie 
“Historical Essay” in Wieland 316).  Ormond, Brown’s next novel, includes two mentions of Milton. And 
in a passage of Arthur Mervyn, Brown draws directly from Milton’s epic.  When Arthur enters the market-
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house for the first time at night, he describes feeling as if “transported to the hall ‘pendent with many a row 
of starry lamps and blazing crescents fed by naphtha and asphaltos,’” which is an imperfect quotation of 
Book I, 727-30 (Arthur Mervyn 28).  Although it cannot be definitively attributed to Brown, admiration of 
Milton’s work is expressed at length in an anonymous article printed in Brown’s Literary Magazine:  
I have now in my hands an old copy of Milton, which at first belonged to my father.  It is 
an old book, and few volumes have been oftener in my hands.  I would not exchange it for 
an edition of the same work embellished by all the arts of the printer, the engraver, and 
the binder. [ . . . ] Milton is only inferior to the voice of inspiration.  He is first among the 
poets who were not prophets. [ . . . ] I consider the relish for the poetry of Milton as a 
criterion of the taste and mental elevation of the reader. [ . . . ]  I could fill a volume in 
speaking of Milton, so keen is my sensibility to his excellencies, so great is the instruction 
and pleasure which I have received from him.  I have marked many of his passages in my 
almost worn-out copy. [ . . . ] To these I sometimes recur with satisfaction; they are 
mementos of former periods which have been passed in converse with the mighty bard, 
and of some hours of dejection which were lightened by his voice. (Literary   
 Magazine of October, 1803 quoted in Warfel’s biography 225) 
Further, in a review of a 1799 Fourth of July oration, Brown quotes “the sublime and forcible language of 
the poet [Milton]”—specifically, a passage from Book II immediately preceding the introduction of Satan’s 
daughter and describing Hell as the place “Where all life dies, death lives and nature breeds / Perverse, all 
monstrous, all prodigious things, / Abominable, inutterable, and worse / Than fables yet have feigned, or 
fear conceived, / Gorgons, and hydras, and chimeras dire”—to mock the orator’s rather overheated 
conception of the horrors and menaces of revolutionary France (“[Review of] An Oration [. . .] by John 
Lowell” rpt. in Literary Essays and Reviews 30-41).  In another article, “On the Portraits of Death,” Brown 
begins with a quotation from the Satan-Sin-Death passage in Paradise Lost.  The piece itself demonstrates 
that though Brown was a great admirer, he retained his critical stance as a freethinker.  Here he argues that 
the poet’s (and others’) portrayal of death as an imaginary personage shows a thoughtless lack of propriety 
and reasonableness.   Milton attributes to Death characteristics (“black as night,” “fierce as ten furies,” and 
“terrible as hell”) that may impart a certain sublimity, Brown argues, but are nonsensical (rpt. in Literary 
Essays and Reviews 111).  Milton’s name appears twice in Brown’s Ormond. 
 
95 Jean Hagstrum traces the characteristic fusion of sex and sensibility he finds in a wide range of 
eighteenth-century cultural productions to Milton’s seminal work (13).  
 
96  Marcia R. Pointon argues that this is the “most widely illustrated episode” in her Milton and English Art 
(1970), cited in Hagstrum (283, n. 12). 
  
97 Cleman argues that, despite his conscious intentions, Wieland’s sacrifices are “in the final analysis, 
selfish acts”: “Wieland is willing to place his own contact with God above the happiness and safety of his 
sister, wife, and children” (203). 
 
98 Elsewhere Brown uses volcanic imagery in a discussion of chaos and the world’s end.  See “The 
Difference between History and Romance” (Monthly Magazine [April 1800], rpt. in Literary Essays and 
Reviews 83-5). 
 
99 For critical recognition of the circular trajectory of the narrative see articles by Marshall N. Surratt, Ed 
White, and Stephen Shapiro. 
 
Notes for Interlude 
 
100 A scholarly edition of his poems, a volume in The Collected Works of Charles Brockden Brown, is 
currently in the works. 
 
101 See David Lee Clark’s Charles Brockden Brown, Pioneer Voice of America. 
 
102 Smith had previously met Scandella in New York on Jan. 22, 1798, and the two had maintained a 
correspondence. See his Diary (420). 
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103 See Heaton “Yellow Fever in New York City.”  
 
104 See Cowie’s “Historical Essay” in the Kent State Bicentennial Edition of Wieland. 
 
Notes for Chapter 3 
 
105 Christophersen calls her “a paradigm of virtue and common sense” (Apparition 55).  Bannet examines 
Constantia as one of several fictional embodiments of the virtue of constancy in 1790s literature. 
 
106 Gordon S. Wood calls the problem of deception “a source of continuing fascination in the eighteenth-
century Anglo-American culture” (106). 
 
107 Constantia is forced to endure “exposure to rude eyes” (31) and being “exposed, by her situation, to the 
danger of being mistaken by the profligate of either sex, for one of their own class” (32).  In her inquiries 
after Thomas Craig, she encounters a manservant who “put on an air of familiar ridicule, and surveyed her 
in silence” (94). 
 
108 See Bellion’s Citizen Spectator: Art, Illusion, and Visual Perception in Early National America (2011). 
 
109 Other literary works of the eighteenth century were not illusionistic in this way, were not transparent 
deceptions, but were instead accused of being utter frauds, invented to be passed off as authentic artefacts.  
In the most famous example, the Ossian poems, presented as transcriptions of Gaelic works from the third 
century, sparked a raging debate about their authenticity.  Today they are widely believed to have been 
crafted in large part by the ostensible translator Scottish poet James Macpherson. The English teenager 
Thomas Chatterton’s reputed discovery of ancient poems was revealed to be a similar misrepresentation. 
 
110 Russo does not address the detailed histories of Martinette or of Sophia and her mother, and the many 
textual details and thematic concerns that form the core of other readings do not figure in his argument. 
Still, it is hard not to admire the way in which he constructs a plausible counter-narrative connecting and 
explaining otherwise problematic elements.  It must be noted, however, that although there appears to be 
nothing in the text to definitively disprove the version of events as Russo presents them, his alternative 
narrative is based on speculation at several points; and there likewise appears to be nothing to definitively 
prove his version is the true one.  Russo is not alone in taking such an approach.  As he points out, critics 
have similarly found alternative narratives behind the implausible or contradictory accounts offered by 
narrators in both Arthur Mervyn and Edgar Huntly.  We can add Wieland to that number as well, with one 
critic speculating that Carwin committed the murders (David Lyttle “The Case against Carwin” Nineteenth 
Century Fiction 26 (1971): 257-69). 
 
111 See Paul Witherington’s “Charles Brockden Brown: The American Artist and His Masquerade” (1976). 
Witherington argues that Brown, unlike Hawthorne and Poe, could not handle the dilemma of the artist 
who must reveal the truth of the human heart while also preserving its sanctity; torn between romanticism 
and neo-classicism, Brown comes close to validating radical moral positions before retreating into 
conventional morality by way of actual or symbolic suicides of his artist characters.  Robert Levine writes, 
“Paul Witherington brings the villain-as-artist motif to a point of reductio ad absurdum: virtually every 
character in Ormond, in Witherington’s judgment, is an artist” (“Villainy” 138, n. 8). 
 
112 Some see the novel suggesting alternative models, correctives, whether progressive or conservative, to 
reigning social ills.  Shapiro, for example, sees Brown positing a queer collectivities model as a preserving 
measure against the ascendancy of conservative backlash against progressivism (“In a French Position”). 
 
113 “Walstein’s School of History” was originally published in Brown’s Monthly Magazine, and American 
Review I.5 (Aug. 1799): 335-38 and I.6 (Sep. 1799): 407-11. 
 
114 The trope of visuality is there in the era’s name, bestowed upon itself, the Age of the Enlightenment.  
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115 The biographical sketch is actually a gallery of biographical sketches, Julia Stern points out, arguing that 
contemporary art genres, including miniatures, biographical portraits, and historical tableaux, offer the 
models for Brown’s narrative structure (162-3).  Stern focuses on a critique of the failure of fellow feeling, 
specifically of the Founders’ kind of fraternity, as seen in the motif of the failure of vision. 
 
116 See also Mary Chapman (Introduction to Ormond) and Stephen Shapiro (“In a French Position”) for 
recognition of the social-bonding uses of narrative exchange. 
 
117 Ellis writes, “Throughout the novel, for instance, many of the female characters are threatened with 
commodification and presented as objects of exchange, rather than as people to be loved” (13). 
 
118 Describing her reception in the elite circles of Vienna, the uncommonly educated Martinette explains, 
“Superficial observers were either incredulous with regard to my character, or connected a stupid wonder 
with their belief.  My attainments and habits, they did not see to be perfectly consonant with the principles 
of human nature” (201). 
 
119 The “[Review of] Joan of Arc: An Epic Poem by Southey” (Literary Essays and Reviews 27) was 
originally published in the Monthly Magazine (I. 3 [June 1799] 225-29).   
 
120 The “[Review of] An Oration, spoken at Hartford, in Connecticut, on the Anniversary of American 
Independence, &c. By William Brown. Hartford. Hudson and Goodwin. 1799. pp. 23.” was originally 
published in the July 1799 issue of Monthly Magazine 287-90.  See also Brown’s “Historical Characters 
Are False Representations of Nature,” where he argues that prominent persons are often falsely represented 
in history books as self-motivating and not subject to the same passions as mere underlings.  
 
121 Plato explains that in the mimetic mode the poet produces an “assimilation of himself to another, either 
by the use of voice or gesture” (Republic III, qtd. in Ross 24).   In the words of the French narrative theorist 
Gerard Genette, "the narrator takes on the speech of the character, or, if one prefers, the character speaks 
through the voice of the narrator, and the two instances then are merged” (qtd. in Stevenson 32). 
 
122 The crossovers between art and life obtain on a meta-textual level as well.  As with so many works of 
art, there are biographical notes here with characters drawn in part from the author’s circle of friends. 
Stephen Dudley, the novel’s painter, may be based on William Dunlap, Brown’s painter friend.  Elihu 
Hubbard Smith, like Dudley, is the son of an apothecary.  Also, Brown scholars have pointed out that the 
Perth Amboy house is clearly modeled on the country residence of William Dunlap where Brown stayed 
just prior to beginning work on the novel.  Barnard and Shapiro, in fact, argue that Ormond is a roman a 
clef or roman a jeu, providing a game of spot-the-allusion for Brown’s acquaintances (Introduction to 
Ormond xxii). 
 
123 Similarly, Cahill, specifying Brown’s Edgar Huntly, argues that the sudden transitions and 
transformations in Brown’s novels suggest potentialities beyond the characters’ previous conceptions: 
“Edgar’s transitions have traumatized him, but they have also opened his eyes to modes of existence 
beyond his ken” (192).  
 
124 Sophia explains, “Constantia did not form her resolutions in haste, but when once formed, they were 
exempt from fluctuation.  She reflected before she acted, and therefore acted with consistency and vigour” 
(146-7).  See Layson on these features of Constantia’s thought, her reliance on rational autonomy, being a 
target of Brown’s critique.  In Constantia’s rationalistic attitude and her susceptibility to bias in her 
reasoning, the novel “implicitly raises questions about Constantia’s own commitment to reason as the guide 
to ethical conduct” (177). 
 
125 Brown’s “Yellow Fever” is one section of an “Extract from a Student’s Diary (I)” (Literary Magazine I. 
1 [Oct. 1803]). 
 
126 This, of course, rehearses the ruse of the Girondist assassin of Marat, Charlotte Corday, who gained 
access to the Jacobin leader by claiming a false identity as a sympathizer with his cause.  She stabbed him 
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to death as he lay in the tub.  She was caught, sentenced, and executed days later.  Moreover, Martinette’s 
plan reiterates the narrative’s trope of role-playing and deceit.  Most important however is the fact that, 
although viscerally repulsed by Martinette’s declaration that she would both commit both murder and 
suicide in the name of defending liberty, Constantia will soon find herself contemplating the same actions 
in the name of defending her female honor.  That she does so dramatizes the fact that her earlier emotional 
rejection of Martinette as a consequence of these revelations can be understood not as a moral 
incompatibility but as a clash between one reading of her interlocutor’s features and deportment and 
another emergent reading.  In the immediate response to Martinette’s disclosure, Constantia evinces this 
dynamic of an evolving understanding of this person in the language of a “reflected” image that changes 
and of “likeness” once imagined now gone. Constantia’s surprised reaction reveals that her conception of 
female sensibility is a projection out onto the world of human actions of a fixed discriminatory grid of 
gendered virtue.  Her seeing or not seeing a likeness between herself and another (as with 
Martinette/Ursula, Hellen, Ormond, and Sophia) is less about the nature of one’s relation to another and 
more about her conceptions (or readings) of the Not Me.  Resemblances in the novel tend to point to the 
way in which her (or other observers’) preconceptions or established field of reference pre-determine 
perceptions.  Like everyone else, Constantia habitually contemplates the images in her mind, taking them to 
be the true reflection of a thing out there; but when the image conflicts with new experience, she finds it 
difficult to change her perceptions and her behaviors.  Her almost immediate show of continued and even 
increased interest, however, suggests that she, unlike so many others, values the opportunity to move 
beyond this habitual operation of mind. 
 
127 “Objections to Richardson’s Clarissa” originally appeared in the Monthly Magazine (III.5: 321-23). 
 
128 Bill Christophersen argues that Constantia is imprisoned in her sterile virtue, another of many paradoxes 
of the novel.   
 
Notes for Chapter 4 
 
129 Readings by Kreyling and Scheick, for example, explore the ways in which Brown’s novels exhibit 
something like a deconstructionist conception of the constructed-ness of truth.  Hedges observes that Arthur 
Mervyn has no moral code by which to solve his dilemmas, knowing only that “the problem of morality 
cannot be completely separated from the problem of knowledge” (307). 
 
130 See articles by Hamelman and by Morris. 
 
131 See Richard P. Moses’ “Quakerism in Charles Brockden Brown.” 
 
132 See Warfel, Clark, and Kafer. 
 
133 Address to the Congress of the United States vi, January 1809.  This and Brown’s three other political 
pamphlets can be found on-line at The Charles Brockden Brown Electronic Archive. 
 
134 The term Quaker reputedly derives from the defiant retort of early Quaker George Fox who told the 
magistrates presiding over his trial for blasphemy that they should “tremble at the word of the Lord.” 
 
135  Ernest Marchand observes that as a true Quaker son Brown eschewed polemics: “Controversial writing 
he distrusted, believing that preoccupation with one side of an abstract subject breeds intolerance, and 
suspicion of the knowledge and intentions of our opponents.  ‘Instead of concentering all our energies in 
argument . . . we are likely to deal too much in sarcasm and invective’” (Marchand “Literary Opinions of 
CBB” 546).  The quote is from Brown’s “[Review of] Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential Diseases 
by Noah Webster” (Monthly Magazine, II [Feb. 1800] 115).  See also Brown’s “Disputation” in Literary 
Magazine 1.2 (Nov. 1803): 85. 
 
136 Richmond P. Miller in Leo Rosten’s Religions of America (218). 
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137 See also Peter Kafer’s biography of Brown for a comparison of Quaker and Godwinian thought (69-72).  
Kafer underscores the specifically political significance of the Quaker and Godwinian influence on 
Brown’s character, on his rejection of party loyalty in favor of a duty to maintain allegiance to one’s own 
judgment and to give respectful and intellectually honest hearing to all persons regardless of supposed 
distinctions: “In all, then Godwin’s Political Justice offers a rigorous critique of the central principles of 
Lockean liberalism and the Whiggism of the American Revolution, and this critique was in profound 
accord with the historical experiences, and cultural values, of Pennsylvania’s Quakers” (71). 
 
138 “Origins of Quakerism” Literary Magazine III. 18 (March 1805): 194-5. 
 
139 See Philp’s “Introduction” to his 2013 edition of Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its 
Influence on General Virtue and Happiness (xiii). 
 
140 Philp’s “Introduction” to Godwin’s Political Justice (xvii). 
 
141 See Political Justice (II.v. 67-72). 
 
142 In an oft-cited passage, Godwin writes, “Truth is in reality single and uniform.  There must in the nature 
of things be one best form of government, which all intellects, sufficiently roused from the slumber of 
savage ignorance, will be irresistibly incited to approve. [ . . . ] Truth cannot be so variable, as to change its 
nature by crossing an arm of the sea, a petty brook or an ideal line, and become falsehood.  On the contrary 
it is at all times and in all places the same” (IIIvii 102-103). 
 
143 Mark Philp observes that Godwin “was not a partisan or a polemicist: he sought dispassionately to 
assess the value of propositions and general ideas and claims” (Philp xix).  
 
144 See Political Justice (VIII. vii. 453-458). 
 
145 See Kafer for the dates of the New York publication of Political Justice extracts. 
 
146 See Collected Writings of Charles Brockden Brown, vol. 1 Letters and Early Epistolary Writings 
(Letters) (420, note 9). 
 
147 His phrasing here (“unfriendly”) may or may not be a knock against the Friends or a nod to the Friendly 
Club or even a subtle suggestion that Bringhurst’s position is not in the true spirit of Quakerism.   
 
148 Some of these, it may be noted, were or were to become positions taken or considered by professed 
Quakers, too.  See Leo Rosten’s Religion in America (213-43). 
 
149 See also a reiteration of the argument concerning the pernicious tendency of a belief in the rewards and 
punishments of an afterlife in Brown’s letter to Bringhurst July 10, 1796 (Letters 355-359). 
 
150 In a follow-up letter dated October 30, Brown clarifies that he was referring to “Godwin’s Enquiry” 
(Letters 314). 
 
151 See his letter to Joseph Bringhurst, Jr. May 11, 1796 (Letters 346-7).  
 
152 Brown’s early “Reflections on Moralists and Moral Writing,” published in March 1799, lists sincerity as 
the first of his criteria for a good writer.  See, however, Berthoff’s reading of Brown’s ambivalence even on 
this topic as expressed in the short story “Lesson on Concealment.”  The unfinished piece referred to as the 
Adini fragment also touches upon practical considerations of allowing some erroneous beliefs to go 
uncorrected. 
 
153 In fact, as Catherine O’Donnell Kaplan explains, Smith committed to paper a detailed outline for a 
Utopia (he even called it such) that put into practice rationalist principles for “creating citizens sound of 
mind, body, and morals.”  Kaplan, who reproduced the unpublished work in a 2000 article, argues that “as 
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he wrote the utopia, he imagined it might serve as a blueprint for reforming the United States as a whole” 
(99).   
 
154 See the “Introduction” to Literary Essays (xv).   
 
155 See his advertisement for Sky-Walk (“Notice of a New Work”) in Watter’s Weekly Magazine (I.7 March 
1798) and the prefatory “advertisement” for Wieland (3). The editors of Charles Brockden Brown: Literary 
Essays and Reviews assert that Brown was “more than a quarter of a century before Edgar Allan Poe, the 
first notable literary critic in the United States” (xi).  Barnard and Shapiro make the claim that Brown’s 
essay “Walstein’s School of History” (1799) “arguably establishes Brown as the first modern U.S. literary 
critic, in the sense of one who explores how texts construct meaning and function in society rather than 
simply asserting the relative merits of literary productions judged against an imaginary standard of 
excellence” (Ormond 223). 
 
156 See Marchand’s article “Charles Brockden Brown’s Literary Theory.” 
 
157 Some more recent criticism, including that by James Dillon, Mark Kamrath, Edward Cahill, and Philip 
Barnard and Stephen Shapiro, finds a more nuanced attitude toward the imagination, a recognition by 
Brown of both its creative and destructive potential.   
 
158 As Edward Cahill points out, “Lord Kames held that the ‘ideal presence of’ a compellingly written 
narrative engages the sympathy and passions as powerfully as the ‘real presence’ of objective experience.  
Indeed, because their power to affect our sympathy ‘depends on the vivacity of ideas they raise,’ Kames 
admits, ‘fable is generally more successful than history.’”  See Liberty of the Imagination 170.  In her 
article “The Early American Novel: Charles Brockden Brown’s Fictitious Historiography,” Amanda 
Emerson quotes similar sentiments from Hugh Blair’s lecture “On History Writing.” 
 
159 Editors Barnard and Shapiro include the article in their editions of each of Brown’s four major novels 
Wieland, Ormond, Arthur Mervyn, and Edgar Huntly.  James Dillon’s discussion of Charles Brockden 
Brown’s literary theory focuses heavily on “Walstein’s” as well as on two other commonly cited pieces 
“The Difference between History and Romance” and “Historical Characters Are False Representations of 
Nature,” which I discuss further on.  Steven Watts calls “Walstein’s” Brown’s “most coherent expression” 
of his “intent and focus as a novelist” (The Romance of Real Life 75). 
 
160 The line is from Brown’s response appended to “Mr.[Noah] Webster’s Letter to the Editor, on the 
review of his History of Pestilence” (Literary Magazine III. 5 November 1800: 339-340). 
 
161 See Verhoeven’s “This Blissful Period” for a discussion of Condorcet’s thought and its influence or at 
least reflection in Brown’s thought. 
 
162 See Dillon’s “Highest Province of Benevolence.” 
 
163 Smith composed a prefatory poem for his first American edition of Erasmus Darwin’s scientific poem 
The Botanic Garden (1798), recounting the history of writing up through the invention of the printing press 
and moveable type and offering a utopic vision of the ensuing brotherhood of “knowledge and of right.”  
The following two passages convey Smith’s faith in the future hegemony of right reason: 
 Hence, wide diffused, increasing knowledge flies, 
 And error’s shades forsake the jaundiced eyes; 
 Man knows himself for man, and sees, elate, 
 The kinder promise of his future fate; 
 Nations, ashamed, their ancient hate forego, 
 And find a brother, where they found a foe.  
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
 Thus shall the years proceed, --till growing time 
 Unfold the treasure of each differing clime; 
 Till one vast brotherhood mankind unite  
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 In equal bands of knowledge and of right: 
 Then, the proud column, to the smiling skies, 
 In simple majesty sublime shall rise, 
 O’er Ignorance foil’d, their triumph loud proclaim, 
 And bear inscribed, immortal, Darwin’s name.  
 (“Epistle to the Author of the Botanic Garden”) 
 
164 See this passage in Political Justice II. ii 53-54. 
 
165 See Krause’s “Ormond: Seduction in a New Key.” 
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